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Introduction
Industrial organization focuses on imperfectly competitive markets to understand the
behavior of ﬁrms and the resulting welfare eﬀects. This is a broad deﬁnition as most
markets are imperfectly competitive and industrial organization research can then focus
on a wide variety of topics. Imperfect competition may be due to many reason. Perfect
competition in fact requires: a large number of ﬁrms and consumers, free entry and exit,
marketability of all goods and service including risk, symmetric information with zero
search cost. Moreover the list includes no increasing returns, no externalities, and no
collusion. Health care markets are a good example for imperfect competition as generally
they violate all requirements included in the previous list.
If we focus only on some violation like asymmetric information and no marketability,
then health care markets fail in a more clear way than other markets. This justiﬁes
the often made claim that the health care market is diﬀerent and implies that any
evaluation of its performance must be based on models that explicitly take into account
its deviations from the assumption required for perfect competition. The model of perfect
competition can still serve as the benchmark of optimal performance, but generally it
cannot be used to analyze how health care markets work.
For this reason the common thread of this thesis is to analyze health care markets
using the theoretical and empirical tools provided by industrial organization. This thesis
is composed by three essays.
In the ﬁrst one I am going to propose a theoretical framework to analyze product
diﬀerentiation withconsumers misperception and information disparities. The model is
an extension of standard vertical product diﬀerentiation (Gabsewictz and Thisse, 1979
and Shaked and Sutton, 1982), where I relax the assumption of perfect information. As
I said before asymmetric information is one of the big problem to deal with in health
economics. And if products are credence goods, as in case of drugs, many consumers may
lack the expertise to ascertain the quality diﬀerential with respect to cheaper standard
brands, even after purchase. In that case consumers face a risky decision and to the extent
they lack information about the true quality diﬀerential they may carry out purchase
decision according to misperceptions about product quality.
In this paper I extend the analysis of Cavaliere (2005) to include the quality choice
by ﬁrms, when providing higher quality requires a costly eﬀort, and propose to analyse
the case of a duopoly with vertically diﬀerentiated products with consumers' mispercep-
tions and information disparities. Consumers are actually split between uninformed and
informed consumers. Uninformed consumers are characterized by consumers' mispercep-
tions as they can underestimate or overestimate the quality diﬀerential.
As a minimum quality standard is imposed by the Government even uninformed con-
sumers expect that any product sold in the market at least complies with the standard.
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As low quality can be said to be veriﬁable, even uninformed consumers can be conﬁ-
dent about low quality products: ﬁrms are expected to provide at least the minimum
quality standard. This last assumption well ﬁts the case of pharmaceutical products.
Actually every developed country has a national institution that enforces and veriﬁes
drug's minimum quality standard. The aim of this paper is to shed light on how ﬁrm
set price and quality when consumers are characterized by asymmetric information and
mispercemption obout quality.
We do not analyze information decisions by consumers, which are exogenously given,
therefore ﬁrms follow a Stackelber behavior vis à vis consumers. However we can analyze
quality and price competition between ﬁrms for the full range of information disparities,
i.e. for any split between informed and uninformed consumers that can aﬀect demand
functions. Furthermore we distinguish between the case of optimistic misperceptions
(uninformed consumers overestimate the quality diﬀerential) and the case of pessimistic
consumers (uninformed consumers underestimate the quality diﬀerential). Competition
between ﬁrms is represented by a two stage game, in the ﬁrst stage the two ﬁrms compete
in qualities, given the market split between informed and uninformed consumers. In the
second stage price competition takes place.
We will show that both price and quality are strictly depend on asymmetric information
as expectation and number of informed consumer aﬀect ﬁrm's choice. For diﬀerent quality
expectations and share of informed consumer we found market failure. In some cases
uninformed consumers are cheated by high quality ﬁrm when they purchase high quality
product, in other cases, for diﬀerent information level and expectations, adverse selection
arises endogenously in the model.
The second paper consists in a theoretical model where I analyse incentives for co-
operative behaviour when heterogeneous health care providers are faced with regulated
prices under yardstick competition. Providers are heterogeneous in the degree to which
their interests match to those of the regulator.
The basic idea behind yardstick competition is that the price (or price cap) faced by
each provider is dependent on the actions of all the other providers (Schleifer, 1985;
Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993). According to Schleifer's rule, the price each provider faces is
based on the costs of all other providers in the industry but not its own. This creates
strong incentives for cost control.
When there is a large number of providers, this is unlikely to be a problem, mainly
because the cost of collusion rises, but even in larger countries, provision might be con-
centrated among a handful of providers, as is likely for utilities, rail or postal services
and for specialist health services, such as bone marrow or lung transplantation.
The innovation with respect to the standard model of yardstick competition is the
introduction of heterogeneity in the degree to which the provider's interests correspond
to those of the regulator. Because the incentive to collude with other providers will
depend on the objectives of the providers, particularly the extent to which their objectives
correspond with those of the price-setting regulator. We use altruism to describe the
behavior of providers whose aims are closely related to those of the regulator and self-
interested to describe providers whose interests are more divergent from those of the
regulator.
6
If we consider the diﬀerent ownership types in health services this heterogeneity in
altruism is evident since we observe full public ownership i.e. altruistic providers and
full private hospital i.e. self-interested providers.
This paper aims then to analyse incentives for collusive behaviour when heterogeneous
providers are faced with regulated prices under yardstick competition. We analyse the
choice of cost when providers do not collude and when they do, and we consider incentives
to defect from the collusion agreement
Our results suggest that under the yardstick competition each provider's choice of
cooperative cost is decreasing in the degree of the other provider's altruism, so a self-
interested provider will operate at a lower cost than an altruistic provider. The prospect
of defection serves to moderate the chosen level of operating cost. More general results
show that collusion is more stable in homogeneous than in heterogeneous markets.
The third paper is an empirical analysis where I test the hypotheses of physicians' al-
truism and ex-post moral hazard using a large national panel dataset of drug prescription
records from Finland. We estimate the probability that doctors prescribe generic versus
branded versions of statins for their patients as a function of the shares of the diﬀerence
in prices between what patients have to pay out of their pocket and what are covered by
insurance.
The role of physicians and insurance in health care markets has been of interest to
economists since the seminal contribution of Arrow (1963). Pioneering the economic
analysis of physician behavior in the context of health care, Arrow (1963) noticed that
doctors may have motives and objectives that diﬀerentiate them from purely proﬁt-
maximizing agents. The original `ex-post moral hazard' hypothesis, predicts that health
insurance increases the consumption of health care and leads to excessive consumption of
services even in a competitive health care market. Ex-post moral hazard has since then
been the focus of various empirical and theoretical studies in health economics (see e.g.
Feldstein, 1973; Leibowitz, Manning, and Newhouse, 1985; Manning, Newhouse, Duan,
Keeler, Leibowitz, and Marquis, 1987; Dranove, 1989; Zweifel and Manning, 2000).
We simultaneously test both altruism and ex-post moral hazard in drug prescription
behavior using a large national panel of administrative data from Finland. We ﬁrst
develop a theoretical model on physician decision-making, which, in line with Heller-
stein (1998) and Lundin (2000), then use a large national panel dataset with all statin
prescriptions in Finland between 2003 and 2010 (n=17 858 829 prescriptions) to test
the physicians' altruism and ex-post moral hazard hypotheses, while controlling for a
large range of physicians, patients, and drug characteristics. Taking advantage of the
panel structure of our national administrative dataset, we directly observe the repeated
prescriptions of statins by physicians over time.
We ﬁnd that although the estimated coeﬃcients associated with ex-post moral hazard
and altruism are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, their size is very close
to zero and the orders of magnitude is smaller than the eﬀects associated with other
key explanatory factors. We also ﬁnd robust and strong evidence of prescription habit-
dependency.
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1 Vertical diﬀerentiation with consumers
misperceptions and information
disparities.
1.1 Introduction1
In markets where products are vertically diﬀerentiated, consumers may be uncertain
about the quality diﬀerential provided by high quality ﬁrms and then consider if this
diﬀerential is worth the price premium they should pay for products that claim to be
ranked as high quality brands. If products are experience goods, ex-post consumption
and repeat purchases may provide more precise information to consumers, and ﬁrms can
establish a reputation for high quality, as shown for example by Shapiro (1982,1983). If
products are credence goods, as in case of drugs, chemicals or products sold as green
goods, many consumers may lack the expertise to ascertain the quality diﬀerential with
respect to cheaper standard brands, even after purchase2.
Actually for products classiﬁed as credence goods, consumers may even not know what
is the minimum and the maximum quality that a ﬁrm can provide. Accordingly it may
be diﬃcult for consumers even to assign a probability distribution to the quality choice
of the ﬁrm. Therefore consumers may carry out purchase decisions according to their
perceptions about product quality. In this last case consumers may either overestimate or
underestimate the quality diﬀerential provided by the seller. For example brand loyalty
may imply that consumers are overestimating the quality provided by one brand and
turn out to be optimistic about the quality diﬀerential actually provided by ﬁrms. In
this last case ﬁrms may proﬁt from imperfect information by charging excessive prices to
consumers. But it may also occur that ﬁrms claiming to sell higher quality brands face
skeptical consumers, which turn out to be pessimistic with respect to the quality choice,
thinking that the claimed quality diﬀerential cannot be provided by a proﬁt maximizing
ﬁrms. In both cases competition between vertically diﬀerentiated brands will be aﬀected
by asymmetric information and consumers misperceptions3.
1Joint work with Alberto Cavaliere, Department of Economics and Management, University of Pavia
2Though minimum quality standard exists in this case in order to guarantee a minimum level of safety
and reliability to consumers, still some brands may claim they oﬀer a better deal to consumers.
3Competition aﬀected by consumers misperception has been seldom analyzed in the economic litera-
ture. Spence (1977) in his pioneering work considers a competitive market where ﬁrms may fail to
provide the adequate level of product safety due to imperfect information about the probability of
product failure and proucer liability may be designed accordingly. Liability rules when consumers'
misperceptions coexist with market power are analyzed by Polinsky and Rogerson (1982). More re-
cently Iossa and Palumbo (2010) consider consumers that underestimate the risk of product failures
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For example in the market for drugs competition betwen generics and branded phar-
maceuticals is aﬀected by brand loyalty, as optimistic consumers continue to buy branded
drugs being optimistic about their quality, though it is likely to be equivalent to the qual-
ity of generic drugs introduced later in the market. On the contrary in the market for
green products ﬁrms may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to persuade pessimisitc consumers that are skep-
tical about the feasibility and propability of selling products with a low environmental
impact. As far as the quality choice implies an hidden action for ﬁrms, asymmetric infor-
mation may imply moral hazard. However if no random shock aﬀects quality and given
that quality is chosen by ﬁrms before purchase, adverse selection is likely to arise. In any
case adverse incentives may aﬀect both price competition and product diﬀerentiation.
However even in markets where the choice of most consumers is aﬀected by uncertainty
about quality, some consumers may be well informed about real quality diﬀerentials. Bet-
ter information may derive either by consumer expertise, costly information gathering
activities or better education, leading some consumers to process complex information
about quality better than others. For example in the case of drugs ﬁrms face both health
institutions and educated consumers making informed decisions and uninformed patients
aﬀected by misperceptions and brand loyalty. In the case of green products, informed con-
sumers may be able able to distinguish a real environmental commitment from strategic
greenwashing, disposing of precise consumer reports provided by associations like Greep-
eace. Informed consumers may then exert a positive externality on uninformed one and
aﬀect the incentive of ﬁrms to provide high quality products, as originally shown by Chan
and Leland (1982), Cooper and Ross (1984) and Wolinsky (1983), in the framework of
perfect competiton and monopolistic competition, or Judd and Riordan (1994) analyzing
the case of a new product monopolist. Information disparities between consumers in a
model of vertical product diﬀerentiation where ﬁrstly introduced by Cavaliere (2005),
just considering the price competition stage and then neglecting both the quality choice
and the cost of quality provision.
In this paper we extend the analysis of Cavaliere (2005) to include the quality choice
by ﬁrms, when providing higher quality requires a costlier eﬀort. We then analyse the
case of a duopoly with vertically diﬀerentiated products, asymmetric information about
quality, consumers' misperceptions and information disparities. Consumers are split
between uninformed and informed consumers. Uninformed consumers are characterized
by consumers' misperceptions as they can underestimate or overestimate the quality
diﬀerential. As a minimum quality standard (MQS) is imposed by the Government, even
uninformed consumers expect that any product sold in the market at least complies with
the standard. As the MQS can be said to be veriﬁable, even uninformed consumers can
be conﬁdent about low quality products: both ﬁrms are expected to provide at least the
MQS ( we show that such an expectation is fullﬁlled in equilibrium). The ﬁrm providing
and show that joint responsibility for breach of contract reduces the incentives of the supplier to
mispresent product quality. Consumers mispercetions about product quality have been considered in
an oligopolistic setting by Garella and Petrakis(2008) in order to justify minimum quality standard
as a solution to market failures due to asymmetric information. Microeconomic foundations for the
theory of choice aﬀected by consumers misperceptions have been extensively analyzed by Bordalo
Gennaioli and Shleifer (2012) and Gennaioli Shleifer (2009) .
9
high quality goods claims overcompliance with respect to the MQS and charges higher
prices accordingly. But overcompliance is neither obervable by uninformed consumers,
nor veriﬁable. Consumers do not even know what is the extent of the quality choice
feasible for the ﬁrm. Informed consumers are on the contrary also informed about the
quality diﬀerential as, beyond the minimum quality standard, they also know the quality
provided by the high quality ﬁrm.
We also assume that information about quality derives either by higher education or a
costly activity, or both. To the extent that both higher education and the willingness to
pay for information gathering activities are correlated with income, one particular feature
of our model is that uninformed and informed consumers are not randomly distributed
in the population of consumers but correlated with the distribution of the willingness to
pay for quality4. Therefore, by assumption, the higher the willingness to pay for quality
the higher the likelyhood that a consumer is informed (such an assumption implies that
if a consumer i, with a willingness to pay for quality θi is informed any consumer j with
a willingness to pay θj > θi will be informed as well)
We do not analyze information decisions by consumers, thar are exogenously given.
Therefore ﬁrms follow a Stackelberg behavior vis à vis consumers. However we can
analyze quality and price competition between ﬁrms for the full range of information
disparties, i.e. for any split between informed and uninformed consumers that can af-
fect demand functions. Furthermore we distinguish between the case of optimistic mis-
perceptions (uninformed consumers overestimate the quality diﬀerential) and the case
of pessimistic consumers (uninformed consumers underestimate the quality diﬀerential)
and will show that such a distinction is built in into the model. Therefore uninformed
consumers hold the same misperception, i.e. uninformed consumers may be either opti-
mistic or pessimisitic. Competion between ﬁrms is represented by a two stage game, in
the ﬁrst stage the two ﬁrms compete in qualities, given the market split between informed
and uninformed consumers which aﬀects demand functions. In the second stage price
competition takes place.
To the best of our knowledge our model is the ﬁrst one to analyze the case of pure ver-
tical diﬀerentiation with imperfect information, information disparities, and endogenous
quality. Previous contribution include Bester (1998) considering a model of horizontal
and vertical diﬀerentiation where quality is both endogenous and uncertain for consumers
and prices can be a quality signal, but information disparities are not analyzed. Garella
and Petrakis (2007) consider both information disparities, consumers'misperceptions and
endogenous quality but in an oligoplistic setting with imperfect substitutes, according
to the Dixit-Spence-Bowley approach. With respect to us they can consider randomly
distributed misperceptions but not in a framework of pure vertical diﬀerentiation. Other
signiﬁcant contributions mainly concern vertical diﬀerentiation with signalling, where
quality is exogenously given This strand of literature includes Fluet and Garella (2002),
Hetzendorf and Overgaard (2002) and Daughety and Reinganum (2008). Our model
does not consider equilibria with signaling, but can provide foundations about the need
4As in turn the willingness to pay for quality can be typically correlated with income in vertical
diﬀerentiation model (cfr. for example Tirole 1989)
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for signalling to overcome adverse selection in case of pessimistic beliefs by uninformed
consumers. Gabszewicz and Resende (2012) consider price competition in the case of
credence goods - as we do - but without considering the issue of quality choice. Moreover
they introduce asymmetric information about quality by assuming that consumers do not
know which ﬁrms sells which quality, building on the previous analysis of Gabszewicz
and Grilo (1992). Bonroy and Constantatos (2008) follow this same approach to adress
the issue of voluntary versus mandatory labels in credence good markets. Information
provision policies are also considered by Brouhle and Khanna (2007) in a duopoly with
vertical diﬀerentiation and imperfect information about quality. As in our case quality is
endogenous in their model, but consumers'heterogeneity depends on their beliefs about
the accuracy of information provision, which directly aﬀects consumers utility. Changes
in information accuracy aﬀect all consumers in the same way so they cannot consider
neither information disparities nor diﬀerent types of consumers'misperceptions.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 1.2 we present the basic model and con-
sider the analytical distinction netween the case of optimistic and pessimistic consumers
aﬀected by misperceptions about the quality diﬀerential. In section 1.3 we consider de-
mand functions when uninformed consumers are optimistic. In section 1.4 we introduce
the equilibrium analysis. In section 1.5 we carry out equilibrium analysis in case of opti-
mistic consumers. In section 1.6 we consider demand functions and equilibrium analysis
in case of pessimistic consumers. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 The Basic Model
We consider a market with N consumers. Each consumer buys one unit of the product
(we shall assume that the market is completly covered). Consumer preferences can be
represented by the following quasi-linear utility function:
U = θq − P
The willingness to pay for quality is represented by θ,which is uniformly distributed
between θ and θ¯ with θ¯ = θ + 1 and density f(θ) = 1. P is the market price and q
represents product quality, which can be low (qL) or high (qL)5. There is a minimum
quality standard q0, enforceable by the government; thus qL ≥ q0 and q0 is common
knowledge. Consumers have rational expectations about the low quality product, as
they expect that qL = q0 (such an expectations is fullﬁlled in equilibrium). High qual-
ity is perfectly known to the producers but is unknown to the consumer, unless it is
informed. Uninformed consumers are uncertain about the quality diﬀerential. Due to
the existence of a minimum quality standard they can exclude that qH < q0 but hold
consumers'misperceptions about the quality diﬀerential which is provided by the ﬁrm
claiming to sell high quality products. However we assume that each uninformed con-
sumer has the same expectation qE concerning high quality. As we do not put further
restrictions on qH and qE , we can distinguish two cases: 1) qE > qH , i.e. uninformed
5The vertical diﬀerentiation model with complete information we make reference to is presented by
Tirole(1989).
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consumers are characterized by optimistic misperceptions 2) qE < qH i.e. uninformed
consumers are characterized by pessimistic misperceptions6.
As to the distinction between informed and uninformed consumers we split the mar-
ket in two parts, following the distribution of θ. Consumers with a willingness to pay
for quality θ ≥ θ∗ are informed and then observe qH . Consumers characterized by a
willingness to pay θ < θ∗remain uninformed; and make purchase decisions on the basis
of an expectation qEconcerning high quality products. Therefore, the greater is θ∗ and
the lower is the portion of informed consumers. In what follows we shall not put any
restriction on the value of θ∗except that θ ≤ θ∗ ≤ θ¯. Therefore demand function will be
shaped accordingly. The timing structure of the model can be described in the following
way:
1.In the ﬁrst stage the market is split between uninformed and informed consumers,
according to consumers heteogeneity about θ, which is exogenously given
2.In the second stage ﬁrms, taking consumers information and expectations about the
quality diﬀerential as given, choose the quality level
3.In the third stage ﬁrms, given their decisions concerning quality, compete in prices.
In the market there are two ﬁrms that can produce either a good of quality qL or
a good of quality qH . Firms are perfectly informed about both product qualities. Let
ﬁrm one specialize in the production of the good of quality qL and ﬁrm two specialize in
the production of quality qH .We do not consider ﬁxed production cost as we neglect the
entry stage and we normalize to zero the variable cost of production. But we suppose
that providing higher qualities implies higher eﬀorts. Therefore we consider the cost of
quality as αq2, with αq2L < αq
2
L. By considering the cost of quality as the cost of the
greater eﬀort of providing high quality goods we can well consider cases where ﬁrms
should respect a minimum quality standard but can put greater eﬀorts in quality control
or any other activity which improves product quality. Low quality goods are sold at price
PL and high quality goods are sold at price PH . As we assume that the market is covered
we suppose that in equilibrium P ∗L ≤ qLθ.
In order to deﬁne market demand for the low quality and the high quality product we
start from the deﬁnition of the marginal consumer, who is indiﬀerent between buying
from ﬁrm one or from ﬁrm two. However in this model informed consumers observe the
true quality qH while uninformed consumers just have an expectation about quality: qE .
Both consumers expect that qL = q0.Thus we are led to deﬁne two types of marginal
consumer. The ﬁrst one is the uninformed marginal consumer θ′, who is deﬁned by the
following equality:
θq0 − PL = θqE − PH
giving
θ′ =
PH − PL
qE − q0
Let us call ∆E = qE − q0 the expected quality diﬀerence perceived by uninformed
consumers. Then uninformed consumers, with a willingness to pay θ ≥ θ′ (and θ ≤ θ∗)
6For a recent tentative contribution to the microfoundations of optimism and pessimism according to
the theory of rational choice one can see (Dillenberger, Postelwaite, Rozen 2013)
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choose the high quality product while uninformed consumers with a willingness to pay
θ ≤ θ′ (and θ ≤ θ∗) choose the low quality product
The second marginal consumer is the informed one θ′′:
θ′′ =
PH − PL
qH − q0
and let us call ∆ = qH − q0 the true quality diﬀerential, only known to informed
consumers. Then informed consumers with a willingness to pay θ ≥ θ′′ (and θ ≥ θ∗)
choose the high quality product while informed consumers with a willingness to pay
θ ≤ θ′′(and θ ≥ θ∗) choose the low quality product.
However the deﬁnition of demand functions for the low quality and high quality prod-
ucts requires further assumptions on the parameters of the model. For each market
splitting between informed and uninformed consumer, i.e. for each location of θ∗ with
respect to θ′ and θ′′, market demands can change accordingly, as we shall show in next
subsections. Furthermore, when considering the respective locations of the marginal con-
sumers θ′ and θ′′ across the market, a basic distinction arises into the model, as we are
necessary led to consider two main cases. Either θ′ < θ′′ or θ′ > θ′′. Given PH , PL and
q0, the sign of the previous inequality only depends on the relationship between qE and
qH . Actually either qH < qE , i.e. uninformed consumers are optimistic, or qH > qE i.e.
uninformed consumers are pessimistic. Therefore the distinction between optimistic
and pessimistic uniformed consumers is endogenously built-in into the model. In the
optimistic case (case A) θ′ < θ′′ while in the pessimistic case (case B) θ′ > θ′′. Therefore
also from the analytical point of view it is necessary to deal separately with these two
cases
1.3 Market demands when uninformed consumers are
optimistic
The main feature of the optimisitc case is that uninformed consumers overestimate the
quality diﬀerential as ∆E ≥ ∆.Due to asymmetric information about the quality choice
and consumers'misperceptions qE > qH .Therefore ﬁrms can proﬁt from asymmetric infor-
mation by charging higher prices and providing lower quality diﬀerentials then expected.
Then in the optimistic case adverse incentives may potentially lead to consumers cheat-
ing.
Equilibrium analysis needs a deﬁnition of demand functions. We can deﬁne demand
functions through the following steps. We start by considering alternative locations for θ∗
in the space
[
θ, θ¯
]
,given both prices and quality diﬀerentials ∆E and ∆.We shall than be
able to restrict our attention to three main cases. For each case we can ﬁnd restrictions
on price domains and expressions for the segments of market demands corresponding to
these restrictions.
However further assumptions about ∆E and ∆ need to be introduced to consider the
full range of price domains consistent with market segments previously deﬁned.(as in case
A1, A2, A3) In the second step we consider in addition the variations in ∆E and ∆, by
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looking at the ratio ∆E∆ ≥ 1 and obtain restrictions about this ratio consistent with the
willingness to pay for quality and the share of informed and uninformed consumers. As
a result we shall be able to restrict the deﬁnitions of market demands to four alternative
cases. In the last step, for each of these four cases we consider price domains and the
market segments that deﬁne demand functions..
1.3.1 Alternative locations of theta in the space
A.1) θ ≤ θ′ ≤ θ∗ ≤ θ′′ ≤ θ¯. (Cf. ﬁgure 1.1). From ﬁg.1.1 we see that both the demand
for the low quality product (DL) and the demand for the high quality product (DH) are
given by the sum of the demand of uninformed consumers and of the demand of informed
consumers: DL = θ′ − θ + θ′′ − θ∗; DH = θ∗ − θ′ + θ¯ − θ′′. One can then notice that
not only uninformed consumer with a lower willingness to pay buy low quality goods,
but also informed consumers with an higher willingness to pay select the low quality
product, once they are informed about the quality diﬀerential. On the contrary there
are consumers - with a compartively lower willingness to pay - that buy high quality
goods just because they are uninformed and hold optimisitic misperceptions about the
quality diﬀerential. Considering the inequalities we can obtain the following restrictions
concerning market prices, which will be useful to deﬁning the price domain of demand
functions. Concerning DL we get
PH − θ∗∆E ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∆E (1.1)
PH − θ¯∆ ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∗∆ (1.2)
and concerning DH
PL + θ∆E ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ∗∆E (1.3)
PL + θ
∗∆ ≤ PH ≤ PL + ∆θ¯ (1.4)
A.2) θ ≤ θ∗ ≤ θ′ ≤ θ′′ ≤ θ¯ (Cfr.ﬁg.1.2). The demand for the low quality product is
the sum of the demand coming from uninformed consumers, (θ∗ − θ) and the demand
from informed consumers, (θ′′− θ∗): then DL = θ′′− θ. The demand for the high quality
product comes only from informed consumers: DH = θ¯−θ′′. In this case even consumers
with a lower willingness to pay know the true quality and are lead to buy the low quality
good. Consumers misperceptions are not aﬀecting neither the demand for the low quality
good nor the demand for the high quality good (such a result is ultimately due to the
location of θ∗, given that θ∗ ≤ θ′) .We can obtain the following restrictions about price
domains:
PH − θ¯∆ ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∗∆ (1.5)
PL + θ
∗∆E ≤ PH ≤ PL + ∆θ¯ (1.6)
A.3) θ ≤ θ′ ≤ θ′′ ≤ θ∗ ≤ θ¯. (Cfr. ﬁg. 1.3). The demand for the low quality product
comes only from uninformed consumers: DL(θ′− θ). The demand for the high quality
product derives both from uninformed consumers, (θ∗ − θ′),and informed consumers as
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Figure 1.1:
well: (θ¯−θ∗): DH = θ¯−θ′. Consumers'misperceptions are then aﬀecting both demands,
while consumers'information has no impact on demand functions (this is ultimately due
to the location of θ∗, given that θ′′ ≤ θ∗). The restrictions on price domains arising from
case A.3 are the following:
PH − θ∗∆ ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∆E (1.7)
PL + θ∆E ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ∗∆ (1.8)
1.3.2 Joint restrictions on quality expectations and the willingness to pay
for quality
Considering alternative locations of θ∗to account for the eﬀect of information disparities
on market demand is not yet suﬃcient to deﬁne demand functions, as informed con-
sumers observe the real quality diﬀerential while the demand of uninformed consumers
depend on their misperceptions about high quality products. As the share of informed-
uninformed consumers can vary together with both the expected quality diﬀerential ∆E
(how much optimistic are optimistic consumers?) and the actual quality provided by the
high quality ﬁrm ∆ , we need to introduce some further restrictions. Furthermore one
should also consider that the expected quality diﬀerential ∆E cannot be unbouded. As
also the willingness to pay for quality cannot be greater then θ¯,restrictions on ∆E and
∆ depending on on θ, θ¯,and θ∗ appear to be sensible in the framework of this model.
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Figure 1.2:
Therefore to fully account for the alternative price orderings that deﬁne the price
domains of the demand functions we need to introduce altogether restrictions: 1) On
the relationship between the quality diﬀererentials expressed by the ratio ∆E∆ ;2) on
the dimension (value) of the market as measured by θ¯ and θ; 3) on the extension of
information disparities (i.e (θ∗ − θ) and (θ¯ − θ∗), as measured by the ratios θ∗θ , θ¯θ∗ . By
considering alternative orderings of price domains we can obtain the following parameter
restrictions that deﬁne four alternative couples of demand functions, when uninformed
consumers are optimistic:
A.a)1 ≤ ∆E
∆
≤Min
{
θ¯
θ∗
,
θ∗
θ
}
;A.b)
θ¯
θ∗
≤ ∆E
∆
≤ θ
∗
θ
;
A.c)
θ∗
θ
≤ ∆E
∆
≤ θ¯
θ∗
;A.d)Max
{
θ∗
θ
,
θ¯
θ∗
}
≤ ∆E
∆
≤ θ¯
θ
Considering the ratio ∆E∆ ≥ 1, in case A.a the previous restrictions allow for an ex-
pected quality diﬀerential ∆E strictly close to the actual one, (i.e
∆E
∆ ∼ 1). In case
A.d we can observe the highest ratio, with over-optimistic consumers (i.e ∆E∆ ∼ θ¯θ ).
In between these two extremes, we ﬁnd cases A.b and A.c where the ratio ∆E∆ can be
said to be intermediate. Furthermore the ratio is bounded in each case through restric-
tions concerning the share of informed-uninformed consumers (location of θ∗) and the
willingness to pay for quality. In cases A. b and A.c the restrictions are such that we
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can respectively state that most consumers are uninformed, (as θ∗ ≥
√
θθ¯ )7 or most
cosnumers are informed (as θ∗ ≤
√
θθ¯) 8.
We concentrate our attention on intermediate cases for ∆E∆ . Actually in case (A.a)
parameters are such that the model can easily collpase to the perfect information case as
either the share of informed consumers is very high (θ∗ ∼ θ) or by chance the expected
quality diﬀerential by uninformed consumers turn out to be closer to the actual one
provided by the high quality ﬁrm (∆E .∼ ∆).
1.3.3 Demand Functions in case (A.b)
In order to deﬁne the price domains of the demand function we consider the following
price ordering for PL : PH − θ∆E ≥ PH − θ∗∆ ≥ PH − θ¯∆ ≥ PH − θ∗∆E , to obtain
the demand of the low quality product DL (PL, PH) , and the following price ordering for
PH : PL + θ
∗∆E ≥ PL + ∆θ¯ ≥ PL + θ∗∆ ≥ PL + θ∆E to obtain the demand for the high
quality product DH (PL, PH). One can check that the previous price orderings can be
7this inequlity say that θ∗must be bigger than geometric mean of minimun willingness to pay θ and
the maximum willingness to pay θ¯ for a most precise deﬁnition see appendix A1
8In case A.a sup
{
1 ≤ ∆E
∆
≤Min
{
θ¯
θ∗ ,
θ∗
θ
}}
= Min
{
θ¯
θ∗ ,
θ∗
θ
}
can be shown to be consistent both
with most consumers being uninformed (as θ∗ ≥ √θ (θ + 1)) and most consumers being (as θ∗ ≤√
θ (θ + 1)) The same conclusion holds for case A.d, where inf
{
Max
{
θ¯
θ∗ ,
θ∗
θ
}
≤ ∆E
∆
≤ θ¯
θ
}
=
Max
{
θ∗
θ
, θ¯
θ∗
}
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reduced to the following condition : θ¯θ∗ ≤ ∆E∆ ≤ θ
∗
θ . The restriction about θ
∗ ( θ¯θ∗ ≤ θ
∗
θ )
implies that θ∗ ≥
√
θθ¯, i.e the share of informed consumers is smaller with respect to
the share of uninformed ones. Given the previous restriction, one can then account for
the location of θ∗ and deﬁne the demand segments for each price domain, by going back
to cases A.1, A2 and A.3 above. We start with the demand function for the low quality
product.
DL (PL, PH) =

θ
′ − θ if PH − θ∗∆ ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∆E
θ
′ − θ + θ′′ − θ∗ if PH − θ∆ ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∗∆
θ
′ − θ + θ − θ∗ if PH − θ∗∆E ≤ PL = PH − θ∆
θ − θ if 0 ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∗∆E
Actually one can check that the price-domain of the ﬁrst segment of DL (PL, PH) =(
θ
′ − θ
)
is consistent with case A.3. The second segment is consistent with case (A.1),
as well as the third segment -
(
θ
′ − θ + θ − θ∗
)
.
With the highest price for the low quality good (ﬁrst price domain), the latter is
bought just by uninformed consumer with the lowest willingness to pay and demand
is just aﬀected by consumers misperceptions. When PL decreases we reach the second
price domain where also informed consumers characterized by an higher willingess to pay
decide to buy the low quality good. Actually it occurs that the reduction in PL moves
θ
′′
towards θ until there is a switch fro θ
′′ ≤ θ∗ to θ′′ ≥ θ∗ ( from A.3 to A.1) implying
that a share of informed consumers switch to the low quality good. Their demand is
given by
(
θ
′′ − θ∗
)
, and depends on the location of θ∗. As θ′′reaches θ - due to the
continuos decrease of PL− we reach the third segment, where all informed consumers
with an higher willingness to pay buy the low quality good, expressing the following
demand:
(
θ − θ∗). In the third segment the decrease of PL gradually reduces also the
share of uninformed consumer with an intermediate willingness to pay that sticks to
the high quality good. As PL decreases the marginal uninformed consumers θ
′
moves
towards θ∗, until all uninformed consumers buy the low quality good
(
θ
′
= θ∗
)
.Then
DL (PL, PH) = 1.
The demand for the high quality product DH (PL, PH) then follows (and one can check
that it is complementary to DL (PL, PH)):
DH (PL, PH) =

θ∗ − θ′ if PL + θ∆ = PH ≤ PL + θ∗∆E
θ∗ − θ′ + θ − θ′′ if PL + θ∗∆ ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ∆
θ − θ′ if PL + θ∆E ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ∗∆
θ¯ − θ if 0 ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ∆E
Then the ﬁrst segment - (θ∗− θ′ ) - is consistent with case A.1. The second segment of
DH (PL, PH) - (θ∗−θ
′
+θ−θ′′) - is consistent with case A.1 as well. The third segment of
DH (PL, PH) -
(
θ − θ′
)
- is consistent with case A.3, as one can easily check by going back
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to (6). Looking at the ﬁrst demand segment one can see that with the highest price for the
high quality good only uninformed consumers which overestimate the quality diﬀerential
are willing to buy it. When PH decreases and the second price domain is reached then also
the demand coming from informed consumers with the highest wilingness to pay
(
θ − θ′′
)
adds to the demand coming from uninformed consumers. Within the second segment, the
reduction of PH implies changes in the location of θ
′′
, moving towards θ∗.When θ′′ = θ∗
the third segment is reached and from now on further reductions of PH imply a switch
from θ
′′ ≥ θ∗to θ′′ < θ∗, which is consistent with case A.3. so that the demand for high
quality goods increases further and just the marginal uninformed consumer can aﬀect it
(actually θ
′′
< θ∗ implies that θ′′can no more aﬀect market demands). As the reduction
of PH also moves θ
′
towards θ, when PH is low enough it then happens that θ
′
= θ. In
this last case all consumers buy high quality goods and DH (PL, PH) = 1.
Demand functions are then represented in ﬁg 1.4, 1.5 showing their kinked shape which
is typical of vertical diﬀerentiation models.
Figure 1.4:
1.3.4 Demand functions in case (A.c)
In this sub case we assume the following price ordering for PL in order to deﬁne the price
domain of DL (PL, PH) : PH − θ∗∆ ≥ PH − θ∆E ≥ PH − θ∗∆E ≥ PH − θ¯∆ and the
following price ordering for PH in order to deﬁne DH (PL, PH) : PL+∆θ¯ ≥ PL+θ∗∆E ≥
PL + θ∆E ≥ PL + θ∗∆. One can check that the previous inequalities reduce to the
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Figure 1.5:
following: θ
∗
θ ≤ ∆E∆ ≤ θ¯θ∗ . The restriction about θ∗ ( θ
∗
θ ≤ θ¯θ∗ ) implies that θ∗ ≤
√
θθ¯, i.e
the share of informed consumers is larger than the share of uninformed ones. Given the
previous restriction, one can then account for the location of θ∗, and deﬁne the demand
functions segments for each price domain, by going back to cases A.1, A2 and A.3 above,
as follows:
DL (PL, PH) =

θ
′′ − θ∗ if PH − θ∆E ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∗∆
θ′′ − θ∗ + θ′ − θ if PH − θ∗∆E ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∆E
θ′′ − θ if PH − θ¯∆ ≤ PL = PH − θ∗∆E
θ − θ if 0 ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ¯∆
Actually one can check that the price domain of the ﬁrst demand segment is consistent
with case A.1. The price domain of the second and third segment are consistent with
case A.1 as well. We can notice at a glance that in this sub-case, the demand function,
turns out being aﬀected mainly by the marginal informed consumer θ
′′
, i.e by the real
quality diﬀerential provided by the high quality ﬁrm, as most consumers are informed.
With the highest price for the low quality good (ﬁrst price domain) demand comes from
informed consumers with an intermediate willingness to pay (ﬁrst demand segment) and
we can notice that the greater is the share of informed consumers (i.e. the lower is
θ∗) the greater this piece of demand. It is then interesting to point out that in this
case information leads consumers to choose the low quality product even with an high
PL,as the real quality diﬀerential is not worth selecting the high quality good. With a
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decrease of PL, also a share of uninformed consumers with the lowest willingness to pay
(θ′ − θ) add to the previous segment, to get DL (PL, PH) = (θ′′ − θ∗ + θ′ − θ). As PL
further decreases within the second price domain, the value of the marginal uninformed
consumer θ
′
increases, i.e. θ
′
moves towards θ∗ until θ
′
= θ∗ and the third price domain
is reached. In this last case the marginal uninformed consumer can no more aﬀect the
demand function and the latter becomes independent from consumers'misperceptions.
Actually the third demand segment will be given by the whole share of uninformed
consumers (θ∗ − θ) plus the share of informed consumers ﬁnding it convenient to buy the
low quality good: (θ′′ − θ∗) .Therefore the third demand segment reduces to (θ′′ − θ) . As
PL further decreases within the third price domain a parallel decrease of θ′′will follow,
implying that θ′′moves towards θ until θ′′ = θ and then DL (PL, PH) = 1.
The demand for the high quality product DH (PL, PH) then follows and one can easily
check that it is complementary to DL (PL, PH):
DH (PL, PH) =

θ − θ′′ if PL + θ∗∆E ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ∆
θ∗ − θ′ + θ − θ′′ if PL + θ∆E ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ∗∆E
θ − θ′′ + θ∗ − θ if PL + θ∆E ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ∗∆
θ¯ − θ if 0 ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ∗∆
One can check that all price domains of DH (PL, PH) are consistent with case A.1.and
that all segments of the demand function (but the second one) are aﬀected by the
marginal informed consumers θ′′and by θ∗. As θ′ disapperars from most segments, con-
sumers'misperceptions are not aﬀecting market demands (the only exception being the
second price domain). With the highest price for the high quality good, the latter is just
purchased by informed consumers with the highest willingness to pay. As PH decreases
and the second price domain is reached, then the demand from uninformed consumers
with an intermediate willingnes to pay (θ∗ − θ′) will add to the ﬁrst demand segment to
get DH (PL, PH) =
(
θ∗ − θ′ + θ − θ′′) .Within the second price domain the decrease of
PH will lead to a decrease of θ′such that the marginal uninformed consumers will move
towards θ , and the third price domain is reached when θ′ = θ. This implies that all
uninformed consumers (included the poorest ones) will demand the high quality good.
Actully in the third segment DH (PL, PH) = 1 + θ∗ − θ′′implying that the demand of
the high quality good increases with a decrease of the share of informed consumer and
with a decrease of the marginal informed consumer (i.e. when PH decreases and /or ∆
increases- to the extent both changes imply that θ′′ is decreasing). When PH further
decreases within the third segment, then θ
′′
decreases too and moves toward θ∗,until
θ′′ = θ∗ and DH (PL, PH) = 1.
Demand functions are then represented in ﬁg 1.6, 1.7
1.3.5 Demand functions in case (A.d) and (A.a)
Even if we do not analyze case A.d, we would like to point out that considering the
concerned parameter restrictions: Max
{
θ∗
θ ,
θ¯
θ∗
}
≤ ∆E∆ ≤ θ¯θ we can ﬁnd that this case
is consistent either with most consumers being informed or most consumers being un-
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Figure 1.6:
informed (as Max
{
θ∗
θ ,
θ¯
θ∗
}
includes both cases where θ∗ ≤
√
θ¯θ and cases where θ∗ ≥√
θ¯θ). Actually when checking for the price domains of the demand functions (Appendix
A2) one can show they are all consistent with case A.1, as in previous sub-case A.c.
Therefore demand functions are expected to be similar to those we have just deﬁned for
this sub-case. However what distinguishes sub-case A.d is the fact that the ratio ∆E∆ is
very high, i.e consumers are over-optimistic . Due to the fact that ∆ is likely to be
lower than in other cases with respect to ∆E , when PL decreases across price domains
then the increase of θ
′′
is likely to be such that θ
′′
moves towards and reaches θ¯ before
DH (PL, PH) = 1, implying of course that it is not necessary to reduce PL too much to
persuade informed consumers with the highest willingness to pay to purchase low quality
goods. On the contrary only a decrease of PH would lead this type of consumers to
switch to high quality goods. Therefore when PH is too high, then high quality good
end up being bought just by uninformed consumers with an intermediate willingness to
pay9. Accounting for this diﬀerence one can then show that the segments of the demand
functions in case A.d are identical to case A.c, with the exception of the third segment of
DL (PL, PH) and, simmetrically, the ﬁrst segment of DH (PL, PH) where PL is very low
9Likewise, as ∆E is likely to be very high, when PH decreases across price domains then the decrease
can be such that θ
′
moves towards and reaches θ before DH (PL, PH) = 1, implying that it is not
necessary to reduce PH to much to persuade uninformed consumers with the lowest willingness to
pay to buy high quality goods.
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and PH is very high10.
Concerning case A.a we can point out that also this case, given the parameter restric-
tions, is consistent both with most consumers being informed and most consumer being
uninformed. Furthermore as ∆E∆ ∼ 1,the quality diﬀerential are less important then in
previous cases in shaping the demand functions. Price changes matter. When PL is very
high and PH is very low, the low quality good is bough just by uninformed consumers
with a lower willingness to pay (DL = θ′− θ) while the high quality good is bought by un-
informed consumers (θ∗−θ′) and by all informed consumers (θ−θ∗), so that demand func-
tions are just aﬀected by the uninformed marginal consumer θ′(consumers'misperceptions
shape demand functions).On the contrary when PL is very low and PH is very high,also
some informed consumers with an intermediate willingness are lead to buy low quality
goods. Actually, given an high PH a decrease of PL gradually induces a switch from
θ′ ≤ θ∗ to θ′ ≥ θ∗, such that low quality goods are bought by all uninformed consumers
and by a share of informed consumers (θ′′ − θ∗). Demand functions are then dependent
on the real quality diﬀerential ∆. Actually, given that θ′ ≥ θ∗,the marginal uninformed
consumer θ′can no more aﬀect demand functions and therefore the model boils down to
the full information case. Furthermore in this case θ∗ can aﬀect demand functions just
when PH and PLare neither too high nor too low, as it occurs across all sub.cases that
we can consider11.
10Appendix A2
11Appendix A2
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1.4 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section we analyse price and quality competition between the two ﬁrms, given ex-
pected and real quality diﬀerences (∆E and ∆), solving the two stage game by backward
inuction. In the last stage, ﬁrms decide on prices, given qualities chosen in the previous
stage and information disparities arising by consumers' decisions in the ﬁrst stage. Each
ﬁrm chooses a strategy that is the best reply to the other seller's strategy. Thus let
Πi(Pi, Pj) = PiDi(Pi, Pj) i, j = L,H denote the proﬁt function of ﬁrm i., remembering
that we have assumed that ﬁrm one sells the low quality product and ﬁrm two sells the
high quality product
Deﬁnition: A price (Nash) equilibrium is a pair (P ∗L, P
∗
H) such that no ﬁrm has an
incentive to change its price unilaterally:
Πi(P
∗
i , P
∗
j ) ≥ Πi(Pi, P ∗j ) i, j = L,H
In the following sub-sections we shall look for a candidate Nash equilibrium in prices
both in the optimistic and the pessimistic case. Being demands piecewise linear, for
each conﬁguration of the demand function we can ﬁnd the candidate Nash equilibrium
prices, considering each price domain for each demand function. For each sub-case we can
moreover obtain the restrictions on the number of informed consumers that result from
checking that the candidate equilibrium prices actually belong to the price domains in
question12. Given equilibrium prices, we then consider the quality choice in the previous
stage, to analyzethe degree of product diﬀerentiation in equilibrium.
In order to show that the price pairs are indeed a Nash equilibrium we have to check
that the last Deﬁnition is satisﬁed.This will be equivalent to checking that the candi-
date equilibrium prices assure optimisation of the proﬁt functions not only in the price
domains considered one at a time, but also in the entire price range characterising each
conﬁguration of the demand functions13.
1.5 Equilibrium Analysis with Optimistic Consumers
1.5.1 Case A.b: Most consumers are uninformed
In this case
(
θ¯
θ∗ ≤ ∆E∆ ≤ θ
∗
θ
)
and (θ∗ ≥
√
θθ¯)
In order to ﬁnd the candidate equilibrium price we consider the complementary demand
segments of DL (PL, PH) and DH (PL, PH) one at a time:
1.5.1.1 A.b.1
Given the following price domains for DLand DH
12A complete analysis of equilibrium including stability is in Appendix A5
13For a similar analytical methodology, see Garella and Martinez-Giralt(1989)
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PH − θ∗∆ ≤ P ∗L ≤ PH − θ∆E
PL + θ∆E ≤ P ∗H ≤ PL + θ∗∆
demand segments lead to the following proﬁt functions:
ΠL (PL, PH) = PL
(
θ′ − θ)− αq2L ΠH (PL, PH) = PH (θ¯ − θ′)− αq2H (1.9)
We can then obtain tthe following candidate equilibrium prices:
P ∗L =
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
P ∗H =
∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
(1.10)
and equilibrium proﬁts:
Π∗L =
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)2
9
− αq2L Π∗H =
∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)2
9
− αq2H (1.11)
By checking if the candidate equilibrium prices are actually included in the price
domains given above, we get a further restictinion on θ∗:
θ∗ ≥ ∆E (2θ + 1)
3∆
By considering that across case A.b the following restriction holds θ∗ ≥
√
θθ¯,in case
A.b.1 θ∗ should be even greater if ∆E∆ '
3
2 (or lower if
∆E
∆ /
3
2). Still most consumers
remain uninformed.
Considering the previous solution for the last stage of the game, we can turn to the
quality selection stage, where the degree of product diﬀerentiation is found by maximizing
equilibrium proﬁts with respect to qualities. Considering the foc we get:
∂ΠL
∂qL
=
4θ¯θ − θ¯2 − 4θ2
9
− 2αqL ≤ 0 (1.12)
Therefore the low quality ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to keep quality as low as possible. Due
to the existence of a MQS q0, this implies that q∗L = q0,which is coinsistent with the
expectations of any consumer. Concerning the high quality ﬁrm, as its proﬁts depend
both on the actual level of quality provided (through costs) and on the expected quality
(through demand) we consider ﬁrstly the impact of the quality increase on costs by
maximixation of the proﬁt function to get:
∂ΠH
∂qH
= −2αqH (1.13)
As revenues depend on expected quality, which aﬀects demand but is not under the
control of the ﬁrm, we can get a restriction on the quality level which is optimal to
provide by considering the price domains given above, by checking that the equilibrium
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prices P ∗L and P
∗
H actually belongs to the respective price intervals. We then get the
following restriction on qH :
qH ≥ q0 + ∆E (2θ + 1)
3θ∗
(1.14)
By jointly considering the foc and the previous inequality we can obtain a corner
solution for q∗H = q0 +
∆E(2θ+1)
3θ∗ . According to this solution we can state that q
∗
H > q0
(there is some product diﬀerentiation as the quality diﬀerential ∆is positive ) and morever
that (q∗H − q0) < ∆E , (the high quality ﬁrm actually provides a lower quality diﬀerential
than expected by uninformed consumers).
As P ∗H and Π
∗
H depends on ∆E , but the actual quality diﬀerential is lower, we can
state that adverse incentives lead to consumer cheating in equilibrium, as consumers of
high quality products pay an excessive price premium with respect to the actual quality
diﬀerential. However high quality will not collapse to the MQS. As the price domains are
such that all informed consumers buy the high quality good (θ∗ > θ′ and θ∗ = θ′′) q∗H
should be consistent with the price that informed consumers are willing to pay. Therefore
it is convenient for the high quality ﬁrm to provide a quality level suﬃciently high to
justify the price charged to informed consumers. The latters in this case are characterized
by the highest willingness to pay. Furthermore by considering the expression of q∗H one
can easily check that a decrease of informed consumers (shown by an increase of θ∗) leads
to a reduction of q∗H while an increase of informed consumers leads to an increase of q
∗
H .
Such an eﬀect is independent from equilibrium prices, but depends on the restrictions on
q∗H obtained by checking if P
∗
H belongs to the price domain deﬁning case A.c.1 (actually
for qH < q∗H , P
∗
H cannot be an equilibrium price as it will not belong to the price domain
characterizing A.b.1)).
Therefore even if the share of informed consumers does not directly aﬀect equilibrium
prices, such a share indirectly aﬀect the quality diﬀerential in equilibrium with a positive
externality for uninformed consumers buying high quality goods. An increase of the share
of informed consumers leads the high quality ﬁrm to provide an higher quality diﬀerential.
However given that most consumers remain uninformed, the share of informed consumers
in never suﬃcient to aﬀect equilibrium prices, which remain distorted upwards as they
depend on the quality diﬀerential expected by uninformed consumers. Both ﬁrms can
proﬁt from imperfect information as they can charge prices and get proﬁts depending on
∆E ,though high quality cannot collapse to the MQS due to the contribution of informed
consumer to the demand for high quality products which constrains the high quality ﬁrm
to provide some product diﬀerentiation. Moreover product diﬀerentiation increases ( and
the extent of consumer cheating decreases) with the share of informed consumers.
1.5.1.2 A.b.2
Considering the following price domain:
PH − θ¯∆ ≤ P ∗L ≤ PH − θ∗∆
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PL + θ
∗∆ ≤ P ∗H ≤ PL + θ¯∆
and the related demand segments, we get the following proﬁt functions:
ΠL (PL, PH) = PL
(
θ′ − θ + θ′′ − θ∗)−αq2L ΠH (PL, PH) = PH (θ¯ − θ′′ + θ∗ − θ′)−αq2H
leading to the following equilibrium prices:
P ∗L =
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))
3 (∆E + ∆)
P ∗H =
∆E∆ (θ + θ
∗ + 2)
3 (∆E + ∆)
In this case both the low quality good and the high quality good are bought by un-
informed and informed conumers. Then candidate equilibrium prices are aﬀected by all
parameters of the model. However one can notice that an increase in the share of in-
formed consumers (lower θ∗) implies an increase of P ∗L and a reduction of P
∗
H . While a
decrease of this share (higher θ∗) has the opposite eﬀect. Therefore in this case consumer
information aﬀects price competition, with opposite eﬀect on ﬁrms. More informed con-
sumers provide a price beneﬁt to the low quality ﬁrm. Less informed consumers provide a
price beneﬁt to the high quality ﬁrm. Considering the restriction given by price domains
we get a further restriction of θ∗ at equilibrium.
θ∗ ≤ min
{
∆E (1 + 2θ)
∆E + 3∆
,
∆E (2 + θ) + 3 (θ + 1) ∆
2∆E
}
By substitution we can ﬁnd equilibrium proﬁt functions as follows:
Π∗L =
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))2
9 (∆E + ∆)
− αq2L Π∗H =
∆E∆ (θ + θ
∗ + 2)2
9 (∆E + ∆)
− αq2H
Turning then to the quality selection stage, by proﬁt maximization in qualities we get:
∂ΠL
∂qL
= −γ
(
q2E + q
2
H + 2q
2
L − 2qHq0 − 2qEqL
)
(9qE + 9qH − 18qL)2
− 2αqL and γ = [1− (θ + θ∗)]2
∂ΠL
∂qL
≤ 0 if : qE ≥ qH ≥ q0 , γ ≥ 0
∂2ΠL
∂q2L
= − 2γ (qE − qH)
2
81 (qE + qH − 2q0)3
− 2α ≤ 0
Therefore14 the low quality ﬁrm is lead to produce the minimum quality, i.e q∗L = q0
as in the previous case.
Concerning the high quality ﬁrm we get:
14proof appendix A3
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∂ΠH
∂qH
=
ϕ (qE − q0)2
9 (qE + qH − 2q0)2
− 2αqH ≥ 0 ϕ = (2 + θ + θ∗)2
∂2ΠH
∂q2H
= − 2ϕ (qE − q0)
2
9 (qE + qH − 2q0)3
− 2α
q∗H = − 13∗22/3α (Φ)
1/3 +
−324α2q2E+1296α2qEq0−1296α2q20
(Φ)1/3
− 2(αq0−2αq0)3α
According to the foc we get q∗H > 0
15. However when considering the restrictions given
by the price domains, we can ﬁnd that q∗H is bounded, both upwards and downward.
q0 +
∆E (2θ
∗ − 2− θ)
3θ¯
≤ q∗H ≤ q0 +
∆E (1 + 2θ − θ∗)
3θ∗
Actually in this case the upper bound increases if θ∗decreases, but the lower bound
decreases for a decrease of θ∗, implying that increasing the share of informed consumers
can widen the set of optimal quality levels at equilibrium. However considering also the
f.o.c., high quality can be given by an internal solution or a corner solution if q∗H is outside
the set of optimal quality.
Considering the corner solution q∗H = q0 +
∆E(1+2θ−θ∗)
3θ∗ we can add that there will
always be some product diﬀerentiation in equilibrium, as q∗H > q0 just requires that
(1 + 2θ) > θ∗a condition which always holds, given the basic model. On the contrary if
the corner solution is on the lower bound and q∗H = q0 +
∆E(2θ∗−2−θ)
3θ¯
, to get product
diﬀerentiation we need
(
θ∗ > 1 + θ2
)
a condition that not necessarily holds. However
by considering the previous inequality one could observe that it can hold the lower the
share of informed consumers is (higher θ∗) implying in turrn that the high quality ﬁrm
can proﬁt from a lower and lower share of informed consumers to provide a lower and
lower quality level. Therefore we can state that ∆ −→ 0 as θ∗ −→ 1, implying that we
cannot exclude cases where product diﬀerentiation is negligible, despite the prices paid
by consumers purchasing the high quality good.
To further consider the eﬀect of the share of informed consumers on product diﬀeren-
tiation, one could check that
d(
∆E
(
1+2θ−θ∗
)
3θ∗ )
dθ∗ =
−3∆E(1+2θ)
9θ∗2 < 0. Therefore an increase of
θ∗, (i.e, a decrease of the share of informed consumers) reduces the set of optimal quality
level q∗H and leads to less product diﬀerentiation. While more informed consumers lead to
more product diﬀerentiation. By considering again equilibrium prices we point-out that
15Let us consider
Φ = −3ϕ2α (qE − q0) +
√
3
√
8α5q3Eϕ (qE − q0)2 − 48α5q2Eq0ϕ (qE − q0)2 +
+
√
3
√
−64α5q30ϕ (qE − q0)2 + 96α5qEq20ϕ (qE − q0)2 + 3α4ϕ (qE − q0)4
+
√
3
√
+96α5qEq20ϕ (qE − q0)2 + 3α4ϕ (qE − q0)4 +
(−4α3q3E + 24α3q2Eq0 − 48α3qEq30 + 32α3q30)
and check appendix A3
28
a larger share of informed consumers also reduces P ∗H and increases P
∗
L. Therefore an
increasing share of informed consumers beneﬁts also uninformed consumers buying high
quality goods, as they are provided higher quality levels at lower prices. The beneﬁts are
extended to the low quality ﬁrm while low quality consumers are aﬀected by a negative
externality as they are provided the same quality level at an higher price.
1.5.1.3 A.b.3
Considering the price domains :
PH − θ∗∆E ≤ P ∗L ≤ PH − θ¯∆
PL + θ¯∆ ≤ P ∗H ≤ PL + θ∗∆E
And the realtive demand segmentswe get the following proﬁt functions
ΠL (PL, PH) = PL
(
(θ¯ − θ)− θ∗ + θ′)− αq2L ΠH (PL, PH) = PH ((θ∗ − θ′)− αq2H
leadingto the following candidate equilibrium prices:
P ∗L =
∆E (2− θ∗)
3
P ∗H =
∆E (1 + θ∗)
3
and equilibrium proﬁts:
Π∗L =
∆E (2− θ∗)2
9
− αq2L Π∗H =
∆E (1 + θ
∗)2
9
− αq2H
Checking if equilibrium prices belongs to the price domain characterizing A.b.3, we
get a further restictinion on θ∗:
θ∗ ≥ 1
2
+
3∆θ¯
2∆E
Considering the quality selection stage we get:
∂ΠL
∂qL
= −θ
∗2 − 4θ∗ + 4
9
− 2αqL ≤ 0
∂2ΠL
∂q2L
= −2αqL
Still leading to q∗
L
= q0. Concerning the high quality ﬁrm, by considering proﬁt maxi-
mization with respect to quality we get:
∂ΠH
∂qH
= −2αqH ; ∂
2ΠH
∂q2H
= −2α
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The previous f.o.c. and s.o.c. account for the negative eﬀect of cost on the level of
quality. And by considering the restriction on equilibrium prices arising from the price
domain we obtain
qH ≤ q0 + ∆E (2θ
∗ − 1)
3θ¯
Therefore by jointly considering both the f.o.c. and the previous restriction we ﬁnd that
the ﬁrm will ﬁnd it optimal to provide the lowest possible quality: q∗H → q0 . As in this
sub-case (A.b.3) θ′′ = θ¯, considering that across case A.b most consumers are uninformed,
then the small share of informed consumers with an high willingness to pay (θ¯−θ∗) ﬁnds
it optimal to purchase low quality goods, together with uninformed consumers with the
lowest willingness to pay (θ′−θ). Being DH (PL, PH) = (θ′ − θ∗), we can notice that only
uninformed consumers with an intermediate willingness to pay buy high quality goods.
These consumers are cheated in equilibrium, as they pay an higher price with respect to
all other consumers to get the same quality q0.
Therefore there is no real product idﬀerentiation in equilibrium, as q∗H → q0 even if
consumers pay a price premium according to the expected quality diﬀerential ∆E . Due
both to consumers misperceptions by uninformed consumers and informed consumers
buying low quality goods, there is no incentive for the high quality ﬁrm to supply a
quality level greater than the MQS, while P ∗L,and P
∗
H both reﬂect the expected quality
diﬀerential ∆E .
Therefore better information can prevent consumers to be cheated about quality, as
they buy low quality goods, but still they pay an higher price with respect to the full
information case as price competition is aﬀected by uninformed consumers and their
misperceptions. Actually the high share of uninformed consumers exert a negative exter-
nality on informed ones, due to equilibrium prices reﬂecting a quality diﬀerential which
is not really provided by the high quality ﬁrm. Equilibrium prices are then distorted
upwards.
However to the extent that P ∗L, and P
∗
H also depend on θ
∗ one can check that an increase
of informed consumers (lower θ∗) leads to a decrease of P ∗H and to an increase of P
∗
L,
that reduces the price diﬀerence. Information counterbalances optimistic misperceptions
and then reduces price distortions. On the contrary an higher and higher θ∗ has just the
opposite eﬀect as, by reducing the number of informed cosnumers, leads to an increase of
the price diﬀerence. By checking equilibrium proﬁts one can see that more information
implies further gains for the low quality ﬁrm and further losses for the high quality ﬁrm.
Therefore informed consumers exert a negative externality on high quality ﬁrms and a
positive externality on the low quality ﬁrm. Acordingly more informed consumers exert a
positive externality on uninformed ones by reducing the price they pay to buy "virtual"
high quality products. On the contrary more informed consumers cotribute to increase
the price of low quality goods (i.e the products bought by them), due to the eﬀect of
consumer information on price competition.
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1.5.2 Case A.c, Most consumers are informed
In this case
(
θ∗
θ ≤ ∆E∆ ≤ θ¯θ∗
)
and (θ∗ ≤
√
θθ¯)
1.5.2.1 A.c.1
PH − θ∆E ≤ P ∗L ≤ PH − θ∗∆
PL + θ
∗∆ ≤ P ∗H ≤ PL + θ∆E
By considering demand segments deﬁned by the previous price domain we can get the
following proﬁt functions:
ΠL (PL, PH) = PL
(
θ′′ − θ∗)− αq2L ΠH (PL, PH) = PH ((θ¯ − θ)− θ′′ + θ∗)− αq2H
leading to the following equilibrium prices:
P ∗L =
∆
(
1(θ¯ − θ)− θ∗)
3
P ∗H =
∆
(
2(θ¯ − θ) + θ∗)
3
and equilibrium proﬁts:
Π∗L =
∆ (1− θ∗)2
9
− αq2L Π∗H =
∆ (2 + θ∗)2
9
− αq2H
By considering that equilibrium prices should belong to the above price domain we get
a further restriction on θ∗:
θ∗ ≤ min
{
1 ,
3θ∆E
2∆
− θ¯ − θ
2
}
Considering then the quality selection stage, by proﬁt maximization in qualities we
get:
∂ΠL
∂qL
= −θ
∗2 − 2θ∗ + 1
9
− 2αqL ≤ 0; ∂
2ΠL
∂q20
= −2α
∂ΠH
∂qH
=
θ∗2 + 4θ∗ + 4
9
− 2αqH
trough the f.o.c. we get the optimal quality level
q∗H =
θ∗2 + 4θ∗ + 4
18α
Actually considering the restrictions given by the price domain we can show that the
following condition about expected quality holds in equilibrium:
qE ≥ q0 + ∆ (2θ
∗ + 1)
3θ
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This lower bound, on expected quality, ensure that uninformed consumers (θ∗ − θ)
purchase high quality.
High quality goods are also bought by informed consumers with the greatest wllingness
to pay
(
θ¯ − θ′′). Accordingly the low quality good is bought by informed consumers, with
an intermediate willingness to pay:.(θ′′ − θ∗). As one can check, both demands depend on
the real quality diﬀerential, then also equilibrium prices will reﬂect ∆. The greater share
of informed consumers then prevents consumers'misperception from aﬀecting equilibrium
prices. Competition between the two ﬁrms only depends on θ′′ and θ∗. The avoided price
distortion, due to most consumers being informed, beneﬁts all cosnumers (then informed
consumers exert a positive externality on uninformed ones) and reduces ﬁrms'proﬁts with
respect to the case where prices depend on ∆E (informed consumers reduce proﬁtability
for both ﬁrms).
Furthermore we can notice that the higher the share of informed consumers (the lower
is θ∗) the higher is P ∗L (as well as Π
∗
L) and the lower is P
∗
H .(as well as Π
∗
H ). Actually
the lower is θ∗ the lower the demand for high quality good arising from (uninformed)
consumers with a lower willingness to pay and the higher the demand for low quality
goods due to (informed) consumers with an intermediate willingness to pay. Actually
the increase in the share of informed consumers leads the high quality ﬁrm to retain
market shares by reducing prices. As the share of uninformed consumers shrinks, more
consumers with a low willingness to pay will switch to low quality goods, i.e. the demand
for high quality goods by uninformed consumers shrink, due to a lower θ∗. Then the high
quality ﬁrm gathers either uninformed cosnumers with a lower and lower willingness to
pay and informed consumers with the highest willingness to pay. A reduction of P ∗H when
θ∗reduces is then justiﬁed as it can help the ﬁrm both to keep its market share arising
from uninformed consumers and to widen its market share due to informed consumer.
Actually a reduction of P ∗H reduces the value of θ
′′, and can extend the demand segment
given by
(
θ¯ − θ′′) .One could also state that as the location of θ∗ moves towards θ, then
the optimal strategy is to move the location of θ′′ towards θ∗, until θ′′ = θ∗.
The low quality ﬁrm that just gathers informed consumers with an intermediate will-
ingness to pay can proﬁt by the exogenous reduction of θ∗ but is hurt by the reduction of
P ∗H that by reducing θ
′′ negatively aﬀectDL = (θ′′ − θ∗). Actually given that the location
of θ∗is exogenously given, and considering that the low quality ﬁrm, due to a decrease
of θ∗ is more and more gathering previously uninformed consumers with an higher will-
ingness to pay, once they switch to low quality they can be charged an higher price.
Therefore, it is proﬁtable for the low quality ﬁrm to increase its price proportionally to
the decrease of θ∗, though an increase of PLalso contributes to decrease θ′′. Therefore
an increase of PL is optimal until the increase in the mark-up of the ﬁrm is greater with
respect to the market share lost, according to a decrease of θ′′. On the contrary if θ∗
increases and the share of informed consumers shrinks PL proportionally decreases and
PH proportionally increases, implying an increase of θ′′. In some cases when the value
of the market, as measured by the increase of θ, is high and θ∗ = 1,the low quality ﬁrm
could even be excluded from the market and the high quality ﬁrm becomes a monopolist.
Given the previous analysis we can then state that both an increase and a decrease of
the share of informed consumers aﬀects price competition between the two ﬁrms, as the
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diﬀerence in prices widens with the share of informed consumers, but with more informed
consumers low quality ﬁrms can charge higher prices while with less informed consumers
it is the high quality ﬁrm that can aﬀord a price increase.
With respect to product diﬀerentiation we can state that quality competition is soft-
ened by the increase in the share of informed consumers while more vertical diﬀerentiation
arises if the share of informed consumers shrinks Actually one can check that with more
informed consumers a positve quality diﬀerential (qH−q0) is provided by the high quality
ﬁrm if q∗H =
θ∗
2
+4θ∗+4
18α > q0. However one can easily check that q
∗
H is an increasing func-
tion of θ∗. A lower θ∗ implies that with an increase of informed consumers it is optimal
for the high quality ﬁrm to provide a lower level of quality. This occurs because with a
lower and lower θ∗ the high quality ﬁrm gathers more and more consumers with a lower
willingness to pay for quality (then it is not worthwhile to increase quality too much, as
when consumers become informed they expect a lower quality diﬀerential) and moreover
by reducing the level of quality the high quality ﬁrm can also attract consumers with an
intemediate willingness to pay without loosing consumers with the highest willingness
to pay. As we saw before, these consumers may be attracted by reducing P ∗H with the
eﬀect of reducing θ′′, entering then in competition with the low quality ﬁrm. However a
reduction of qH reduces ∆ as well, implying a greater θ′′ in equilibrium,leading in turn to
an increase in the demand for low quality goods by informed consumers and a decrease
in the demand for high quality goods by these same consumers.
On the contrary an increase of θ∗, by reducing the share of informed consumers leads
the high quality ﬁrm to provide an high quality diﬀerential, to charge an higher price and
gain higher proﬁts for the high quality good. On the contrary the low quality ﬁrm is lead
to reduce prices and obtains lower proﬁts in equilibrium. Less informed consumers imply
then more product diﬀerentiation and still asymmetric eﬀects on price competition, as
P ∗H increases and P
∗
L decreases.
1.5.2.2 A.c.2
This sub-case is completely equivalent to case A,b.2 and is analyzed in Appendix A4
1.5.2.3 A.c.3
In this sub-case we consider the following price domains
PH − θ¯∆ ≤ P ∗L ≤ PH − θ∗∆E
PL + θ
∗∆E ≤ P ∗H ≤ PL + θ¯∆
and given the related demand segments we get the following proﬁt functions:
ΠL (PL, PH) = PL
(
θ′′ − θ)− αq2L ΠH (PL, PH) = PH (θ¯ − θ′′)− αq2H
Leading to the following candidate equilibrium prices:
33
P ∗L =
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
P ∗H =
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
and equilibrium proﬁts:
Π∗L =
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)2
9
− αq2L Π∗H =
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)2
9
− αq2H
By considering the price domain we get the following restictinctions on θ∗:
θ∗ ≤ ∆ (2θ + 1)
3∆E
Considering then quality competition, by maximization of the respective proﬁt func-
tions we get:
∂ΠL
∂qL
=
4θ¯θ − θ¯2 − 4θ2
9
− 2αqL ≤ 0
and
∂ΠH
∂qH
=
θ¯2 + 4θ2 − 4θ¯θ
9
− 2αqH = 0
considering the f,o,c, we get the following interior solution for qH :
q∗H =
(
θ¯ − 2θ)2
18α
and considering price domains we also get the following restriction concerning q∗H
q∗H ≥ q0 +
3∆Eθ
∗
1 + 2θ
In this sub-case it is worthwhile to consider the previous restrictions on θ∗ ≤ ∆(2θ+1)3∆E .As
across case A.c most consumers are informed due to θ∗ ≤
√
θθ¯, the previous restric-
tions allow for a even larger number of consumers being informed as θ∗ ≤ ∆(2θ+1)3∆E ≤√
θθ¯. Furthermore, being θ∗ < θ′ < θ′′, DL = (θ′′ − θ∗) + (θ∗ − θ) = (θ′′ − θ) and then
DH =
(
θ¯ − θ′′), one can see that in this sub-case the model is equivalent to vertical
diﬀerentiation with perfect information.
1.6 Market demands and Equilibrium Analysis when
uninformed consumers are pessimistic
In the pessimistic case uninformed consumers are suspicious and underestimate the qual-
ity diﬀerential: ∆E ≤ ∆,as qE ≤ qH 16.
16If quality were exogenous and consumers knew the minimum and the maximum quality and the
probability distribution (Akerlof 1970), one could also state that qE = E(qH) = qLp+qH(1−p),where
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In order to deﬁne demand functions we can follow the same steps as in the optimistic
case. Concerning alternative locations of θ∗ in the space
[
θ, θ¯
]
we are lead to consider
three cases that lead us to list the possible demand segments related to each price domain
to be considered when deﬁning demand functions:
B.1)
(
θ ≤ θ′′ ≤ θ∗ ≤ θ′ ≤ θ¯) . This case is represented in ﬁg 1.8 Informed consumers
only buy high quality goods, while uninformed consumers only buy low quality goods.
Thus information disparities create a separation between the two markets. We get:
DL (PL, PH) = θ
∗− θ¯ and DH (PL, PH) = θ¯−θ∗. Therefore market demands are aﬀected
only by the weight of informed consumers and result to be perfectly inelastic with re-
spect to prices. Actually in this case neither the marginal uninformed consumers nor the
marginal informed consumer can aﬀect market demands, which end up being inelastic to
prices. From this point of view one could state that vertical diﬀerentiation mitigates ad-
verse selection, as both products can be sold in equilibrium, though neither DL (PL, PH)
nor DH (PL, PH) turn out to be sensitive to prices and such to completely cover the
market, unless all consumers are either informed or uninformed. Information disparities
imply as a further eﬀect perfectly inelastic demands. The restrictions on price domains
arising from B.1 are given by:
PH − θ∗∆ ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∆ (1.15)
PH − θ¯∆E ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∗∆E (1.16)
and by:
PL+θ∆≤PH ≤ PL+θ∗∆ (1.17)
PL + θ
∗∆E≤PH ≤ PL+θ¯∆E (1.18)
B.2)
(
θ ≤ θ′′ ≤ θ′ ≤ θ∗ ≤ θ¯.) .See ﬁg 1.9 Informed consumers only buy high quality
goods while uninformed consumers buy both low quality and high quality goods. Thus
we get DL (PL, PH) = θ′− θ¯ and DH (PL, PH) = θ¯− θ∗ +θ∗− θ′ = θ¯− θ′. And demands
will be aﬀected only by the uninformed marginal consumer. The restrictions on price
domains arising from B.2 are given by:
PH − θ∗∆E ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∆ (1.19)
p and (1− p) are their prior probailities about the high quality ﬁrm delivering a low or high quality
level. As we deal with credence goods no updating of the probaility distribution is possible. However
we can remark that when we consider the quality diﬀerential, with this approach we would get ∆E =
qLp+ qH(1− p)− qL = (1− p)(qH − qL). Then we always obtain ∆E ≤ ∆,We can then notice that by
considering expected quality as above: 1) we would always end up in the case of pessimistic consumers
2) we are in a typical adverse selction framework. Therefore, as far as vertical diﬀerentiation with
asymmetric information is concerned, pessimisitic consumers beliefs implies adverse selection (and
viceversa). However, being in a vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly, the eﬀect of adverse selection is
expected to be diﬀerent with respect to the standard case, as both low quality goods and high
quality goods can be sold in equilibrium. Therefore product diﬀerentiation is expected to mitigate
adverse selection
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Figure 1.8:
and:
PL + θ∆ ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ∗∆E (1.20)
B.3)
(
θ ≤ θ∗ ≤ θ′′ ≤ θ′ ≤ θ¯)See ﬁg. 1.10. In this case uninformed consumers buy low
quality goods while informed consumers buy both high quality and low quality goods.
Thus we get DL (PL, PH) = θ∗ − θ +θ′′ − θ∗ = θ′′ − θ and DH (PL, PH) = θ¯ − θ′′.
Therefore in this case market demands are aﬀected by the marginal informed consumer.
The restrictions on price domains arising in this case are the following:
PH − θ¯∆E ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∗∆ (1.21)
and
PL + θ
∗∆ ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ¯∆E (1.22)
As a second step we consider joint restrictions on ∆E∆ ,
θ∗
θ ,
θ¯
θ∗ , and as in the case of
optimistic consumers we can deﬁne market demand functions in four alternative cases,:
B.a)
θ
θ¯
≤ ∆E
∆
≤Min
{
θ∗
θ¯
,
θ
θ∗
}
;B.b)
θ∗
θ¯
≤ ∆E
∆
≤ θ
θ∗
; (1.23)
B.c)
θ
θ∗
≤ ∆E
∆
≤ θ
∗
θ¯
;B.d)Max
{
θ∗
θ¯
,
θ
θ∗
}
≤ ∆E
∆
≤ 1 (1.24)
Considering the ratio ∆E∆ ≤ 1, the previous restrictions allow for the lowest expected
quality diﬀerential ∆E in case B.a (over-pessimistic consumers) and the highest ratio
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Figure 1.9:
∆E
∆ in case B.d (consumers are only slightly pessimistic). In between the two extremes,
we ﬁnd intermediate cases like B.b and B.c,Furthermore the ratio is bounded in each
case through restrictions on the share of informed-uninformed consumers (location of θ∗)
and the value of the willingness to pay (as a proxy of the value of the market under
consideration).
In cases B. b and B.c the restrictions are such that we can respectively state that most
consumers are informed (as θ∗ ≤
√
θ¯θ) and most consumers are uninformed, (as θ∗ ≥√
θ¯θ). We shall consider in detail the deﬁnitions of demand functions and equilibrium
prices in case B.d, both because demand functions in the other cases turn out to be
combinations of the demand segments already considered in case B.d (thus candidate
equilibrium prices turn out to be the same) and also due to the fact that demand functions
in the other cases may be either perfectly inelastic to prices or even not deﬁned across
some price domain.
1.6.1 Demand functions
Considering then case B.d we assume that the following restrictions hold: PH − θ∆ ≥
PH−θ∗∆E ≥ PH−θ∗∆ ≥ PH− θ¯∆E and PL+ θ¯∆E ≥ PL+θ∗∆ ≥ PL+θ∗∆E ≥ PL+θ∆
to get:
max
{
θ∗
θ¯
,
θ
θ∗
}
≤ ∆E
∆
≤ 1
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Figure 1.10:
The previous restriction allow for most consumers being either informed or uninformed.
By sticking to that restriction, as to demand functions and their price domains we get:
DL (PL, PH) =

θ′ − θ if PH − θ∗∆E ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∆
θ∗ − θ if PH − θ∗∆ ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∗∆E
θ′′ − θ if PH − θ¯∆E ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∗∆
θ¯ − θ if 0 ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ¯∆E
Considering the price domains one at a time we can show that in the ﬁrst price domain
we are in case B.2, as described above. In the second price domain we are in case B.1
and in the third price domain we are in case B.3.
Considering the highest price, the demand for the low quality good is just given by
uninformed consumers with the lowest willingness to pay. When prices are lower the
uninformed marginal consumer moves towards θ∗and also uninformed consumers with
an intermediate willingness to pay switch to low quality goods. As shown also by ﬁg. 1.8
one can check that even for a set of lower and lower prices belonging to the second price
domain, DL (PL, PH) is inelastic to prices . Actually when all uninformed consumer buy
low quality goods, informed consumers, who can evaluate the real quality diﬀerential,
need to pay a very low price (than pessimistic uninformed consumers) to switch to low
quality goods. A further decrease of PL leads some of them to switch, until PL is so low
that the low quality ﬁrm can cover the entire market.
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As to the demand for high quality goods, it is complementary to DL (PL, PH) and can
be expressed as follows:
DH (PL, PH) =

θ¯ − θ′′ : if : PL + θ∗∆ ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ¯∆E
θ¯ − θ∗ : if PL + θ∗∆E ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ∗∆
θ¯ − θ′ : if PL + θ∆ ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ∗∆E
θ¯ − θ : if 0 ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ∆
With the highest prices, the high quality good is demanded just by informed consumers
with the highest willingness to pay, as they know the real quality diﬀerential. Informed
consumers with an intermediate willingness to pay are those buying the low quality good.
When PH decreases even the latter switch to high quality goods until all informed cos-
numers buy them. When the second price domain is reached then DH (PL, PH) becomes
inelastic to prices as the pessimist beliefs of uninformed consumers are such that a sig-
niﬁcant decrease of PH is needed to persuade them to buy the high quality good. Then
for further price decreases DH (PL, PH) is such to capture all the uninformed consumers
until the entire market is covered by the high quality ﬁrm.
Demand functions are then represented in ﬁg 1.11, 1.12
Figure 1.11:
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Figure 1.12:
1.6.2 Equilibrium analysis with pessimistic consumers
Still restricting our attention to case B.d, and then considering the demand functions we
have just analyzed, we look for candidate equilibrium prices for each price domain. We
make reference to the concept of Nash Equilibrium, as analyzed in section 1.4 to discuss
the optimistic case.
1.6.2.1 B.d.1
By considering the ﬁrst price domain, equilibrium prices should be such that:
PH − θ∗∆E ≤ P ∗L ≤ PH − θ∆
PL + θ∆ ≤ P ∗H ≤ PL + θ∗∆E
leading to the following proﬁt functions:
ΠL (PL, PH) = PL
(
θ′ − θ)− αq2L ΠH (PL, PH) = PH (θ¯ − θ′)− αq2H
and the following candidate equilibrium prices:
P ∗L =
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
P ∗H =
∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
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and equilibrium proﬁts:
Π∗L =
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)2
9
− αq2L Π∗H =
∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)2
9
− αq2H
By furtherly restricting the share of informed consumers we get:
θ∗ ≥ 2θ + 1
3
Considering then the quality choice we get:
∂ΠL
∂qL
=
4θ¯θ − θ¯2 − 4θ2
9
− 2αqL ≤ 0
implying then:
qL =
4θ¯θ − θ¯2 − 4θ2
18α
≤ 0
As low quality in equilibrium should be as low as possible, the low quality ﬁrm will
stick to the MQS. Therefore the low quality ﬁrm will supply qL = q0.Considering then
the high quality ﬁrm, the foc imply:
∂ΠH
∂qH
= −2αqL < 0
by considering the restriction on equilibrium prices in addition, we get:
qH ≤ q0 + ∆E (2θ + 1)
3
Considering that with pessimistic consumers ∆ ≥ ∆E , the previous condition holds for
∆ = ∆E , implying in turn that θ = 1. Therefore pessimistic expectations lead the high
quality ﬁrm to supply qH = qE , i.e. the quality expected by uninformed consumers.
Actually if the high quality ﬁrm decided to supply the MQS (as implied by the foc)
informed consumers will switch to the low quality good, therefore it is convenient for this
ﬁrm to increase qH above the MQS in order to retain the goodwill of informed consumers,
even though the pessimistic expectations constrain the size of the quality diﬀerential.
Informed consumers in this case still exert a positive externality on uninformed ones as
the quality level will not drop to the MQS. Moreover as qH = qE equilibrium prices will
reﬂect the quality diﬀerential provided by the high quality ﬁrm.
1.6.2.2 B.d.2
In this sub case we consider the following restriction on equilibrium prices:
PH − θ∗∆ ≤ P ∗L ≤ PH − θ∗∆E
PL + θ
∗∆E ≤ P ∗H ≤ PL + θ∗∆
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And given that demand segments are such thatDL (PL, PH) = (θ∗ − θ) andDH (PL, PH) =(
θ¯ − θ∗) , the proﬁt functions are given by :
ΠL(PL,PH) = PL (θ
∗ − θ)− αq2L ΠH(PL,PH) = PH
(
θ¯ − θ∗)− αq2H
In this sub case, as demand functions are perfectly inelastic to price, we observe that
the market is split between informed consumers, buying high quality goods, and un-
informed consumers buying low quality goos. Then in this price domain we observe
market segmentation according to information disparities. Equilibrium prices should be
just consistent with the restriction concerning the price domain. As perfectly inelastic
demands imply that the ﬁrm can charge a price as high as possible, but included in the
price domain, we are lead to consider the following candidate equilibrium prices:
P ∗L = PH − θ∗∆E
P ∗H = PL + θ
∗∆
Therefore a continuum of price equilibria can exist. If we resort to the condition which
ensures that the market is covered one equilibrium is the following: the maximun price
that ﬁrm L can charge is P ∗L = θq0, the price of ﬁrm H follows from the restriction on
the price domain (P ∗H ≤ P ∗L + θ∗∆), i.e PH = θq◦ + θ∗∆.
Equilibrium proﬁts will be given by:
Π∗L = θq0 (θ
∗ − θ)− αq02 Π∗H = (θq0 + θ∗∆)
(
θ¯ − θ∗)− αq2H
No further restrictions on θ∗are necessary in this case, but those already arising from
the price domain. In this equilibrium the low quality ﬁrm supplies the MQS to unin-
formed consumers. Concerning the high quality ﬁrm we can consider the foc:
∂ΠH
∂qH
= θ¯θ∗ − θ∗2 − 2αqH = 0
and the soc:
∂2ΠH
∂q2H
= −2α
through the foc we get:
qH =
θ¯θ∗ − θ∗2
2α
> 0
therefore the high quality ﬁrm is lead to increase qH with the increase of informed
consumers (i.e when θ∗ decreases).
1.6.2.3 B.d.3
Considering the restriction on equilibrium prices:
PH − θ¯∆E ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∗∆
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PL + θ
∗∆ ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ¯∆E
and the demand segments resulting from this restriction, we get the following proﬁt
functions:
ΠL (PL, PH) = PL
(
θ′′ − θ)− αq2L ΠH (PL, PH) = PH (θ¯ − θ′′)− αq2H
and obtain the following candidate equilibrium prices:
P ∗L =
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
P ∗H =
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
and equilibrium proﬁts:
Π∗L =
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)2
9
− αq2L Π∗H =
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)2
9
− αq2H
We can then notice that in this case, equilibrium prices and proﬁts boil down to the case
of vertical diﬀerentiation with perfect information. Therefore prices will reﬂect the real
quality diﬀerential provided by the high quality ﬁrm. By considering that the candidate
equilibrium prices should be included in the price domain given above, we get a further
restriction on θ∗:
θ∗ ≤ 2θ + 1
3
This restriction then implies that in this sub-case the share of informed consumers is
likely to be high, and therefore is consistent with the previous equilibrium results as the
share of informed consumers need to be high enough to let prices aand prioﬁts collapse
to the perfect information case. Considering then the quality choice we get:
∂ΠL
∂qL
=
4θ¯θ − θ¯2 − 4θ2
9
− 2αqL
implying then:
qL =
4θ¯θ − θ¯2 − 4θ2
18α
≤ 0
As low quality in equilibrium should be as low as possible, the low quality ﬁrm will
stick to the MQS and then qL = q0.Concerning the high quality ﬁrm, by considering the
foc we get
∂ΠH
∂qH
=
θ¯2 + 4θ2 − 4θ¯θ
9
− 2αqH
q∗H =
θ¯2 + 4θ2 − 4θ¯θ
18α
≥ 0
43
Therefore the high quality ﬁrm, in equilibrium is lead to provide a real quality diﬀer-
ential ∆ = q∗H − q0.Therefore in equilibrium, the share of informed cosnumers should be
high eneough to let prices reﬂect the real quality diﬀerential as in a standard model of
vertical diﬀerentiation and product diﬀerentiation will be such to relax price competition.
Interestingly this result holds even though not all consumers are informed, what matters
is the extension of the share of informed consumers in equilibrium.
1.7 Conclusions
In this model we have considered vertical product diﬀerentiation in a duopoly with cre-
dence goods. According to our assumptions both low quality and high quality ﬁrms
comply with a MQS and consumers have rational expectations about low quality, as low
quality ﬁrms actually choose to provide the MQS in equilibrium. High quality remains
completely unknown to consumers unless they are informed according to their willingness
to pay for quality and their information about product quality. Uninformed consumers
make decisions according to their misperceptions about the quality diﬀerential. A dif-
ference endogenously arises in the model between optimistic and pessimistic uninformed
consumers, due to the location of the informed marginal consumers with respect to the
uninformed marginal consumer. The shares of informed and uninformed consumers de-
pend on the location of a further marginal consumer. Such a location is exogneously given
but in our analysis we consider the deﬁnition of demand functions and then sub-game
perfect equilibria for any possible split between informed and uninformed consumers in
the market.
The diﬀerence between optimistic uninformed consumers and pessimistic uninformed
consumers arises endogenously into the model and we analyse these two cases sparately
from each other. Therefore we cannot consider random distributions of consumers beliefs
across the population, but we can analyse markets with vertical diﬀerentiation where
either optimistic beliefs or pessimistic beeliefs prevail across uninformed consumers. We
claim that competition between branded drugs and lately introduced generics can be a
good example of a market for a credence good with a MQS, where uninformed consumers
are characterized by optimistic beliefs (as in the case of brand loyalty). On the contrary
in markets where ﬁrms claim to supply green goods to be ranked as high quality products,
uninformed consumers may be pessimistic as far as they are skeptical about the feasibility
and proﬁtability of selling environemntally friendly product, such that ﬁrms overcomply
with respect to existing environmental regulations.
With optimistic beliefs by uninformed consumers we ﬁnd a conﬁrmation of a well
known result already found in the economic literature: if the share of informed consumers
is suﬃciently high then ﬁrms have an incentive to provide high quality goods, prices will
reﬂect the quality diﬀerential actually provided by ﬁrms and informed consumers exert
a positive externality on the small share of uninformed consumers. However past result
concerned perfect competition and monopolistic competiton, while we consider them in
a framework where asymmetric information and information disparities are introduced
in a vertical diﬀerentiation model. Such a result appears in our analysis when, due to
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the very high share of informed consumer, the model collapses to vertical diﬀerentiation
with perfect information. However our model is rich enough to consider, within the
case of optimistic uninformed consumers, diﬀerent equilibria according to the size of the
expected quality diﬀerential, the extension of the share of informed consumer, and the
fact that ﬁrms may compete either for informed or for uninformed consumers.
If the expected quality diﬀerential is not too large, most consumers are uninformed,
and in equilibrium all informed consumers buy the high quality good, then equilibrium
prices are distorted upwards (with respect to the full information case) and reﬂect the
expected quality diﬀerential. Considering the incentive to product diﬀerentiation by the
high quality ﬁrm we ﬁnd that though the real quality diﬀerential is lower than the ex-
pected one, still an increase of informed consumers leads the high quality ﬁrm to increase
the quality diﬀerential in equilibrium (considering that the low quality ﬁrm sticks to the
MQS). We can further notice in this case that while "rich" and informed consumers stick
to the high quality good being aware of the quality diﬀerential, less rich uninformed con-
sumers buy the high quality good due to their quality expectation.Therefore uninformed
consumers are cheated in equilibrium. Furthermore both equilibrium prices are distorted
upwards, as the low quality ﬁrm compete in prices with the high quality ﬁrm just to
achieve a greater share of uninformed consumers, while richer and informed consumers
stick to high quality goods, given their high willingness to pay for quality. Therefore
product diﬀerentiation softens price competition as in the canonical model with perfect
information, but uninformed consumers are cheated in equilibrium as they would have
chosen the low quality good if they were informed.
Still, if most consumers remain uninformed but their share is even lower than in the
previous case we can ﬁnd a diﬀerent equilibrium, where on the contrary rich and in-
formed consumers choose the low quality good while "less rich" uninformed consumers
buy the high quality good and the poorest one buy the low quality good. In this last
case the high quality ﬁrm just competes for uninformed consumers, given that all (rich)
and informed consumers stick to low quality. In this equilibrium there are no incentives
for real quality diﬀerentiation from the point of view of the ﬁrm claiming to sell high
quality good. Actually product diﬀerentiation is purely virtual as in practice the high
quality ﬁrm is lead to provide the MQS as its competitor does. That is why all informed
consumers stick to low quality goods, despite their higher willingness to pay. In equilib-
rium, prices continue to depend on expected quality and are then distorted upward as
before. Therefore uninformed consumers buying high quality goods are still cheated in
equilibrium. However equilibrium prices also depend on the share of informed consumers,
but consumers information aﬀects equilibrium prices asymmetrically as the price of the
"virtually" high quality good decreases with consumers'information and the price of the
low quality good increases with it. Actually as ﬁrms compete for uninformed consumers,
the high quality ﬁrm is especially hurt by an increase of the share of informed consumers,
as competition for uninformed ones becomes ﬁercer and in order to compete with the low
quality ﬁrms it should set lower prices On the contrary the low quality ﬁrm beneﬁts from
consumer information as it can extend its market share due to informed consumers and
still sell to uninformed consumers with the lowest willingness to pay, who cannot aﬀord
to pay higher prices.
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In our opinion this kind of equilibrium can well be adapted to represent the case of
competition between branded drugs and generics in markets with a minority of informed
consumers. In this last case even consumers with an high willingness to pay may switch
to a cheaper generic drug, when introduced in the market, as they know that generics
are equivalent or slightly equivalent to branded drugs. On the contrary optimistic mis-
perceptions may lead uninformed consumers with an intermediate willingness to pay to
continue to buy branded drug, despite their price. Generics are also bought by con-
sumers with the lowest willingness to pay due to their lower prices. However both prices
are distorted upwards, therefore the price of branded drugs may not necessarily decrease
after the introduction of generics but changes in consumers information may aﬀect price
competition and drive price reductions of branded drugs. Actually information provision
policies, widely used in this market, can then be grounded on our results.
If we consider the case with a majority of informed consumers and an even greater
expectation about the quality diﬀerential (uninformed consumers are more "optimistic"
than before), then if the share of informed onsumers is very large we can boil down to
the canonical case of vertical diﬀerentiation with perfect inﬁormation: As we said we can
then extend the result of the literature concerning information disparities in perfect and
monopolistic competition to vertical product diﬀerentiation.
In case the share of informed consumers is not so high (though most consumers are in-
formed) we can ﬁnd another equilibrium where prices can reﬂect the real quality diﬀeren-
tial (as with complete information) but also depend on the share of informed consumers.
In this equilibrium low quality goods are just bought by informed consumers with an
intermediate willingness to pay, while low quality goods are bought by all uninformed
cosnumers and by informed consumers with a the greatest willingness to pay. Therefore
the high quality ﬁrm competes for both uninformed an informed cosnumers, while the
low quality ﬁrm just sells to informed consumers This equilibrium actually requires a
very high expectation about the quality diﬀerential provided by the high quality ﬁrm,
as even consumers with the lowest willingness to pay are lead to buy the high quality
product. Furthermore as in equilibrium also a share of informed consumers buys the
high quality good, then the high quality ﬁrm has an incentive to provide an high quality
diﬀerential, though lower with respect to the expected one. Furthermore as both equi-
librium prices and the equilibrium level of high quality depend on the share of informed
consumers, one can show that the higher the share of informed consumers, the lower the
level of high quality and the lower the price charged by the high quality ﬁrm. Therefore
with information disparities, if most consumers are informed there are less incentives for
product diﬀerentiation and also more price competition resulting in lower prices for the
high quality good.
On the contrary the low quality ﬁrm can aﬀord to charge higher prices with more
informed consumers. Actually if the share of informed consumers increases then we have
more competition between ﬁrms to achieve informed consumers and this leads the high
quality ﬁrm to reduce the equilibrium price, as with more informed consumers the share of
uninformed consumers buying high quality goods (just on the basis of their expectation)
shrinks, increasing consumers adressing to the low quality ﬁrm. The latter can proﬁt
from consumers switching by charging an higher price. If the proﬁtable strategy for the
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high quality ﬁrm is to reduce both price and the quality level, we can then conclude that
increasing consumers information is detrimental to product diﬀerentiation and a stimulus
for price competition
While considering the pessimistic case, as uninformed consumers are skeptical about
the quality diﬀerential provided by the high quality ﬁrm, the latter faces a diﬀerent type
of adverse incentives, as even though supplying a level of quality higher than expected
may be feasible and proﬁtable, the ﬁrm will not ﬁnd it convenient as consumers may not
be willing to pay a corresponding price premium to the high quality ﬁrm. The market
may fail in providing higher quality goods, unless the share of informed consumers is
suﬃciently high. And actually also in the case of pessimistic consumers if the share of
informed consumers is very high the model boils down to the canonical model of vertical
diﬀerentiation with perfect information.Therefore the high quality ﬁrm is lead to supply
the quality diﬀerential provided with perfect information, equilibrium prices reﬂect the
real quality diﬀerential and there is a positive externality for the negligible share of
uninformed consumers.
But still restricting our attention to the case where uninformed consumers are not
too pessimistic, if the share of informed consumer is lower than in the previous case
we can ﬁnd another equilibrium where prices reﬂect the expected quality diﬀerential
and therfore at a ﬁrst glance they appear to be distorted downward with respect to
the canonical case with perfect information. When considering the equilibrium level of
product diﬀerentiation we can ﬁnd that the high quality ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to supply
exactly the quality diﬀerential expected by uninformed consumers.
It is interesting to point out that with pessimistic consumers a third type of equilibrium
can arise in case the location of (informed and uninformed) marginal cosnumers is such
to lead all uninformed consumers to buy low quality goods and all informed consumers to
buy high quality goods. In this case demand functions are perfectly inelastic to prices and
there is perfect market segmentation according to consumer information. As a continuum
of equilibria may arise in this case we just characterize one of these equilibria by making
resort to the assumption that the market is completely covered, which is made across all
the paper just for tractability reasons. (the more the number of marginal consumers the
more the analysis becomes cumbersome).
In our analysis consumers information and consumers beliefs are exognously given.
However we think that it could be possible to consider also a further stage about ﬁrm
entry and to consider sunk costs as R&D, which may aﬀect the real quality diﬀerential,
or advertising, that could aﬀect consumers beliefs and the expected quality diﬀerential.
The latter could then become endogenous to the model. In our framework expenditure
in persuasive advertising may then be provided a foundation through the analysis of
the optimistic case, while non informative advertising as a signal seem to be consistent
with remedies for market failures arising in the pessimistic case. Furthermore if persua-
sive advertising can modify consumers beliefs, an even richer model could be considered
where beliefs become endogenous. Finally as the case of optimistic consumers can be
well adapted to deal with competition in the drug market, with slight modiﬁcations we
can account also for price regulation and information provision to consider competition
between generics and branded drugs aﬀected by public policies.
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2 Collusion in regulated pluralistic
markets
2.1 Introduction1
Many countries have introduced some form of yardstick competition in order to regulate
prices in contexts where providers face limited competitive pressure. Examples are the
maximum price limits each water company may charge its customers in the UK (Ofwat,
1993); price caps imposed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to hold down
the wholesale price of natural gas and electricity in interstate commerce in the US (US
Department of Energy, 2002); postal tariﬀs determined by independent regulators in
countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and the UK (NERA, 2004); and prospective
payment system (PPS) that have been introduced to pay for health care services in many
countries (Schreyögg et al., 2006; Ma, 1994).
The fundamental idea behind yardstick competition is that the price (or price cap)
faced by each provider is dependent on the actions of all the other providers (Schleifer,
1985; Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993). According to Schleifer's rule, the price each provider
faces is based on the costs of all other providers in the industry but not its own. This
creates strong incentives for cost control: each provider's cost reducing eﬀort will not
be detrimental to the price it faces. A potential drawback with yardstick competition
is that providers have an incentive to collude on higher costs, ﬁrst because they can get
a higher price for their services and, second, because they can exert less cost reducing
eﬀort, thereby beneﬁting from slack (Wilson, 1989).
In contexts where there is a large number of providers, this is unlikely to be problem-
atic, mainly because the cost of collusion rises (Pope, 1989). But there is greater potential
for collusive behaviour in contexts where there is a limited number of providers. This is
most obviously a problem for small countries: for instance, Northern Ireland or Iceland
have considered introducing PPS arrangements for health services despite there being
fewer than ﬁve hospitals in each country. But even in larger countries, provision might
be concentrated among a handful of providers, as is likely for utilities, rail or postal
services and for specialist health services, such as bone marrow or lung transplantation.
There is also potential for collusion for services regulated at local authority or municipal
level, as is often the case for social care or education.
The incentive to collude with other providers will depend on the objectives of the
provider, particularly the extent to which their objectives correspond with those of the
1Joint work with: Marisa Miraldo,Imperial College Business School, Imperial College of London; An-
drew Street, Centre for Health Economics, University of York and Roberta Longo, Institute of Health
Sciences, University of Leeds
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price-setting regulator. We use the terms altruistic to describe providers that have ob-
jectives closely related to those of the regulator and self-interested to describe providers
whose interests are more divergent from those of the regulator (Rose-Ackerman, 1996;
Bozeman, 1984; Rainey et al. 1976). If providers diﬀer in their degree of altruism,
they may behave quite diﬀerently in response to ﬁnancial incentives (Aas, 1995). Diver-
gence among providers may arise in situations where greater plurality of provision has
been encouraged, as is evident for various services that may have been provided in the
past predominantly by public providers. For example, since the 1980s in England and
more recently in Denmark, there has been a trend away from public toward private local
provision of long-term adult social care, whether this be residential or domiciliary care
(Glendinning and Nolan 2009; Fotaki et al 2013). Some countries are encouraging mixed
provision of secondary school education, an example being the Academy programme
in England whereby academy schools are not regulated by their local authority but di-
rectly accountable to the national Department of Education (National Audit Oﬃce 2010,
Machin and Vernoit 2011). Similarly traditionally public National Health Service sys-
tems in England, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain are encouraging more private sector
organisations to enter the health care market to provide care to patients funded by the
NHS (Oliveira and Pinto, 2002; Aballea et al 2006; Levaggi, 2007; Pollock and Godden
2008).
Greater plurality may accentuate the principal-agent problem, extenuating divergence
between regulatory and provider interests. Public providers may have a strong sense
of mission, aiming to maximize the well-being of the people they serve (Wilson 1989),
just as the regulator would like. But private providers are also accountable to their
shareholders, with an interest in proﬁt making. This implies that they have a weaker
sense of public service mission, and might have objectives that are less closely aligned
to those of the regulator (Newhouse, 1970; Hansmann, 1980; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001).
If objectives are misaligned, providers may be more likely to resist or undermine yard-
stick competition arrangements. One way of doing this is by not making available the
information required by the regulator to set prices or budgets. The National Audit Oﬃce
notes that the Department of Education has to make complex annual calculations with
certain adjustments to determine funding but that Academy schools are often late or
fail altogether in submitting ﬁnancial data (NAO 2011). Unlike their NHS counterparts,
private treatment centres in England are not required to submit information about their
costs to the Department of Health (Mason et al 2008). It is diﬃcult to base prices on
costs if cost information is unavailable.
Another way to undermine yardstick competition is by colluding with other providers
with regard to the costs that they incur and, by implication, the cost information that
they do submit to the regulator. We explore the implications of this strategy in this
paper. There are a number of works that have addressed the issue of collusion under
yardstick competition (Boardman et al 1986; Tangeras, 2002; Chong and Huet, 2009).
However the existing literature assumes homogeneous providers, so does not address the
implications of greater plurality of provision. Our paper is close to Potters et. al. (2004)
in which the authors present an adapted version of Schleifer's model (Schleifer, 1985) and
test it experimentally in order to explore collusive incentives under diﬀerent yardstick
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competition schemes.
We extend this work by analysing incentives for collusive behaviour when heteroge-
neous providers are faced with regulated prices under yardstick competition. We analyse
the choice of cost when providers do not collude and when they do so, and we consider in-
centives to defect from the collusion agreement. Our results show that in markets served
by purely altruistic providers there is no collusion on costs while in markets served by
purely self-interested providers there is scope for collusion. The paper is organized as
follows. Section 2.2 introduces the main assumptions of the model, and considers coop-
erative behaviour under a yardstick competition model. Section 2.3 presents summarizes
the main results of the paper and section 2.4 draws the main conclusions.
2.2 The Model
Consider a market with three types of agent: consumers, providers and a regulatory
authority. We consider two providers (with i = 1, 2 ) each with its own population of
consumers deﬁned geographically, so that each provider is a local monopolist facing a
downward-sloping demand curve with pˆ being the price paid by consumers for each unit
of service q . In sectors that provide services of public interest, such as for postal services,
utilities, or the healthcare sector consumers may face the full or a partially subsidised
price. Under yardstick competition, the regulator establishes a payment that gives the
providers incentives to reduce costs. In particular each provider faces a regulated price
set beforehand equal to the average (say) of the marginal costs of all the other providers
in the market except its own (Shleifer, 1985). We assume that costs are observed by
the regulator. The regulator sets a cap -pˆ - on the price that each provider can charge.
Note that this restriction will bind in equilibrium otherwise there would be no need for
regulation. The main objectives of a regulation policy are to promote technical eﬃciency
and allocative eﬃciency by simulating the outcomes of competitive markets (Laﬀont and
Tirole, 1993). When providers enjoy a degree of monopoly power, they can provide a
lower volume of output than they would in a competitive situation and, thereby, secure
higher prices. This causes welfare loss. Moreover, monopoly ﬁrms lack incentives to be
cost eﬃcient, thus undermining technical eﬃciency.
The utility of provider i -Ui - is a function of the regulated price, the marginal costs
and the altruism level. We assume that altruistic and self-interested providers are dis-
tinguished by the degree to which they are concerned about consumer surplus,
CS =
ˆ ∞
p
q (x) d (x) (2.1)
This is graphically represented by the area under the demand curve for their services,
above their price. Recall that consumer surplus is decreasing in the unit price of the
service, so that the greater the degree of altruism, the greater the utility providers derive
from lower prices. We further assume that the provider cares about consumer welfare to
some proportion αi with i = 1, 2. Without loss of generality we assume that provider 2
is at least as altruistic as provider 1, i.e. α1 ≤ α2. We further assume that providers
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beneﬁt from slack, i.e. they derive utility from avoiding cost reducing eﬀort (Bradford
and Craycraft, 1996; Pope, 1989). The beneﬁt of slack S(ci) is an increasing function of
cost at a decreasing rate (i.e. S′(ci) > 0, S′′(ci) < 0). Thus the utility of each provider
is given by the sum of net revenues, the beneﬁt from slack, and the utility the provider
derives from increased consumer welfare,
Ui (pˆi,ci;αi) = (pˆi − ci) q (pˆi) + S (ci) + α
ˆ ∞
pˆi
q (x) d (x) (2.2)
Assumption 1:For i = 1, 2 i 6= −i we have: (i) ∂U2i/∂c2i < 0;(ii)|∂U2i/∂c2i | > |∂U2i/∂ci∂c−i|
Assumption (i) insures that Ui is well behaved and therefore that the second order
conditions for a maximum are met (it also ensures that the trace of the Jacobian matrix
is negative); (ii) states that the own price eﬀects on marginal utility are of greater
magnitude than cross-price eﬀects; (i) and (ii) ensure that the Jacobian determinant
is positive that is a suﬃcient condition for the equilibrium to be stable.
2.2.1 The ﬁrst best and free price scenario
For comparison purposes we ﬁrst develop a ﬁrst best benchmark. Consider a ﬁrst best
scenario by which the regulator can decide on both the price and the cost of each service.
In each local market the optimum is then characterized by the pair p∗i , c
∗
i that maximizes
social utilitarian welfare W (.) given by the sum of consumer surplus and the provider's
utility2 , i.e.:
W (pi, ci) = (1 + αi)
ˆ ∞
pi
q(x)d(x) + (pi − ci)q(pi) + S(ci) (2.3)
with i = 1, 2. Maximizing welfare with respect to price and cost, the social optimum3
is then given by the ﬁrst order conditions (FOC henceforth) with respect to the price,
(pi − ci)q′(pi) = αiq(pi) (2.4)
and with respect to the cost,
S′ (ci) = q(pi) (2.5)
According to (2.4) the optimal price should be such that the marginal net revenues
due to an increase in the price equal the change in consumer surplus weighed by the
altruistic parameter . Correspondingly (2.5) entails that the provider's marginal beneﬁt
from slack should be equal to the eﬀect of increased costs on revenues. From (2.4), the
socially optimal price rule can be written as:
2Note that consumer surplus shows twice in this utilitarian welfare function because some providers are
altruistic. We have assumed a utilitarian welfare function as it is commonly used in the literature.
Other functional forms would have an impact on our results but that is out of the scope of our
analysis
3Social optimum solved in Appendix B1
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pi − ci
pi
= − αi|εi| (2.6)
With ei being the price elasticity. For 0 < ai ≤ 1 we have a negative mark-up i.e.
p∗i < c
∗
iwhile for ai = 0 the mark-up is zero, i.e. p
∗
i = c
∗
i . For the existence of an interior
solution the condition ai < 1 − (q′(pi))/(S′′(ci)) must hold (ensures a negative deﬁnite
Hessian).
Note that the optimal price diﬀers with the level of altruism, so if a1 ≤ a2 the price
for the less altruistic provider is at least the same as the price for the more altruistic
provider, i.e. p∗2 ≤ p∗1, while by (2.5) the ﬁrst best cost of the more altruistic provider is
lower than the cost of the least altruistic provider, i.e. c∗2 ≤ c∗1 (see Appendix B1).
Before proceeding with the analysis it is useful to evaluate a free price scenario.
Maximizing
Ui (pˆi,ci;αi) = (pi − ci) q (pi) + S (ci) + αi
ˆ ∞
pi
q (x) d (x)i (2.7)
With respect to pi and ci the optimal price p
f
i and cost c
f
i are the solution for the
following FOCs: are:
∂Ui
∂pi
= (pi − ci) q′ (pi)− αiq (pi) + q (pi) = 0 (2.8)
∂Ui
∂ci
= −q (pi) + S′ (ci) = 0 (2.9)
Rearranging (2.8)
pi − ci
pi
=
1− αi
|i| (2.10)
We have a positive mark up, if ai < 1 (i.e. p
f
i > c
f
i ); zero mark-up for ai = 1 (i.e.
pfi = c
f
i ). In the latter when ai = 1 the free price solution is the same as in the ﬁrst best
solution with zero altruism.
Comparing (2.10) with (2.6) ∀ai, −ai/|ei| ≤ 0 and (1 − ai )/|ei| ≥ 0, it follows that
pfi > p
∗
i . Moreover given that the mark-up decreases with the altruism level it follows
that pf1 ≥ pf2 for a1 ≤ a2. Furthermore given (2.9) it follows that cf1 ≥ cf2 .
The following proposition summarizes the results.

Proposition 1 : In a free price scenario the price and cost of the more altruistic provider
are lower than those of the most altruistic provider. Furthermore providers' prices and
costs are higher than in the ﬁrst best.

Proof: Proof in Appendix B2. According to Proposition 1, in the absence of regulation
the provider would optimally price higher than the socially optimal price. Therefore, any
price cap regulation will bind in equilibrium.
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2.2.2 The provider's problem
Non-cooperative solution
We will analyse two types of games. First we start by describing a setting in which
providers strategically choose the cost level in a one shot game. In section 2.3 we char-
acterize a repeated game.
In a one-shot non-cooperative game, each provider i maximises its utility by choosing
the cost ci given the price rule to which the regulator will commit. Provider i 's problem
is given by,
Maxci Ui (pˆi,ci;αi) = (pˆi − ci) q (pˆi) + S (ci) + α
ˆ ∞
pˆi
q (x) d (x) (2.11)
Since we are considering a two-agent model, the yardstick rule is such that provider i
faces a price per service that is equal to the competitor's (−i) marginal cost in providing
the same service, i.e. (pˆi = c−i).
The FOC with respect to cost∂Ui/∂ci, is given by:
∂Ui
∂ci
=
(
∂pˆi
∂ci
− 1
)
q (pˆi) + (pˆi − ci) q′ (pˆi) ∂pˆi
∂ci
+ S′ (ci)− αiq (pˆi) ∂pˆi
∂ci
= 0 (2.12)
Proposition 2 : Under a non-cooperative the equilibrium is such that providers opti-
mally choose the same level of costs, i.e. cnc1 = c
nc
2 = c
nc, the cost does not change
with the altruism level. For a1 ≤ a2 ∀ai ≥ 0, cf1 ≥ cf2 ≥ cnc1 = cnc2 ≥ c∗1 ≥ c∗2, while
pf1 ≥ pf2 ≥ pnc1 = pnc2 ≥ p∗1 ≥ p∗2.
Proof : Proof in Appendix B3.
Corollary 1 : When providers are purely altruistic i.e. a1 = a2 = 1 then pf = cf =
cncc = pnc > c∗ > p∗. When providers are purely self-interested i.e.a1 = a2 = 0, then
pf > cf > cnc = pnc = c∗ = p∗.
Proof: Proof in Appendix B3.
The scenario under which providers are purely self-interested (a1 = a2 = 0) is akin
to Scheiﬀer's (1985) original model and the ﬁrst best price coincides with the yardstick
price the regulator has committed to. It follows that under such regulated price while a
provider's cost reduction leads to a reduced price faced by the other provider, it does not
adversely aﬀect its own price. This arrangement gives both providers strong incentives to
operate at a socially optimal cost level. Take the more altruistic provider (i = 2), which
aﬀords greater weight to consumer surplus. The price this provider faces depends on the
costs of the other provider, implying that the consumer surplus has less inﬂuence on its
own choice of costs. The opposite rationale holds for the more self-interested provider.
These results hold independently of the degree of altruism. Indeed, it is straightforward
to show that dcnci /αi = dc
nc
i /α−i(see Appendix B3).
However, for any other levels of altruism the regulated price is no longer set according to
the ﬁrst best price rule (indeed in the ﬁrst best p∗i < c
∗
i , ∀ai 6= 0, i = 1, 2). Consequently
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as the yardstick price is a weaker regulatory instrument when compared to p∗i it follows
that providers costs levels will be higher than in the ﬁrst best, i.e. cnc1 = c
nc
2 > c
∗
1 > c
∗
2.
Cooperative solution
Still on a one shot game, we will now characterize the cooperative solution within which
providers maximize their joint utility U =
∑
i Ui . The advantage of agreeing on a
strategy is that the providers can avoid competing against each other in lowering their
production costs. Collusion allows providers to limit their cost reducing eﬀort while
receiving a higher price for their services. Oﬀsetting these beneﬁts, there are the neg-
ative eﬀects resulting from lower demand as well as reduced consumer surplus (which
aﬀects utility in proportion αi ). Thus, the ﬁnal outcome will depend on the balance of
these eﬀects. Letting the superscript c indicate the cooperative solution, the following
proposition summarises the results in a cooperative scenario.
Proposition 3 : In a cooperative scenario, for a2 ≥ a1 and ai ∈ [0, 1] for i = 1, 2 the
providers' cost strategies are such that cc2 ≥ cc1, ∀ai ∈ [0, 1] i = 1, 2 and a1 ≤ a2. With
asymmetric levels of altruism cc2 > c
c
1 > c
nc > c∗i for i = 1, 2. Providers cost strategies
decrease on both levels of altruism (i.e. , dci/α−i < 0, dci/αi < 0).
Proof : Proof in Appendix B4.
Corollary 2 : In the case of homogeneous purely altruistic providers, i.e. a2 = a1 = 1
cost strategies are such that cc2 = c
c
1 = c
nc > c∗i . In the case of homogeneous purely
self-interested providers, i.e. a2 = a1 = 0 it follows cc2 = c
c
1 > c
nc > c∗i .
Proof : Proof in Appendix B4.
Note that, in a cooperative scenario, providers maximize joint surplus and there-
fore provider i's decision rule displays provider −i's altruism level. It follows that
the providers' optimization problem is symmetric apart from the diﬀerences between
providers' altruistic levels namely −α2q(c1) and −α1q(c2). This implies that the costs of
one provider decrease in relation to the level of altruism displayed by the other.
As in the non-cooperative solution, the more altruistic provider cannot inﬂuence the
consumer surplus it produces as this depends solely on the cost chosen by the other,
less altruistic, provider. It can impact, though, on the other provider's consumer surplus
even if this weighs less in the optimal decision rule. The situation under this yardstick
regime is akin to the two providers swapping their roles. Indeed, even though provider
2 is more altruistic than provider 1, a situation of pure collusion is such that provider 1
exhibits the strongest cost response in order to reﬂect the impact of costs on consumer
surplus. In this way provider 2 can aﬀord a higher cost. This higher cost will allow
provider 1 a higher yardstick price that will counterbalance the decreased beneﬁt from
slackness caused by a lower cost.
For a given cc−i , we note that the cooperative and the non-cooperative best responses
of provider i, are given respectively by:
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∂JU
∂ci
= −q (c−i) + S′ (ci) + (ci − c−i) q′ (ci) + (1− α−i) q (ci) (2.13)
and
∂Ui
∂ci
= S′ (ci)− q (c−i) = 0 (2.14)
These expressions diﬀer in the quantity (ci − c−i) q′ (ci) + (1− α−i) q (ci) . The term
(1− α−i) q (ci) is the net eﬀect that provider i's cost directly has on provider −i's rev-
enues. The term (ci − c−i) q′ (ci) is the eﬀect of a unit of provider i's cost on the joint
surplus as determined through the demand function. We note that, with regard to
provider 1, the impact is positive because cc1 < c
c
2. Thus we can conclude that, for a
given cc2 , the cooperative strategy of the more self-interested provider 1 is that it will
operate at a higher cost than in the non-cooperative scenario. It can be shown (see
Appendix B4) that this result holds also for the more altruistic provider 2.
If the market is served by two purely altruistic providers, the costs will be the same
as in the non-cooperative scenario
To summarise the results, given that the consumer surplus depends on the regulated
price and given that the regulatory scheme sets pˆi = c−i , the maximization of the joint
utilities (JU) is such that provider i's choice will aﬀect provider −i's consumer surplus.
It follows that provider i makes a decision on costs bearing in mind the altruism level of
the other provider.
Defection solution
This cooperative solution can never be sustainable in a one shot game. Indeed, consider
provider i. If this provider defects from the cooperative agreement (considering that
provider −i plays according to the cooperative strategy), then it will revert to behaving
according to the best response function as in (2.14) with the optimal defection cost cdi
(where the superscript d indicates defection) satisfying:
S′
(
cdi
)
− q (cc−i) = 0 (2.15)
Proposition 4 : Provider i's defection cost lies between the optimal non-cooperative
and the cooperative strategies i.e. c∗i ≤ cnc ≤ cdi . Furthermore cd2 ≤ cd1 for a1 ≤ a2
and the defection costing strategies are decreasing with both providers altruism level, i.e.
∂cdi /∂ai < 0, ∂c
d
i /∂a−i < 0 for i = 1, 2,−i = 1, 2, i 6= −i.
Proof : Proof in Appendix B5.
Intuitively provider i's best response is cdi < c
c
i , given the choice of the other, and it
would still face a higher price and therefore increase its surplus. The provider's decision
is based on the maximization of its own utility and the FOC will coincide with the non-
cooperative FOC. However the defection level will diﬀer from the non-cooperative level
as provider i is still playing the cooperative solution.
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Given the latter, since q′(.) < 0 the negative impact of the yardstick price on providers'
proﬁt through the cost of providing the service (i.e. −q(cc−i)) is higher in absolute value
for provider 2 (since in the cooperative scenario the demand for this provider is higher
than for provider 1) moreover sinceS′′(.) < 0 the cost of reducing the slack is lower for
provider 2. Therefore these imply that for provider 2 it pays oﬀ more to decrease its
marginal cost of providing the service (even if that implies a reduction in the beneﬁt
from slack) than for provider 1 and therefore the deviation strategies in equilibrium are
such that cd2 ≤ cd1.
Given that the cooperative costing strategies decrease with the altruism level, then it
follows that the cost of providing the service for each provider also increases with the
altruism due to an increase in the demand (i.e. −q(cc−i) is bigger in absolute value for
higher levels of altruism). Therefore both providers will need to deviate further from the
cooperative agreement in order to compensate for this impact of increased altruism on
the cost of providing the service.
To sum up we have shown that in a one shot game deviation from the cooperative
agreement is always proﬁtable and, consequently, collusion is never sustainable. Therefore
the one shot Nash equilibrium is non-cooperative. This result is consistent with the
ﬁndings of the existent literature (Tirole, 1988).
2.3 Repeated game: Incentives to collude
Let us consider a repeated game in which the providers can play grim trigger strategies
(Friedman, 1971). At the beginning of each period the two providers choose the cost
level and act according to the following trigger strategies. If one of them defects in
some period t, by choosing a cost level cdi 6= cci , then in any subsequent period the
other provider reverts to play her best response to defection from that point onwards.
This is a typical trigger strategy, whereby if a provider deviates from the cooperative
agreement all providers revert to the one shot Nash equilibrium from thereon. Therefore,
in deciding whether to stick to the cooperative agreement, a provider compares the stream
of proﬁts of cooperating U ci /(1− di) with the stream of proﬁts obtained by deviating i.e.
Udi + diU
nc
i /(1 − di) . It is easy to show that collusion is sustainable for provider i if
and only if di ≥ (Udi − U ci )/(Udi − Unci ) where Unci is the equilibrium payoﬀ provider
i receives in the non-cooperative scenario, U ci is the payoﬀ gained in collusion and U
d
i
is the payoﬀ obtained in defection. The outcome depends on the individual discount
rate di ∈ [0, 1], that represents the extent to which each provider considers short term
proﬁts more valuable than proﬁts accrued later in time. The higher the rate the lower is
each provider's incentive to collude. Therefore it follows that collusion is sustainable for
d ≥ d∗
δ∗ = max {δi, δ−i}
With
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Figure 2.1:
δi≥ (U
d
i − U ci )
(Udi − Unci )
δ−i≥
(Ud−i − U c−i)
(Ud−i − Unc−i)
When the market is served by two purely altruistic providers, i.e. ai → 1 it is easy
to see that providers have no incentive to collude since U ci → Unci . In fact providers
do not have an incentive to deviate from the non-cooperative cost under joint proﬁt
maximization.
If providers are homogeneous and self-interested, it follows that since d1 = d2 = d and
d decreases with the altruism level. Collusion in such a market is more likely than in a
market served by two purely altruistic providers.
In heterogeneous markets collusion stability will depend on d∗. Sustainability of col-
lusion in the presence of asymmetric providers depends on the shape of the demand and
slack functions. In particular for the more altruistic provider (provider 2) cooperation is
proﬁtable only if the beneﬁt from slack is big enough to oﬀset the ﬁnancial loss and the
decrease in consumer surplus that more altruistic ﬁrms have to bear in cooperation, i.e.
Unc2 < U
c
2 holds if and only if:
(S (cnc2 )− S (cc2)) ≤ (cc1 − cc2) q (cc1)− α2
ˆ ∞
cnc
q (x) dx+ α2
ˆ ∞
cc
q (x) dx (2.16)
If this condition is not veriﬁed, if provider 2 were to collude he would sustain a loss
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Figure 2.2:
with respect to the non-cooperative strategy in every single period, i.e. d2 ≥ 1 implying
that there would be no collusion (see Figure 2.2).
In order to infer how di changes according to the level of altruism we performed a
comparative static analysis to study how provider i's rate changes with their own and
the competitors degree of altruism. Proposition 5 summarizes the results.
Proposition 5 : A provider's incentive to collude is a decreasing function of its own
level of altruism and an increasing function of its competitor's altruism.
Proof: Proof in Appendix B7.
Departing from a homogeneous sector in which providers have the same level of al-
truism, increasing one provider's level of altruism decreases its incentive to collude in
the market, while increasing its competitor level of altruism increases the incentive to
collude. Thus in a heterogeneous market, the altruistic provider's incentive to collude4is
lower than it would be in a market where providers have the same level of altruism.
Intuitively it might be that homogeneous providers ﬁnd it easier and more proﬁtable to
collude because of their symmetric objectives.
With regards to the more self-interested provider 1, similarly it can be shown that, as
4Note that here we are merely referring to the individual incentive to stick with the cooperative agree-
ment rather than the sustainability of collusion as that will depend on the actions of both providers
considered simultaneously. That analysis follows in the paper.
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provider 2's degree of altruism increases, provider 1's rate decreases. Thus in a heteroge-
neous market, the self-interested provider's incentive to collude is higher than it would
be in a market where providers have the same level of altruism.
Comparing di across providers it is easy to show that d2 ≥ d1 for a2 ≥ a1 (see Appendix
B7) therefore as long as (2.16) is veriﬁed there is scope for collusion in heterogeneous
markets and collusion is less (more) likely when the altruism of the more (less) altruistic
provider increases (decreases).
Corollary 3 : For a given level of ai, since d2 ≥ d1 collusion is more likely to be sustained
in homogeneous than in heterogeneous markets.
Proof: Proof in Appendix B7.
This result is in line with the existing literature that has shown that asymmetries
between providers are an obstacle to collusion (see for e.g. Scherer, 1970; Barla, 2000;
Compte and Ray, 2002). Given that in many contexts policy has been to encourage
the entry of private providers in traditionally public settings these results suggest that
increasing the plurality in service provision renders collusion less likely to occur. Finally,
when comparing pure altruistic homogeneous markets with pure self-interested markets,
we notice collusion on costs higher than the non-cooperative costs is more likely in the
latter.
2.4 Conclusions
A potential drawback with yardstick competition regulation is that it might be susceptible
to collusion, because by colluding on higher costs, providers may be able to secure a higher
price for their services. We ﬁnd that the incentive will depend on the degree to which
provider objectives correspond to those of the regulator under yardstick competition
arrangements.
We generalize the literature analysis by allowing for provider heterogeneity in their
degree of altruism. By relaxing the assumption of provider homogeneity we are able to
explore a fundamental change in the provision of public services where greater plurality
is being encouraged. This is important given the trends toward greater mixed public
and private provision in many regulated sectors of the economy, including health care,
social care and education services, with governments encouraging more private sector
organisations to enter markets traditionally served by public providers.
Our analysis demonstrates that it is important to consider the composition of the
market when designing yardstick competition arrangements. We show that in markets
served by purely altruistic providers there is no collusion on costs while in markets served
by purely self-interested providers there is scope for collusion. We show that collusion is
more stable in homogeneous than in heterogeneous markets, i.e. departing from a scenario
where providers are homogeneous, we ﬁnd that a change in the altruism of one provider
decreases the stability of collusion in a repeated game. To sum-up, the incentives to
collude depend on the extent to which providers share similar objectives. With pluralistic
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markets being encouraged in many countries and sectors of the economy it is increasingly
important that provider heterogeneity is taken into account when designing regulatory
policies.
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3 Physicians' altruism and ex-post moral
hazard: (weak) evidence from Finnish
national prescriptions data
3.1 Introduction1
In this article we test the hypotheses of physicians' altruism and ex-post moral hazard
using a large national panel dataset of statin prescriptions records from Finland (n=17
858 829). The role of physicians and insurance in health care markets has been of interest
to economists since the seminal contribution of Arrow (1963). Pioneering the economic
analysis of physician behavior in the context of health care, Arrow (1963) noticed that
doctors may have motives and objectives that diﬀerentiate them from purely proﬁt-
maximizing agents.
Together with Arrow (1963), (1968) developed the original `ex-post moral hazard'
hypothesis, predicting that health insurance increases the consumption of health care
and leads to excessive consumption of services in a competitive health care market.
Ex-post moral hazard has since been the focus of numerous empirical and theoretical
studies in health economics (see e.g. Feldstein, 1973; Leibowitz, Manning, and Newhouse,
1985; Manning, Newhouse, Duan, Keeler, Leibowitz, and Marquis, 1987; Dranove, 1989;
Zweifel and Manning, 2000).
In the context of prescription drugs Hellerstein (1998) has further developed and tested
the ex-post moral hazard hypothesis by analyzing the decisions of a physician facing a
choice between branded and generic versions of a drug. Hellerstein (1998) assumed that
both the (indirect) utility of the patient and insurance expenditures enter the utility
function of the physician that internalizes a proportion of patients' utility in their own
utility functions, together with a proportion of the drug costs covered by the insurance
company.
In the theory model Hellerstein (1998) assumed that the branded version of the drug
is more expensive than the generic version, and showed that if the physician places a
higher weight on the patient's utility than on insurance expenditures, an increase in the
insurance coverage decreases (increases) the likelihood of the generic (branded) prescrip-
tion. An increase in the insurance coverage, in fact, increases insurance expenditures and
decreases patient's expenditures, ceteris paribus. As both these variables have a similar
1Joint work with: Matteo M. Galizzi London School of Economics, Behavioural Research Lab, LSE
Health, and Department of Social Policy; Ismo Linnosmaa Centre for Health and Social Economics,
Finnish National Institute for Health and Welfare and Marisa Miraldo Imperial College Business
School, Imperial College of London
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eﬀect on the physician's utility, higher insurance coverage leads to a lower probability
of generic prescribing when the physician values the utility of the patient more than
insurance expenditures.
Hellerstein (1998) then empirically tested the ex-post moral hazard hypothesis using
data from the 1989 National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) in the USA.
Physicians selected in the NAMCS survey recorded information on a random sample of
their patients who visited their oﬃces over a two-week period over the course of a year
in 1989. The dataset consisted of 38 384 patient visits to 1233 oﬃce-based physicians,
for a total of 492 multisource prescription drugs corresponding to 149 diﬀerent generic
compounds for which both branded and generic versions were available. Hellerstein
(1998) estimated a random eﬀects probit model for whether physicians prescribed the
branded or generic version of the drugs, and, while controlling for the characteristics of
the physician, found no evidence of ex-post moral hazard in insurance for multisource
prescription drugs in the NAMCS data.
Lundin (2000) further analyzed the eﬀect of health insurance on the probability of
physician prescribing a generic or branded version of a drug in Sweden. Making use of
prescriptions data (n=6142) on seven diﬀerent drugs collected from two pharmacies in
Tierp (Sweden) in 1992 and 1993, Lundin (2000) estimated a random eﬀects probit model
for whether physicians prescribed the branded or generic version of the drugs. Unlike
Hellerstein (1998), Lundin (2000) found some support for both the physicians' altruism
and ex-post moral hazard hypotheses in the market for prescription drugs in Sweden:
higher coverage decreased (increased) the probability of prescribing a generic (branded)
version of a drug.
Our research builds on these contributions in that we simultaneously test both altruism
and ex-post moral hazard in drug prescription behavior using a large national panel of
administrative data from Finland. We ﬁrst develop a theoretical model on physician
decision-making, which, in line with Hellerstein (1998) and Lundin (2000), predicts that
the higher is the patient's insurance coverage for pharmaceutical expenditures, the more
likely it is that physicians prescribe an expensive branded version of a drug. We then use
a large national panel dataset with all statin prescriptions in Finland between 2003 and
2010 (n=17 858 829 prescriptions) to test the physicians' altruism and ex-post moral
hazard hypotheses, while controlling for a large range of physician, patient, and drug
characteristics.
Our work contributes to the previous literature in three respects. First, we consider
the complete national administrative records for statin prescriptions in Finland: both
Hellerstein (1998) and Lundin (2000) considered speciﬁc samples of prescriptions in the
USA and Sweden, respectively, and included very diverse types of drugs in their analyses.
Second, we directly control for a broad range of physician, patient, and drug characteris-
tics: neither Hellerstein (1998) nor Lundin (2000) had information on income and other
patient characteristics, and we also have direct information on prices for each branded
and generic version of the statins in Finland. Third, taking advantage of the panel struc-
ture of our national administrative dataset, we directly observe the repeated prescriptions
of statins by physicians over time (to the same patient and to the whole sample of pa-
tients of the same physician), so that we directly account for multiple observations for
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both patients and physicians, and we explicitly model habit-dependent prescriptions in
our panel estimations, that is important in the context of chronic diseases. To the best
of our knowledge, ours is the largest national panel dataset to date (n=17 858 829) on
which the hypotheses of ex-post moral hazard, altruism, and prescription habits have
been explicitly tested in regard to drug prescription behavior.
Our main ﬁndings are the following. We ﬁnd weak and mixed evidence in support
of the hypotheses of physicians' altruism and ex-post moral hazard: although the es-
timated coeﬃcients associated with ex-post moral hazard and altruism are statistically
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (due to the large number of observations), their size is
very close to zero and their order of magnitude smaller than the eﬀects associated with
other key explanatory factors, such as the class of the prescribed statins and the year of
prescriptions. We ﬁnd, moreover, robust and strong evidence that the physicians' deci-
sions to prescribe branded versions of statins in Finland are habit-dependent: physicians
who have prescribed more branded drugs in the past are signiﬁcantly less likely to switch
to generic versions.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the theoretical
framework generating the hypotheses to be tested empirically. Section 3.3 presents the
data and Section 3.4 the econometric model. Results and conclusions are discussed in
Sections 3.5 and 3.6.
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3.2 Theoretical model
Although we use a diﬀerent setting to test predictions, the theoretical modeling proceeds
along the lines presented in Hellerstein (1998). We consider a physician i = 1, 2. . . I (she)
and a patient j = 1, 2. . .J (he). The physician acts as a double agent for the patient and
the health insurer (Blomqvist, 1991; Hellerstein, 1998; Lundin, 2000). The physician has
diagnosed the patient and chosen a therapeutic treatment that is eﬀective in curing the
patient. The physician now faces a choice between branded and generic versions of the
drug, denoted as b and g, respectively.
By consuming the version s in b, g of the drug, the patient j obtains utility:
Ujs = v (qs)− (1− r) ps (3.1)
where qs is the quality of the version s; the function v(q) measures the patient's utility
of consuming one unit of the drug with quality q ≥ 0; ps is the price of the version s;
and rj measures the fraction of the price covered by the patient's health insurance. The
term (1− rj)ps thus measures the copayment of patient j consuming the version s of the
drug. Since the branded and generic versions are bioequivalent, it is assumed throughout
all the following analysis that qb = qg(see also Hellerstein, 1998).
By choosing the version s in b, g of the drug, the physician obtains random utility:
Vijs = vijs + εijs = yi + γ1 [v (qs)− (1− r) ps]− γ2rjps + εijs (3.2)
where yi refers to physician's labor income, and the terms (1− rj)ps and rjps measure
the copayment of patient j consuming the version s of the drug and the corresponding in-
surance expenditure, respectively. In the simpler case where patients pay no deductibles,
the patient's copayment amounts to her total out-of-pocket expenditure for the version
s. In reality, out-of-pocket payments may include both copayments and deductibles.
Deductibles, however, do not play any role in physician's choice between generic and
branded versions of the drug, since the deductible level is usually lower than the price of
the cheapest version. It is assumed throughout the article that the insurance coverage is
determined independently of the version of the drug prescribed by the physician.
The parameter g1 in the utility function (3.2) measures the physician's altruism to-
wards the welfare of the patient. The parameter g2, on the other hand, measures the
degree to which the physician takes into account the consequences of her treatment
choices on insurance expenditures.
The value of the parameter g1 is zero for a selﬁsh physician and increases with the
level of altruism. The hypothesis on altruistic physicians is supported empirically if g1
is positive and diﬀers statistically from zero. The parameter g2 can be either positive, or
negative, valued. If g2 > 0, the physician internalizes the consequences of her decisions on
insurance expenditures and restrains pharmaceutical consumption. If g2 = 0, the physi-
cian ignores possible cost consequences. Finally, if g2 < 0, the physician takes advantage
of health insurance as an external means to ﬁnance the consumption of pharmaceuticals
and increases pharmaceutical consumption.
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The random term eijs in the physician's utility function captures unobservable fac-
tors aﬀecting the physician's choice between the two versions of the drug. Such factors
may be the advertising eﬀorts of pharmaceutical companies to promote the sales of their
products (Gonul et al., 2001) or the costs of prescribing generic versions of drugs (Heller-
stein, 1998). We assume that the random terms eijs are identically and independently
distributed.
The rational physician i prescribes the generic drug version to patient j, if Vijg ≥ Vijb.
Assuming that the random terms eijs are type 1 extreme value distributed, the probability
of the physician prescribing the generic version of the drug is given by (see McFadden,
1974):
Pr (sij = g) =
evijg
evijb + evijg
=
exp {Vijg-Vijb}
1 + exp {Vijg-Vijb} (3.3)
where
Vijg-Vijb = γ1 (1− rj) ∆p+ γ2rj∆p (3.4)
and Dp ≡ pb − pg is the price diﬀerence between the branded and generic versions of
the drug. Given that the price diﬀerence Dp is not aﬀected by physician's prescriptions,
the eﬀect of the insurance coverage on the probability of prescribing the generic version
is given by:
∂Pr (sij = g)
∂rj
=
exp {Vijg-Vijb} (γ1 − γ2) ∆p
(1 + exp {Vijg-Vijb})2
(3.5)
It is natural to assume that the branded version of the drug is more expensive than the
generic version (see e.g. Hellerstein 1998), which implies that Dp > 0. Then it follows
from the expression (3.5) that an increase in the patient's insurance coverage will decrease
(increase) the probability that the physician prescribes the generic (branded) version of
the drug if g1 ≥ g2, and the physician gives a higher weight to patient welfare than to
insurance expenditures. The following statement summarizes the main prediction of the
model:
Prediction 1 Provided that the branded version of a drug is more expensive than the
generic version, an increase in the patient's insurance coverage decreases (increases) the
probability to prescribe the generic (branded) version of a drug if g1 ≥ g2.
We next test this prediction using national prescriptions data from the Finnish phar-
maceutical market.
3.3 Data
Data on pharmaceutical prescriptions was obtained from Kela, the Social Insurance In-
stitution of Finland, which insures all Finnish residents. The original data contain infor-
mation on all drugs that were prescribed and dispensed in outpatient settings in Finland
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during each year between 2001 and 2010. The original data include lipid modifying
agents (Anatomical Therapeutic Class (ATC) C10), depression drugs (ATC N06A) and
two biological drugs (epoetin ATC B03XA01, and ilgrastim ATC L03AA03). In this
article we focus on prescriptions for lipid modifying agents (`statins').
Although information about the drug version (either a branded or generic) is available
for all prescriptions, data on patients' income are only available from 2003 onwards.
Therefore, in this article we consider all the prescriptions of statins in Finland from 2003
to 2010 for which generic substitution was available.
In the period from 2003 to 2010, a total number of 17 858 829 statin prescriptions were
issued in Finland2. More speciﬁcally, in the period 2003 to 2010, six statins were pre-
scribed in Finland: in decreasing order by total number of prescriptions, these were Sim-
vastatin (ATC C10AA01, 56.83% of the prescriptions), Atorvastatin (C10AA05, 22.08%
of the prescriptions), Rosuvastatin (C10AA07, 6.92% of the prescriptions), Fluvastatin
(C10AA04, 6.24% of the prescriptions), Pravastatin (ATC C10AA03, 4.52% of the pre-
scriptions), and Lovastatin (ATC C10AA02, 3.39% of the prescriptions).
The dataset contains information on the characteristics of dispensed pharmaceutical
products, patients, and physicians. We have access to information about the name,
strength, form, producer, ATC-class, number of sold packages, and Deﬁned Daily Doses
(DDDs) of the pharmaceutical products (in the above-mentioned ATC-classes) prescribed
by each physician and dispensed from all Finnish pharmacies each day for the period
starting 1st January 2003 to 31st December 2010.
In addition, the dataset contains detailed information about the full price of the pre-
scription and the amount reimbursed by the social insurer. Hence, both insurance cov-
erage and coinsurance could be computed for each prescribed package in our dataset.
The data also reveal if the prescribed product was substituted for another product at the
pharmacy, so that we are able to precisely disentangle whether the generic substitution
occurred by the initiative of physicians or pharmacists.
Observations are deﬁned at the level of an individual prescription, each of which con-
taining the above information about the pharmaceutical product, and linked to data on
the patient and the prescribing physician characteristics.
Original data does not contain information on whether the prescribed product is either
a branded or generic version of the medicine. The most updated oﬃcial information
linking prescriptions with the versions was obtained from the Finnish Medicine Agency
(FIMEA) and directly incorporated into the dataset. In particular, in our empirical
analyses we explicitly control for the type of statins by including dummy variables for
each of the 7-digit ATC groups (the reference group being Simvastatin, ATC C10AA01,
accounting for 56.83% of the prescriptions). Generic substitution in Finland is, in fact,
possible only within the same 7-digit ATC class.
The price diﬀerence between the branded and generic versions plays a key role in
both the theoretical and empirical analyses (see Hellerstein, 1998; Lundin, 2000; and
Section 2) and is expected to inﬂuence physicians' choices between the two versions of
2This is excluding Cerivastatin (C10AA06), for which no generic substitution was available in Finland,
and only one branded product was in the market in the period considered here.
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drugs. In our dataset, we observe information about the prescribed medicine, including
its price, but the data do not provide an indication of alternative products in competition
with the prescribed product, nor of their prices. We calculated the price of alternative
prescriptions, building on the principles developed by Lundin (2000). Lundin (2000)
considered as an alternative price to a generic prescription the price of the branded
competitor, and, as an alternative price to a branded prescription, the price of the generic
competitor with the largest market share.
We generalize the same principles by allowing prescribing physicians to have only a
coarse knowledge of the prices of alternative drugs (Kolassa, 1995). In particular, if the
prescribed drug was a generic version, we deﬁne the price of the alternative prescription
as the average price in the same calendar quarter as the prescription of the branded
product within the same 7-digit ATC class, with the same active ingredient, package
size, and strength. Similarly, if the prescribed drug was a branded version, we deﬁne
the price of the alternative prescription as the average price in the market in the same
quarter of the prescription of all generic products within the same 7-digit ATC class with
the same active ingredient, package size, and strength3 .
In order to calculate the average price, the price of each alternative product, either
generic or branded, was weighted in proportion to the share of the sales of that product
over the total sales of generic and branded versions within that 7-digit ATC class in the
same quarter of the prescription. If, for a speciﬁc quarter, the branded product was no
longer in the market (for instance because of the widespread use of generic alternatives),
the last known price of the branded version was used as an alternative price. Applying
these principles, we were able to compute the price diﬀerence (PriceDiﬀ henceforth)
between the branded and generic versions for each prescribed drug k as Dpk ≡ pbkpgk.
Information about patients in the dataset is quite rich. For each patient in the data,
we observe gender (Gender), the date of birth (from which we can calculate age, Age,
and the proportion of patients over 75 years old, Over75 ), the eventual date of death, the
taxable income (Income), and the type and amount of social security beneﬁts, if present.
In addition, we also have information on the reimbursement status of the patients. The
latter two variables are used to build illness severity proxies.
In the Finnish social insurance system, health insurance reimbursements can be clas-
siﬁed into three classes on the basis of the severity of a patient's illness and the type of
medication. Table 3.1 describes reimbursement rates for any pharmaceutical expenditure
in excess of the patients' deductibles in each reimbursement class: the variable rj stands
for the reimbursement rate of patient j, while dj is the deductible of patient j.
All drugs approved by FIMEA are granted the basic reimbursement level. To qualify
for the lower special reimbursement rate, the drug must target the treatment of diﬃcult-
to-treat chronic diseases, such as hypertension or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(COPD). Finally, to qualify for the higher special reimbursement rate, the drug must be
remedial and target the treatment of severe and life-threatening diseases, such as cancer
or diabetes mellitus.
Statin prescriptions are granted either the basic reimbursement or the low special
3Note that in each ATC group in our data there is only one branded drug.
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Table 3.1: Reimbursement classes in the Finnish health insurance
reimbursement rate rj , % Deductible dj ¿
Special reimbursement
- Higher 100 4.20
- Lower 72 4.20
Basic reimbursement 42 8.41
reimbursement rate, depending on the characteristics of the patient. The reimbursement
rate, therefore, can be used as a proxy of patients' health status.
We deﬁne a variable called Severe as a proxy of the severity of patients' disease based
on the reimbursement class they are in. The dummy variable Severe takes the value 1 if
the dispensed prescription received low special reimbursement, and 0 if the prescription
received basic reimbursement. Alternatively, we were able to control for patients' disease
severity by using another dummy variable, Ill, which is based on information about the
health insurance codes (so-called SVA codes) present in the prescription registers. A
patient purchasing the prescription was deﬁned as `severely ill' (the variable Ill taking
value 1) if the prescription was associated with health insurance SVA codes 203, 211, or
213, the Ill variable taking the value 0 otherwise. Although the information contained
in the Severe and the Ill variables coincide for 99.99 percent of the prescriptions4, we
report empirical results using either variable alternatively in the regressions.
The price diﬀerence Dpk = pbkpgk, together with the individual rates of reimburse-
ment rj allow us to deﬁne the two key variables that measure the shares of the price
diﬀerence paid by patients (PatOOP) and by the health insurer (InsExp). In particu-
lar, patient j's share of the price diﬀerence is given by PatOOP = (1 − rj)Dpk, while
InsExp = rjDpk is the corresponding share of the price diﬀerence faced by the health
insurer. As discussed in Section 2, in our analysis, a physician's altruism is operationally
measured by the coeﬃcient of the variable PatOOP, while the ex-post moral hazard is
measured as the degree of physicians' responsiveness to variables PatOOP and InsExp.
Our dataset identiﬁes prescribing physicians on the basis of a code (sv-code) that
entitles a physician to practice the medical profession as a certiﬁed practitioner. Every
physician with at least four years of university education can apply to receive such a code
in Finland. In addition to the sv-code, we observe the date and the ﬁeld of specialization
of each physician in the dataset that we use to build a proxy for experience (PhysExper)
measured as the number of years from the ﬁrst specialization degree. Fields of special-
ization, in particular, were grouped into 17 ﬁelds (internal medicine, cardiology, anes-
thesiology, surgery, neurology, psychiatry, diagnostic imaging, clinical and anatomical
pathology, infectious diseases, pharmacology, oncology, gynecology and obstetrics, ears
4In particular, 977 Ill prescriptions were not categorized as Severe, while 22 Severe prescriptions were
not categorized as Ill.
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nose and throat medicine, neonatology and pediatrics, dermatology, geriatric medicine,
and others). We also control for the physician's prescribing habits (PastBranded), proxied
by the portion of branded drugs prescribed by a given physician over the total prescrip-
tions in the previous twelve months, for each prescription of a 7-digit ATC statin with a
speciﬁc active ingredient, package size, and strength.
Table 3.2 (below) describes the main variables used in the empirical analysis. The
dependent variable is the binary variable Generic, taking the value 1 if a generic version
was prescribed, and 0 otherwise.
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistic
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Generic 17 858 829 0.6131 0.4870 0 1
PriceDiﬀ 13 350 469 39.0176 29.0871 0 227.2695
PatOOP 13 350 469 20.5571 15.7529 0 288.0607
InsExp 13 350 469 18.4605 160.828 0 163.6355
Gender 17 858 829 0.5078 0.4994 0 1
Age 17 858 829 65.8538 11.1833 0 105
Over75 17 858 829 0.2412 0.4278 0 1
Income 17 858 829 21 038 21 651 0 8 246 447
Severe 17 858 829 0.1941 0.3956 0 1
Ill 17 858 829 0.1942 0.3956 0 1
Simvastatin 17 858 829 0.5683 0.4953 0 1
Atorvastatin 17 858 829 0.2208 0.4148 0 1
Rosuvastatin 17 858 829 0.0692 0.2537 0 1
Fluvastatin 17 858 829 0.0624 0.2419 0 1
Pravastatin 17 858 829 0.0452 0.2078 0 1
Lovastatin 17 858 829 0.0339 0.1812 0 1
Men accounted for 50.8 percent of the patients prescribed statins in our data. The
mean age of patients using statins was 65.85 (with a standard deviation of 11.18 years),
with about one quarter of the statins prescribed to patients aged over 75 years. The
mean taxable income among the patients in the data was 21 038.54 euro (with a standard
deviation of 21 651.87 euro). In terms of disease severity, about 19.42 and 19.41 percent
of the patients were classiﬁed as Ill or Severe, respectively, in the latter case thus having
the right to the lower special reimbursement.
About 61.31 percent of the total statin prescriptions were generic versions. The average
price diﬀerence between the branded and generic prescriptions was 39.02 euro (with a
standard deviation of 29.08 euro). Patients paid on average about 52.69 percent of the
price diﬀerence (20.56 euro), while the remainder was paid by insurance (18.46 euro).
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In addition to the variables described in Table 3.2, in some of the empirical speciﬁca-
tions we use some further explanatory variables. In particular, to account for changes
in the economic, institutional, and health policy context (e.g. generic substitution and
reference pricing were introduced in 2003 and 2009, respectively5), we included dummy
variables for each year from 2004 to 2010 (the reference year being 2003). Furthermore,
we also used two physician-speciﬁc variables that are described in the next Section (Phy-
sExper and PastBranded).
3.4 Econometric model
The dependent variable of interest is the binary variable yijk = Generic, which takes the
value 1 if the medical doctor i prescribes the generic version of drug k to patient j, and
0 if the branded version of the drug is prescribed. In the empirical analyses we estimate
the probability that the medical doctor i prescribes the generic (versus branded) version
of a drug k to patient j, Prob(yijk = 1)6.
In order to directly test for the altruism and ex-post moral hazard hypotheses, in the
baseline empirical speciﬁcation the probability of prescribing a generic drug is modeled
as a function of the price diﬀerence paid by the patients (PatOOP ) and by the health in-
surance (InsExp); the main patient-speciﬁc characteristics Xj(Gender, taking the value
1 for females; Age; and Income); and the drug-speciﬁc dummy variables Dk (Ator-
vastatin, Rosuvastatin, Fluvastatin, Pravastatin, Lovastatin, ﬁve dummies capturing the
7-digit ATC classes of statins, with the reference drug being Simvastatin).
Further empirical models include among the explanatory variables diﬀerent measures
for the severity of the patient's illness (either Ill or Severe, two dummies for the sever-
ity of patients' medical conditions); year-speciﬁc dummy variables (the reference year
being 2003); and physician-speciﬁc characteristics Phi. The latter are either physician's
experience (PhysExper) or physician prescribing habits (PastBranded) as deﬁned above.
Formally, the most general econometric model thus takes the form:
Prob(yijk = 1) = Λ (α+ γ1(1− rj)∆pk + γ2rj∆pk + βPhi + δXj + φDk + τY ) (3.6)
where Λ is the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution; rj is the
reimbursement rate of patient j; Dpk is the price diﬀerence between the branded and
generic versions of drug k; Phi is the variable for physician experience as deﬁned above;
Xj refers to a vector of patient-speciﬁc variables; Dk is a vector of drug-speciﬁc dummies;
and Y a vector of year dummies.
5The reference pricing (RP) is a pharmaceutical price regulation scheme where the patient (or in-
surance) is ﬁnancially responsible for the diﬀerence between the price of the purchased drug and a
predetermined `reference price'. See Galizzi, Ghislandi, Hokkanen, Kangasharju, Linnosmaa, Miraldo
and Valtonen (2009) and Galizzi, Ghislandi and Miraldo (2011) for reviews of the RP experiences in
Finland and internationally, respectively.
6We have also replicated the analysis while considering a diﬀerent dependent variable based on whether
the pharmacist dispenses a generic version of the drug to a patient, and found substantially similar
results (available upon request).
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As discussed in Section 3.2, the parameters g1 and g2 measure the weights that the
physician places on patients' welfare and health insurance expenditures, respectively. The
empirical speciﬁcation (3.6) allows the estimation of the parameters. The results of the
empirical analysis give support to the doctors' altruism hypothesis, if g1 > 0, and to the
ex-post moral hazard hypothesis if g1 > g2. The identiﬁcation of the parameters rests on
the assumption that the price diﬀerence Dpk is independent of physicians' prescriptions,
which is indeed satisﬁed given the Finnish institutional context and the principles based
on which we have constructed the price diﬀerences.
In line with the theoretical model in Section 2, we estimate the logit speciﬁcation of
the empirical model (3.6). To take advantage of the unique longitudinal dimension of
our dataset, we estimated panel logit models. In particular, we estimate a set of random-
eﬀects (RE) panel logit models, which look at each physicianpatient pair i−j over time,
and treats the pair-speciﬁc eﬀects as unobserved random variables uncorrelated with the
regressors:
Pr(yi−jt = 1|xi−jt, αi−j) = Λ
(
αi−j + x′i−jtβ
)
(3.7)
where L(z) = ez/((1 + ez)), the vector xi−jt contains the independent variables dis-
cussed above, and ai−j ∼ N(0,sv2a). To correct for possible error correlation over time
for a given physicianpatient pair, we use cluster-robust standard errors at the i − j
pair level. The pair-speciﬁc eﬀects are integrated out over the joint density function.
Since there is no analytical solution to the integral, numerical methods are used in the
estimation, such as the adaptive 12-point Gauss-Hermite quadrature.
In our case, the RE panel logit model results in an unbalanced panel structure with
the number of time observations for each doctorpatient pair being equal to the number
of drug prescriptions in the 2003-2010 period under consideration. On average, the
doctorpatient pairs have 10.54 drug prescriptions over that period (with a standard
deviation of 10.29), with half of the observations having 6 or more prescriptions, and a
quarter having 12 or more, up to a maximum of 150.
In order to obtain a clean panel structure using the calendar time as the temporal
dimension, we eliminated the rare cases (a total of 41 976 observations, 0.23% of the
total number of observations) where more than one drug was prescribed on the same day
within the same physicianpatient pair. We have directly tested whether the observations
excluded were systematically diﬀerent from the remainder in terms of observable char-
acteristics, and could not reject the null hypothesis of no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
the two groups.
Notice that the estimation of an RE panel logit model entails the assumption that the
physicianpatient pair-speciﬁc eﬀects are uncorrelated with the regressors. Relaxing this
assumption would in principle require the estimation of a ﬁxed-eﬀect (FE) panel logit
model, treating the pair-speciﬁc eﬀects as unobserved random variables that potentially
correlate with the regressors. In our case, however, the FE panel logit model is not a vi-
able option, since jointly estimating the high number of incidental physicianpatient ﬁxed
eﬀects together with the other model parameters would lead to inconsistent estimations
due to very few time points in our short panel.
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All estimations were conducted with Stata 13, using the High Performance Computer
at Imperial College London.
3.5 Results
We ﬁrst estimate a baseline RE panel logit model (Model 1 ) where the probability of
prescribing a generic drug is a function of the shares of the price diﬀerences paid by
patients and the health insurance, controlling for age, gender, and income of the patients,
and for drug-speciﬁc dummy variables. We then add dummy variables into the model to
control for patients' severity of disease (Models 2 and 3 ), as well as dummy variables for
each year in our dataset (Model 4 ). The same analysis is then replicated by estimating the
corresponding RE panel logit models while controlling for either physicians' experience
(Models 5-8 ), or physicians' past shares of the prescriptions of the branded versions of
the drugs (Models 9-12 ). Further sets of estimations (all available on request) have
been replicated in order to test for robustness when considering the sub-samples of the
population (e.g. older than 75); generic substitutions by the pharmacists (instead of the
physicians); probit models (instead of logit); and sub-sets of years (e.g. excluding years
after 2009 when a reference price was introduced). Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 below display
the estimation results of the three main sets of estimations.
As can be seen in Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, our results seem to provide some support for
the physicians' altruism hypothesis in the Finnish statin market. The higher the share
of the price diﬀerence paid by patients, the higher is the probability that physicians
prescribe the generic version of the pharmaceutical (i.e. g1 > 0). From this perspective,
our results are thus similar to Lundin's (2000) ﬁndings in Sweden for 19937.
Given the large number of observations of our prescriptions dataset, it is not too
surprising that the estimated eﬀect of the altruism coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant
across the diﬀerent models. Three further aspects deserve a more developed discussion.
First, the estimated altruism coeﬃcient is very small in magnitude and close to zero.
It is true that its size is broadly in line with the eﬀects of patients' socio-demographics,
such as income or age, but it should also be noticed that the estimated eﬀect is orders
of magnitude smaller than the eﬀects associated with other key explanatory variables.
Second, other factors appear to be the main drivers of generic substitution in Finland.
Rather than being based on considerations related to the patients' out-of-pocket pay-
ments, the physicians' decision to prescribe the generic or branded version of the statins
is mainly associated with the class of the prescribed statins; the timing of the prescrip-
tions; the status of the patients; and the physicians' past experience. In particular, the
generic prescription is far less likely when the prescribed statin is not Simvastatin, with
particularly remarkable eﬀects for Fluvastatin, Rosuvastatin, and Atorvastatin. More-
over, generic substitution becomes gradually much more likely as time has passed, re-
7Our estimates of the parameters g1 are larger in magnitude than Lundin's (2000) estimates, suggesting
that the eﬀects of doctors' altruism may be larger in Finland in 20032010 than in Sweden in 1993.
Such diﬀerences in the results, however, may be due to diﬀerent modeling choices or data, or to
diﬀerences in the institutional context (for instance, the introduction of the generic substitution
policy in Finland in 2003).
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Table 3.3: Results of the random eﬀects panel logit model
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
PatOOP 0.0376*** 0.0110*** 0.0110*** 0.0381***
0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
InsExp 0.0080*** 0.0359*** 0.0359*** -0.0127***
0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
Gender 0.2889*** 0.0549*** 0.0552*** 0.6969***
0.0120 0.0116 0.0116 0.0117
Age 0.0555*** 0.0576*** 0.0576*** -0.0999***
0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006
Income 0.0317*** 0.0273*** 0.0273*** -0.0020***
0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
Atorvastatin -14.6338*** -13.8391*** -13.8379*** -14.0945***
0.0286 0.0279 0.0279 0.0245
Rosuvastatin -28.9538*** -23.4818*** -23.4783*** -23.3092***
0.0476 0.0745 0.0737 0.0619
Fluvastatin -32.5642*** -31.5209*** -31.5210*** -23.4584***
0.0404 0.0417 0.0417 0.0882
Pravastatin -9.7950*** -12.0383*** -12.0363*** -8.3476***
0.0268 0.0366 0.0375 0.0245
Lovastatin -3.2090*** -2.8483*** -2.8479*** -0.5434***
0.0253 0.0236 0.0236 0.0261
Ill -3.5365***
0.0191
Severe -3.5412***
0.0191
2004 2.1208***
0.0150
2005 4.6528***
0.0164
2006 6.2075***
0.0171
2007 7.4898***
0.0171
2008 8.5222***
0.0192
2009 9.0679***
0.0210
2010 11.1415***
0.0257
Constant 5.2378*** 5.5576*** 5.5583*** 8.3670***
N 17 858 829 17 858 829 17 858 829 17 858 829
Log-L -1960969 -1942662.3 -1942661 -1664209.8
Wald χ 2 1268203.38*** 1074915.73*** 1075638.49*** 605518.14***
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Table 3.4: Results of the random eﬀects panel logit model with doctors' experience eﬀects
Variables Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
PatOOP 0.0336*** 0.0147*** 0.0145*** 0.0334***
0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004
InsExp 0.0101*** 0.0302*** 0.0301*** 0.0068***
0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004
Gender 0.2512*** 0.0442** 0.0380** 0.6142***
0.0185 0.0189 0.0187 0.0173
Age 0.0586*** 0.0622*** 0.0634*** -0.0893***
0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008
Income 0.0209*** 0.0170*** 0.0172*** -0.0029***
0.0002 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003
PhysExper 0.2087*** 0.1957*** 0.1977*** 0.0025***
0.0010 0.0013 0.0013 0.0009
Atorvastatin -14.3656*** -12.9302*** -12.9925*** -13.0618***
0.0327 0.0292 0.0286 0.0316
Rosuvastatin -28.6611*** -26.7189*** -26.8181*** -22.2205***
0.1876 0.1606 0.1715 0.0780
Fluvastatin -34.6019*** -31.8933*** -32.0945*** -21.8357***
0.1103 0.0744 0.0726 0.0639
Pravastatin -12.3583*** -11.3999*** -11.3979*** -8.1665***
0.0408 0.0490 0.0415 0.0368
Lovastatin -3.5421*** -3.2445*** -3.2573*** -0.6222***
0.0427 0.0411 0.0416 0.0402
Ill -3.1744***
0.0274
Severe -3.1744***
0.0274
2004 2.0664***
0.0212
2005 4.4990***
0.0230
2006 5.9747***
0.0238
2007 7.2670***
0.0249
2008 8.2781***
0.0263
2009 8.7422***
0.0276
2010 10.8485***
0.0321
Constant 3.4693*** 3.3262*** 3.3245*** 6.0195***
N 4 219 510 4 219 510 4 219 510 4 219 510
Log-L -812241.7 -806476.5 -806006.5 -691989.7
Wald χ2 395956.15*** 416510.38*** 437581.45*** 366641.07***
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Table 3.5: Results of the random eﬀects panel logit model with doctors' habits eﬀects
Variables Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
PatOOP 0.0385*** 0.0048*** 0.0048*** 0.0366***
0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
InsExp -0.0094*** 0.0258*** 0.0259*** -0.0123***
0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
Gender 0.5133*** 0.3035*** 0.3022*** 0.6303***
0.0102 0.0105 0.0105 0.0109
Age -0.0608*** -0.0477*** -0.0477*** -0.0939***
0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
Income 0.0030*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** -0.0022***
0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003
PastBranded -11.0729*** -10.5522*** -10.5550*** -6.0536***
0.0182 0.0176 0.0177 0.0236
Atorvastatin -3.0324*** -2.4207*** -2.4249*** -8.2275***
0.0213 0.0190 0.0191 0.0281
Rosuvastatin -10.0697*** -9.7872*** -10.2294*** -16.6532***
0.0935 0.1241 0.1871 0.0522
Fluvastatin -15.7918*** -14.6833*** -14.7048*** -17.5825***
0.0506 0.0483 0.0494 0.1443
Pravastatin -3.7717*** -3.4179*** -3.4219*** -5.5751***
0.0237 0.0221 0.0222 0.0244
Lovastatin -1.6221*** -1.3076*** -1.3059*** -0.7553***
0.0242 0.0239 0.0239 0.0254
Ill -2.9006***
0.0143
Severe -2.8992***
0.0145
2004 1.1770***
0.0153
2005 2.9486***
0.0169
2006 3.7311***
0.0183
2007 4.3404***
0.0198
2008 4.8913***
0.0213
2009 5.1713***
0.0224
2010 6.7571***
0.0254
Constant 13.4153*** 12.5973*** 12.6016*** 10.3093***
N 9 714 779 9 714 779 9 714 779 9 714 779
Log-L -1628755.7 -1615883.5 -1615826.7 -1575877.8
Wald χ2 907837.72*** 804929.79*** 789530.22*** 761915.17***79
ﬂecting general changes in the policy and the institutional context (Models 4, 8, and 12 )
in Finland. On the other hand, physicians tend to prescribe more branded versions of
statins to patients aﬀected by more severe health conditions (Models 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, and
11 ). Finally, while physicians' experience does not seem to play a major role in generic
substitution (Models 5-8 ), physicians' habits do: the larger is the past share of branded
versions of the drug, the more likely it is that the physician continues to prescribe branded
statins (Models 9-12 ).
Third, in only half of the estimated models (Models 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 12 ) were we
able to ﬁnd evidence that g1 > g2. The ex-post moral hazard hypothesis that physicians
value patients' welfare more than insurance expenditures, in particular, is not supported
in the models while controlling for patients' illness severity (Models 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, and
11 ). Moreover, the sign of the estimated g2 coeﬃcient is not robust across diﬀerent
speciﬁcations. As observed above for g1, this is because, although both the altruism and
the moral hazard coeﬃcients appear signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero due to the very large
number of observations, their size is very close to zero, so that slight variations in the
empirical speciﬁcations can shift their sign from positive into negative (Models 4, 9, and
12 ).
All in all, while we ﬁnd remarkable eﬀects of physicians' habits and path-dependence
in generic versus branded prescriptions, the evidence on both altruism and ex-post moral
hazard is mixed and rather weak in our data.
We replicated the empirical analysis, focusing on patients aged over 75 years only, which
yielded substantially analogous results, with the only exception of a consistently negative
eﬀect of age: older subjects are less likely to be given generic versions of the drugs.
We also replicated the analysis while considering as the dependent variable the generic
substitution at the pharmacy level, ﬁnding substantially equivalent results. Finally, we
also replicated the estimations using probit rather than logit models, and considering
only sub-sets of years, for instance, excluding the years after 2009, when a reference price
was introduced. The main ﬁndings described above are substantially unaltered across all
these robustness check estimations. All additional analyses are available upon request.
3.6 Conclusions
We tested the physicians' altruism and moral hazard hypotheses using a large national
dataset of drug prescription records from Finland (n=17 858 829). We estimated the
probability that physicians prescribe generic versus branded versions of statins drugs
for their patients as a function of the shares of the diﬀerence in prices that patients
have to pay out of their pocket and that are covered by insurance. Given that in Finland
physicians bear no ﬁnancial consequences whatsoever for the type of drug they prescribe,
doctors are assumed to behave altruistically if they prescribe generic versions of the drug
when patients' out-of-pocket payments are large. Moreover, prescribing of more branded
versions of the drugs when insurance reimbursement rates are high provides evidence for
physicians' moral hazard.
We have estimated the probability that physicians prescribe the generic version of
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statins using a set of random eﬀects panel logit models while controlling for a wide range
of doctor, patient, and drug characteristics. The results of all our estimations provide
mixed and rather weak evidence on the hypotheses of physicians' altruism and ex-post
moral hazard in the Finnish statins market: although the estimated coeﬃcients associated
with ex-post moral hazard and altruism are, due to the large number of observations,
statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, their size is very close to zero, and is orders
of magnitude smaller than the eﬀects associated with other key explanatory factors, such
as the class of the prescribed statins, and the year of prescriptions.
We ﬁnd, moreover, robust and strong evidence that the physicians' decision to prescribe
branded versions of statins in Finland is a self-reinforcing pattern, in the sense that
physicians who have prescribed more branded drugs in the past are less likely to switch
to generic versions. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the largest national panel
dataset to date on which the hypotheses of ex-post moral hazard, altruism, and habit-
dependence have been explicitly tested in regard to drug prescription behavior.
More broadly, our results complement and qualify the ﬁndings from other streams of
the health economics literature that have found some evidence for physicians' altruism,
mainly in lab experiments (Hennig-Schmidt, Selten, and Wiesen, 2011; Godager and
Wiesen, 2013; Galizzi, Godager, Linnosmaa, Tammi, and Wiesen, 2015). Further re-
search is needed to test whether physicians' altruism depends on the healthcare context
(e.g. drug prescription versus treatment choice), the type of drug prescriptions (e.g. re-
peated versus one-oﬀ), or the nature of the diseases (e.g. cardiovascular versus mental
health).
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4 Appendix A
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4.1 A1
a restiction on informed consumer came from price range in demand function, when we
have θ¯θ∗ ≤ θ
∗
θ ,
we obtain θ∗ ≥
√
θ¯θ this inequlity say that θ∗must be bigger than geometric mean of
minimun willingness to pay θ and the maximum willingness to pay θ¯
and considering θ¯ = θ + 1
we have the result θ∗ ≥√θ (θ + 1) .
Using a laurent expansion for θ =∞
θ + 12 − 18θ +
1
16θ2
− 5
128θ3
+O
so the number of informer consumers is approaching 1/2 of the market size when θ
increase.
for opposite case θ¯θ∗ ≥ θ
∗
θ , we obtain: θ
∗ ≤
√
θθ¯so θ∗must be lower than geometric
mean of minimun willingness to pay θ and the maximum willingness to pay θ¯
4.2 A2
Optmist θ′ ≤ θ′′ or ∆E ≥ ∆
We assume an eﬀort to increase quality level. the functional forma for eﬀor is the usual
found in licterature αq2i
∆E = qE − q0 and ∆ = qH − qL or if qL = q0∆ = qH − q0
A.a
restriction:
PH − θ∆E ≥ PH − θ∗∆ ≥ PH − θ∗∆E ≥ PH − θ¯∆ (4.1)
PL + θ¯∆ ≥ PL + θ∗∆E ≥ PL + θ∗∆ ≥ PL + θ∆E
obtain:
1 ≤ ∆E
∆
≤ min
{
θ∗
θ
,
θ¯
θ∗
}
Given these restrictions we can specify price domains and market demands as follows:
DL (PL, PH) =

θ′ − θ if PH − θ∗∆ ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∆E
θ′ − θ + θ′′ − θ∗ if PH − θ∗∆E ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∗∆
θ′′ − θ if PH − θ¯∆ ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∗∆E
θ¯ − θ if 0 ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ¯∆
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DH (PL, PH) =

θ¯ − θ′′ if PL + θ∗∆E ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ¯∆
θ¯ − θ′′ + θ∗ − θ′ if PL + θ∗∆ ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ∗∆E
θ¯ − θ′ if PL + θ∆E ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ∗∆
θ¯ − θ if 0 ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ∆E
A.a.1
restriction
PH − θ∗∆ ≤ P ∗L ≤ PH − θ∆E
PL + θ∆E ≤ P ∗H ≤ PL + θ∗∆
proﬁt function:
ΠL (PL, PH) = PL
(
θ′ − θ)− αq2L ΠH (PL, PH) = PH (θ¯ − θ′)− αq2H
price:
P ∗L =
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
P ∗H =
∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
Equilibrium proﬁt:
Π∗L =
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)2
9
− αq2L Π∗H =
∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)2
9
− αq2H
restictin on θ∗:
θ∗ ≥ ∆E (2θ + 1)
3∆
Quality stage:
derivate:
∂ΠL
∂q0
=
4θ¯θ − θ¯2 − 4θ2
9
≤ 0
∂ΠL
∂qL
= −2αqL ≤ 0
∂ΠH
∂qH
= −2αqH ≤ 0
∂ΠH
∂qE
=
θ¯2 + 4θ2 − 4θ¯θ
9
≥ 0
from restriction
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qH ≥ q0 + ∆E (2θ + 1)
3θ∗
Π∗L =
(qE − q0)
(
θ¯ − 2θ)2
9
−αq20 Π∗H =
(qE − q0)
(
2θ¯ − θ)2
9
−α
(
q0 +
∆E (2θ + 1)
3θ∗
)2
The results are equivalent to case A.b.1 already discussed in chapter 1
A.a.2
Restiction:
PH − θ∗∆E ≤ P ∗L ≤ PH − θ∗∆
PL + θ
∗∆ ≤ P ∗H ≤ PL + θ∗∆E
proﬁct function:
ΠL (PL, PH) = PL
(
θ′ − θ + θ′′ − θ∗)−αq2L ΠH (PL, PH) = PH (θ¯ − θ′′ + θ∗ − θ′)−αq2H
price:
P ∗L =
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))
3 (∆E + ∆)
P ∗H =
∆E∆ (θ + θ
∗ + 2)
3 (∆E + ∆)
1 came from
(
θ¯ − θ)so it is the market extention.
restriction on θ∗
∆ (1 + 2θ)
3∆E + ∆
≤ θ∗ ≤ ∆E (1 + 2θ)
∆E + 3∆
proﬁt funcition:
Π∗L =
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))2
9 (∆E + ∆)
− αq2L Π∗H =
∆E∆ (θ + θ
∗ + 2)2
9 (∆E + ∆)
− αq2H
quality stage:
for ΠL
∂ΠL
∂q0
= −γ
(
q2E + q
2
H + 2q
2
0 − 2qHq0 − 2qEq0
)
(9qE + 9qH − 18q0)2
− 2αqL and γ = [1− (θ + θ∗)]2
∂ΠL
∂q0
≤ 0 if qE ≥ qH ≥ q0 , γ ≥ 0
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∂2ΠL
∂q20
= − 2γ (qE − qH)
2
81 (qE + qH − 2q0)3
− 2α ≤ 0
for ΠH
∂ΠH
∂qH
=
ϕ (qE − q0)2
9 (qE + qH − 2q0)2
− 2αqH ϕ = (2 + θ + θ∗)2
∂2ΠH
∂q2H
= − 2ϕ (qE − q0)
2
9 (qE + qH − 2q0)3
− 2α
q∗H = − 13∗22/3α (Φ)
1/3 +
−324α2q2E+1296α2qEq0−1296α2q20
(Φ)1/3
− 2(αq0−2αq0)3α
Φ = −3ϕ2α (qE − q0) +
√
3
√
8α5q3Eϕ (qE − q0)2 − 48α5q2Eq0ϕ (qE − q0)2 +
+
√
3
√
−64α5q30ϕ (qE − q0)2 + 96α5qEq20ϕ (qE − q0)2 + 3α4ϕ (qE − q0)4
+
√
3
√
+96α5qEq20ϕ (qE − q0)2 + 3α4ϕ (qE − q0)4 +
(−4α3q3E + 24α3q2Eq0 − 48α3qEq30 + 32α3q30)
this is the only rearl solution of ∂ΠH∂qH , we have to check ih the q
∗
H is consistent with the
follow contrain.
Possibility of diﬀerent scenarios. or diﬀerentiation or convergence to case A.b.3
using restiction we have some bound for qH :
on right side:
qH ≤ q0 + (qE − q0) (1 + 2θ)− θ
∗ (qE − q0)
3θ∗
on left side:
qH ≤ q0 + 3 (qE − q0) θ
∗
1 + 2θ − θ∗
The results are equivalent to case A.b.2 and A.c.2 already discussed in chapter 1
A.a.3
restriction
PH − θ¯∆ ≤ P ∗L ≤ PH − θ∗∆E
PL + θ
∗∆E ≤ P ∗H ≤ PL + θ¯∆
proﬁt function:
ΠL (PL, PH) = PL
(
θ′′ − θ)− αq2L ΠH (PL, PH) = PH (θ¯ − θ′′)− αq2H
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price:
P ∗L =
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
P ∗H =
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
Equilibrium proﬁt:
Π∗L =
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)2
9
− αq2L Π∗H =
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)2
9
− αq2H
restictin on θ∗:
θ∗ ≤ ∆ (2θ + 1)
3∆E
Quality stage:
derivate:
∂ΠL
∂q0
=
4θ¯θ − θ¯2 − 4θ2
9
− 2αqL
qL =
4θ¯θ − θ¯2 − 4θ2
18α
and
4θ¯θ − θ¯2 − 4θ2
18α
≤ 0
∂ΠH
∂qH
=
θ¯2 + 4θ2 − 4θ¯θ
9
− 2αqH
q∗H =
θ¯2 + 4θ2 − 4θ¯θ
18α
from restriction
qH ≥ q0 + 3∆Eθ
∗
1 + 2θ
if q∗Hrespect the last constrain the proﬁt functions are:
Π∗L =
(
θ¯ − 2θ)3 − q0 (θ¯ − 2θ)2
162α
−αq20 Π∗H =
(
2θ¯ − θ)3 − q0 (θ¯ − 2θ)2
162α
−α
((
θ¯ − 2θ)2
18α
)2
here add comment about the quality range and possible proﬁt or deviation.
The results are equivalent to case A.c.3 already discussed in chapter 1
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A.d
restriction:
PH − θ∗∆ ≥ PH − θ∆E ≥ PH − θ¯∆ ≥ PH − θ∗∆E (4.2)
PL + θ
∗∆E ≥ PL + θ¯∆ ≥ PL + θ∆E ≥ PL + θ∗∆
from this restriction in this case we need θ > 0
obtain:
max
{
θ¯
θ∗
,
θ∗
θ
}
≤ ∆E
∆
≤ θ¯
θ
Given these restrictions we can specify price domains and market demands as follows:
DL (PL, PH) =

θ′′ − θ∗ if PH − θ∆E ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∗∆
θ′ − θ + θ′′ − θ∗ if PH − θ¯∆ ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∆E
1− θ∗ + θ′ if PH − θ∗∆E ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ¯∆
θ¯ − θ 0 ≤ PL ≤ PH − θ∗∆E
(4.3)
DH (PL, PH) =

θ∗ − θ′ if PL + θ¯∆ ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ∗∆E
θ¯ − θ′′ + θ∗ − θ′ if PL + θ∆E ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ¯∆
1− θ′′ + θ∗ if PL + θ ∗∆ ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ∆E
θ¯ − θ if 0 ≤ PH ≤ PL + θ ∗∆
(4.4)
A.d.1
restriction
PH − θ∆E ≤ P ∗L ≤ PH − θ∗∆
PL + θ
∗∆ ≤ P ∗H ≤ PL + θ∆E
proﬁt function:
ΠL (PL, PH) = PL
(
θ′′ − θ∗)− αq2L ΠH (PL, PH) = PH ((θ¯ − θ)− θ′′ + θ∗)− αq2H
price:
P ∗L =
∆
(
1(θ¯ − θ)− θ∗)
3
P ∗H =
∆
(
2(θ¯ − θ) + θ∗)
3
Equilibrium proﬁt:
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Π∗L =
∆ (1− θ∗)2
9
− αq2L Π∗H =
∆ (2 + θ∗)2
9
− αq2H
restictin on θ∗:
θ∗ ≤ min
{
1 ,
3θ∆E
2∆
− θ¯ − θ
2
}
Quality stage:
derivate:
∂ΠL
∂q0
= −θ
∗2 − 2θ∗ + 1
9
− 2αqL ≤ 0
∂2ΠL
∂q20
= −2α
∂ΠH
∂qH
=
θ∗2 + 4θ∗ + 4
9
− 2αqH
qH =
θ∗2 + 4θ∗ + 4
18α
from restriction
qH ≤ q0 + 3∆Eθ
2θ∗ + 1
The results are equivalent to case A.c.1 already discussed in chapter 1
A.d.2
Restiction:
PH − θ¯∆ ≤ P ∗L ≤ PH − θ∆E
PL + θ∆E ≤ P ∗H ≤ PL + θ¯∆
proﬁct function:
ΠL (PL, PH) = PL
(
θ′ − θ + θ′′ − θ∗)−αq2L ΠH (PL, PH) = PH (θ¯ − θ′′ + θ∗ − θ′)−αq2H
price:
P ∗L =
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))
3 (∆E + ∆)
P ∗H =
∆E∆ (θ + θ
∗ + 2)
3 (∆E + ∆)
1 came from
(
θ¯ − θ)so it is the market extention.
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restriction on θ∗
θ − 1
2
+
3∆Eθ
2∆
≤ θ∗ ≤ θ + 2
2
+
3∆θ¯
2∆E
proﬁt funcition:
Π∗L =
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))2
9 (∆E + ∆)
− αq2L Π∗H =
∆E∆ (θ + θ
∗ + 2)2
9 (∆E + ∆)
− αq2H
quality stage:
for ΠL
∂ΠL
∂q0
= −γ
(
q2E + q
2
H + 2q
2
0 − 2qHq0 − 2qEq0
)
(9qE + 9qH − 18q0)2
− 2αqL and γ = [1− (θ + θ∗)]2
∂ΠL
∂q0
≤ 0 if qE ≥ qH ≥ q0 , γ ≥ 0
∂2ΠL
∂q20
= − 2γ (qE − qH)
2
81 (qE + qH − 2q0)3
− 2α ≤ 0
for ΠH
∂ΠH
∂qH
=
ϕ (qE − q0)2
9 (qE + qH − 2q0)2
− 2αqH ϕ = (2 + θ + θ∗)2
∂2ΠH
∂q2H
= − 2ϕ (qE − q0)
2
9 (qE + qH − 2q0)3
− 2α
q∗H = − 13∗22/3α (Φ)
1/3 +
−324α2q2E+1296α2qEq0−1296α2q20
(Φ)1/3
− 2(αq0−2αq0)3α
Φ = −3ϕ2α (qE − q0) +
√
3
√
8α5q3Eϕ (qE − q0)2 − 48α5q2Eq0ϕ (qE − q0)2 +
+
√
3
√
−64α5q30ϕ (qE − q0)2 + 96α5qEq20ϕ (qE − q0)2 + 3α4ϕ (qE − q0)4
+
√
3
√
+96α5qEq20ϕ (qE − q0)2 + 3α4ϕ (qE − q0)4 +
(−4α3q3E + 24α3q2Eq0 − 48α3qEq30 + 32α3q30)
this is the only rearl solution of ∂ΠH∂qH , we have to check ih the q
∗
H is consistent with the
follow contrain.
using restiction we have some bound for qH :
on right side:
q0 +
2∆Eθ
∗ −∆E (θ + 2)
3θ¯
≤ qH ≤ q0 − 3 (qE − q0) θ
θ − 1− 2θ∗
θ − 1− 2θ∗is negative becouse θ ≤ θ∗by deﬁnition.
The results are equivalent to case A.b.2 and A.c.2 already discussed in chapter 1
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A.d.3
restriction
PH − θ∗∆E ≤ P ∗L ≤ PH − θ¯∆
PL + θ¯∆ ≤ P ∗H ≤ PL + θ∗∆E
proﬁt function:
ΠL (PL, PH) = PL
(
(θ¯ − θ)− θ∗ + θ′)− αq2L ΠH (PL, PH) = PH ((θ∗ − θ′)− αq2H
price:
P ∗L =
∆E (2− θ∗)
3
P ∗H =
∆E (1 + θ
∗)
3
Equilibrium proﬁt:
Π∗L =
∆E (2− θ∗)2
9
− αq2L Π∗H =
∆E (1 + θ
∗)2
9
− αq2H
restictin on θ∗:
θ∗ ≥ 1
2
+
3∆θ¯
2∆E
Quality stage:
derivate:
∂ΠL
∂q0
= −θ
∗2 − 4θ∗ + 4
9
− 2αqL ≤ 0
∂2ΠL
∂q20
= −2α
∂ΠH
∂qH
= −2αqL
∂ΠE
∂qE
=
θ∗2 + 2θ∗ + 1
9
≥ 0
from restriction
qH ≤ q0 + ∆E (2θ
∗ − 1)
3θ¯
The results are equivalent to case A.b.3 already discussed in chapter 1
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4.3 A3
proﬀ of equilibium in case A.b.2 and A.c.2
startin from the follow proﬁt function:
ΠL (PL, PH) = PL
(
θ′ − θ + θ′′ − θ∗)−αq2L ΠH (PL, PH) = PH (θ¯ − θ′′ + θ∗ − θ′)−αq2H
leading to the following equilibrium prices:
P ∗L =
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))
3 (∆E + ∆)
P ∗H =
∆E∆ (θ + θ
∗ + 2)
3 (∆E + ∆)
By substitution we can ﬁnd equilibrium proﬁt funcitions as follows:
Π∗L =
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))2
9 (∆E + ∆)
− αq2L Π∗H =
∆E∆ (θ + θ
∗ + 2)2
9 (∆E + ∆)
− αq2H
Turning then to the quality selction stage, by proﬁt maximization in qualities we get:
∂ΠL
∂qL
= −γ
(
q2E + q
2
H + 2q
2
L − 2qHq0 − 2qEqL
)
(9qE + 9qH − 18qL)2
− 2αqL and γ = [1− (θ + θ∗)]2
(4.5)
∂ΠL
∂qL
≤ 0 if : qE ≥ qH ≥ q0 , γ ≥ 0
∂2ΠL
∂q2L
= − 2γ (qE − qH)
2
81 (qE + qH − 2q0)3
− 2α ≤ 0 (4.6)
solving equation (4.5) for q0we found 3 solution one real solution and two solution in
the domain of complex number, so we discart non real solution.
now we have to undestand if real solution is positive or negative. First of all aur
derivativative (eq 4.5) is negative for q0 = 0 and also the lim for q0 →∞is −∞. Using the
second derivative equation (4.6) we can say that the ﬁrst derivative is alwais decreasing
so under that condition the only real solution must be a negative solution.
Thereforethe low quality ﬁrm is lead to produce the minimum quality, i.e q∗L = q
◦
as
corner solution
.Concerning the high quality ﬁrm we get:
∂ΠH
∂qH
=
ϕ (qE − q0)2
9 (qE + qH − 2q0)2
− 2αqH ≥ 0 ϕ = (2 + θ + θ∗)2 (4.7)
∂2ΠH
∂q2H
= − 2ϕ (qE − q0)
2
9 (qE + qH − 2q0)3
− 2α (4.8)
from equation (4.7) we obtain three solution uno real solution and two complex solu-
tion, discarting the complex one we obtain the follow real solution:
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q∗H = − 13∗22/3α (Φ)
1/3 +
−324α2q2E+1296α2qEq0−1296α2q20
(Φ)1/3
− 2(αq0−2αq0)3α
Φ = −3ϕ2α (qE − q0) +
√
3
√
8α5q3Eϕ (qE − q0)2 − 48α5q2Eq0ϕ (qE − q0)2 +
+
√
3
√
−64α5q30ϕ (qE − q0)2 + 96α5qEq20ϕ (qE − q0)2 + 3α4ϕ (qE − q0)4
+
√
3
√
+96α5qEq20ϕ (qE − q0)2 + 3α4ϕ (qE − q0)4 +
(−4α3q3E + 24α3q2Eq0 − 48α3qEq30 + 32α3q30)
now we have to prove that the above solution is positive, the proo is the follow:
the ﬁrst derivati eq(4.7) evalued in qH = 0 is positve
∂ΠH
∂qH
|qH=0 > 0 and the the linit
of ∂ΠH∂qH for qH → ∞is −∞from these result and the second derivative always
∂2ΠH
∂q2H
< 0
we can say that the only real solutio is unique and positive.
as before we have rescriction on qHso we have to check if those restriction are respected
for each case, otherwise we have a corner solution.
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4.4 A4
this case is completely equivalent to case A,b.2 and is analyzed in Appendix II
This sub-case is deﬁned by the following price domains:
PH − θ∗∆E ≤ P ∗L ≤ PH − θ∆E
PL + θ∆E ≤ P ∗H ≤ PL + θ∗∆E
Considering the related demand segments we get the following proﬁt functions:
ΠL (PL, PH) = PL
(
θ′ − θ + θ′′ − θ∗)−αq2L ΠH (PL, PH) = PH (θ¯ − θ′′ + θ∗ − θ′)−αq2H
price:
P ∗L =
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))
3 (∆E + ∆)
P ∗H =
∆E∆ (θ + θ
∗ + 2)
3 (∆E + ∆)
By checking that equilibrium prices belong to the price domains we get a further
restriction on θ∗
θ∗ ≥ max
{
∆ (1 + 2θ)
3∆E + ∆
,
θ (3∆E + ∆)
2∆
− ∆
2∆
}
proﬁt funcition:
Π∗L =
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))2
9 (∆E + ∆)
− αq2L Π∗H =
∆E∆ (θ + θ
∗ + 2)2
9 (∆E + ∆)
− αq2H
quality stage:
for ΠL
∂ΠL
∂q0
= −γ
(
q2E + q
2
H + 2q
2
0 − 2qHq0 − 2qEq0
)
(9qE + 9qH − 18q0)2
− 2αqL and γ = [1− (θ + θ∗)]2
∂ΠL
∂qL
≤ 0 if : qE ≥ qH ≥ q0 , γ ≥ 0
∂2ΠL
∂q2L
= − 2γ (qE − qH)
2
81 (qE + qH − 2q0)3
− 2α ≤ 0
for ΠH
∂ΠH
∂qH
=
ϕ (qE − q0)2
9 (qE + qH − 2q0)2
− αq2H ϕ = (2 + θ + θ∗)2
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∂2ΠH
∂q2H
= − 2ϕ (qE − q0)
2
9 (qE + qH − 2q0)3
− 2α
Still considering the price domains together with equilibrium prices we can ﬁnd lower
and upper bounds for qH :
q0 +
3 (qE − q0) θ
1 + 2θ∗ − θ ≤ qH ≤ q0
3 (qE − q0) θ∗
1 + 2θ − θ∗
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4.5 A5
Stability Condition
Case A (optimist)
A.a.1
A.a.1 vs A.a.2
A.a.1 vs A.a.2 for L ΠA.a.1L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.a.2L (P ′L, P ∗H)
∆E(θ¯−2θ)2
9 ≥ P ′L (θ′ − θ + θ′′ − θ∗)
if P ∗H =
∆E(2θ¯−θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆E
6
∗ −2θ + 2∆ + θ∆E + 2∆E − 3θ
∗∆
∆ + ∆E
or we can rewrite
P dL =
(
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
− θ∗∆ + ∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
− θ∆
)
1
2
∆E
∆ + ∆E
comment is like an average weight price
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
[(
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
+
∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
− θ∆
)
1
2
∆E
∆ + ∆E
− ∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
]
1
∆E
(
−2∆E + 2∆
2∆E + ∆
)
≤ θ∗
θ∗ ≤
[(
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
+
∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
− θ∆
)
1
2
∆E
∆ + ∆E
− ∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
]
1
∆
(
−2∆E + 2∆
∆E + 2∆
)
and proﬁt:
ΠdL =
∆E (−2θ∆ + θ∆E − 3∆θ∗ + 2∆ + 2∆E) (−4θ∆ + θ∆E + 2θ − 3θ∗∆ + 2∆ + 2∆E)
36 (∆ + ∆E)
−αq2L
A.a.1 vs A.a.2 for H ΠA.a.1H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.a.2H (P ∗L, P ′′H)
∆E(2θ¯−θ)2
9 ≥ P ′′H
(
θ¯ − θ′′ + θ∗ − θ′)
if P ∗L =
∆E(θ¯−2θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆E
6
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)+ ∆ (θ¯ − 2θ)+ 3∆θ¯ + 3∆θ∗
∆E + ∆
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or rearranged
P dH =
(
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+ θ∗∆ +
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+ θ¯∆
)
1
2
∆E
∆ + ∆E
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤
[(
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+ θ¯∆
)
1
2
∆E
∆ + ∆E
− ∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
]
2∆ + 2∆E
2∆2 + ∆∆E
θ∗ ≥
[(
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+ θ¯∆
)
1
2
1
∆ + ∆E
−
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
]
2∆ + 2∆E
∆ + ∆∆E
proﬁt:
ΠdH =
∆E (−2θ∆ + θ∆E − 3∆θ∗ + 4∆ + 2∆)
(
4θ∆2 + 7θ∆∆E − 4θ∆− θ∆E + 3∆2θ∗ + 2∆2 + 6θ∗∆∆E + 5∆∆E − 3θ∗∆− 2∆ + ∆E
)
36 (∆ + ∆E)
2 −αq2H
A.a.1 vs A.a.3
A.a.1 vs A.a.3 for L ΠA.a.1L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.a.3L (P ′L, P ∗H)
∆E(θ¯−2θ)2
9 ≥ P ′′L (θ′′ − θ)
if P ∗H =
∆E(2θ¯−θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)
6
− θ∆
2
or in an other form P dL =
∆Eθ
6 +
∆E
3 − θ∆2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤
(
2θ¯ − θ)
6
+
θ∆
2∆E
and proﬁt:
ΠdL =
[
∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)− 3θ∆]2
36∆
− αq2L
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A.a.1 vs A.a.3 for H ΠA.a.1H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.a.3H (P ∗L, P ′′H)
∆E(2θ¯−θ)2
9 ≥ P ′′H
(
θ¯ − θ′′)
if P ∗L =
∆E(θ¯−2θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
6
+
θ¯∆
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ −
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
6
+
θ¯∆
2∆E
proﬁts is:
ΠdH =
[
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)+ 3θ∆]2
36∆
− αq2H
A.a.2
A.a.2 vs A.a.1
A.a.2 vs A.a.1 for L ΠA.a.2L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.a.1L
(
P dL, P
∗
H
)
∆E∆(1−(θ+θ∗))2
9(∆E+∆)
≥ P dL (θ′ − θ)
if P ∗H =
∆E∆(θ+θ∗+2)
3(∆E+∆)
from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆∆E (2 + θ + θ
∗)
6 (∆ + ∆E)
− θ∆E
2
or after some manipulation P dL =
∆E
6
2∆−2θ∆+∆θ∗−3θ∆E
∆+∆E
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≥ 2∆∆E (2 + θ) + θ∆ [6 (∆ + ∆E)]
2∆ [6 (∆ + ∆E) + 1]
θ∗ ≥ 3θ (∆ + ∆E)
∆
− θ − 2
and proﬁts is:
ΠdL =
[∆∆E (2 + θ + θ
∗)− 3θ∆E (∆ + ∆E)]2
36 (∆ + ∆E)
2 ∆E
− αq2L
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A.a.2 vs A.a.1 for H ΠA.a.2H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.a.1H
(
P ∗L, P
d
H
)
∆E∆(θ+θ∗+2)
2
9(∆E+∆)
≥ P dH
(
θ¯ − θ′)
if P ∗L =
∆E∆(1−(θ+θ∗))
3(∆E+∆)
from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))
6 (∆E + ∆)
+
θ¯∆E
2
or after some manipulation P dH =
∆E
6
2θ∆+4∆−θ∗∆+3θ∆E+3∆E
∆E+∆
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≥
[
−∆∆E (1− (θ
∗ + θ))
6 (∆ + ∆E)
+
θ¯∆E
2
]
∗ 1
∆
and proﬁt:
ΠdH =
[
∆∆E (1− (θ∗ + θ)) + 3¯θ∆E (∆ + ∆E)
]2
36 (∆ + ∆E) ∆E
− αq2H
A.a.2 vs A.a.3
A.a.2 vs A.a.3 for L ΠA.a.2L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.a.3L
(
P dL, P
∗
H
)
∆E∆(1−(θ+θ∗))2
9(∆E+∆)
≥ P dL (θ′′ − θ)
if P ∗H =
∆∆E(θ+θ∗+2)
3(∆E+∆)
from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆∆E (2 + θ + θ
∗)
6 (∆ + ∆E)
− θ∆
2
or after some manipulation P dL =
∆
6
2∆E−2θ∆E+∆Eθ∗−3θ∆
∆+∆E
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ 6 (∆E + ∆)
∆
− θ − 2
θ∗ ≤
(
3θ∆ + 2θ∆E − 2∆E
∆E
)(
∆
∆ + 6 (∆ + ∆E)
)
proﬁts:
ΠdL =
[∆∆E (2 + θ + θ
∗)− 3θ∆ (∆ + ∆E)]2
36 (∆ + ∆E)
2 ∆
− αq2L
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A.a.2 vs A.a.3 for H ΠA.a.2H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.a.3H
(
P ∗L, P
d
H
)
∆E∆(θ+θ∗+2)
2
9(∆E+∆)
≥ P dH
(
θ¯ − θ′′)
if P ∗L =
∆E∆(1−(θ+θ∗))
3(∆E+∆)
from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))
6 (∆E + ∆)
+
θ¯∆
2
or after some manipulation P dH =
∆
6
2θ∆E+4∆E−θ∗∆E+3θ∆+3∆
∆E+∆
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤
[
−∆∆E (1− (θ
∗ + θ))
6 (∆ + ∆E)
+
θ¯∆
2
]
∗ 1
∆E
proﬁts:
ΠdH =
[
∆∆E (1− (θ + θ∗)) + 3θ¯∆ (∆ + ∆E)
]2
36 (∆ + ∆E)
2 ∆
− αq2H
A.a.3
A.a.3 vs A.a.1
A.a.3 vs A.a.1 for L ΠA.a.3L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.a.1L
(
P dL, P
∗
H
)
∆(θ¯−2θ)2
9 ≥ P ′L (θ′ − θ)
if P ∗H =
∆(2θ¯−θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
6
− θ∆E
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≥
(
2θ¯ − θ)
6
+
θ∆E
2∆
and proﬁts is:
ΠdL =
[
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)− 3θ∆E]2
36∆E
− αq2L
A.a.3 vs A.a.1 for H ΠA.a.3H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.a.1H
(
P ∗L, P
d
H
)
∆(2θ¯−θ)2
9 ≥ P dH
(
θ¯ − θ′)
if P ∗L =
∆(θ¯−2θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
6
+
θ¯∆E
2
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or after some manipulation P dH =
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ −∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)+ 3θ¯∆E
6∆E
and proﬁt:
ΠdH =
[
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)+ 3θ¯∆E]2
36∆E
− αq2H
A.a.3 vs A.a.2
A.a.3 vs A.a.2 for L ΠA.a.3L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.a.2L
(
P dL, P
∗
H
)
∆(θ¯−2θ)2
9 ≥ P ′L (θ′ − θ + θ′′ − θ∗)
if P ∗H =
∆(2θ¯−θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
(
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
− θ∗∆E +
∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
− θ∆E
)
1
2
∆
∆ + ∆E
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
[
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
−
(
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
+
∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
− θ∆E
)
1
2
∆
∆ + ∆E
]
1
∆E
(
2∆E + 2∆
2∆E + ∆
)
≤ θ∗
θ∗ ≤
[
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
−
(
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
+
∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
− θ∆E
)
1
2
∆
∆ + ∆E
]
1
∆
(
2∆E + 2∆
2∆ + ∆E
)
proﬁts:
ΠdL =
(
2θ¯ − θ)2 ∆2 (∆ + ∆E)2 + 6 (2θ¯ − θ)∆E (∆ + ∆E)2 + 9∆E (θ∗ + θ) (∆2 (− (∆E (θ∗ + θ) + 4))− 6∆∆E − 2∆E)
36∆E (∆ + ∆E)
2 −αq2L
A.a.3 vs A.a.2 for H ΠA.a.3H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.a.2H
(
P ∗L, P
d
H
)
∆(2θ¯−θ)2
9 ≥ P ′′H
(
θ¯ − θ′′ + θ∗ − θ′)
if P ∗L =
∆(θ¯−2θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
(
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+ θ∗∆E +
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+ θ¯∆E
)
1
2
∆
∆ + ∆E
or after some manipulation P dH =
∆
6
3θ¯∆E+∆E(θ¯−2θ)+3θ∗∆E+∆(θ¯−2θ)
(∆E+∆)
103
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤
[(
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+ θ¯∆E
)
1
2
∆
∆ + ∆E
− ∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
](
2∆ + 2∆E
2∆2 + ∆∆E
)
[(
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+ θ¯∆E
)
1
2
∆
∆ + ∆E
− ∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
](
2∆ + 2∆E
2∆2E + ∆∆E
)
≤ θ∗
proﬁts:
ΠdH =
∆
[(
θ¯ − 2θ) (∆ + ∆E) + 3∆E (θ∗ + θ¯)]2
36 (∆ + ∆E)
− αq2H
A.b.1
A.b.1 vs A.b.2
A.b.1 vs A.b.2 for L ΠA.b.1L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.b.2L (P ′L, P ∗H)
∆E(θ¯−2θ)2
9 ≥ P ′L (θ′ − θ + θ′′ − θ∗)
if P ∗H =
∆E(2θ¯−θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆E
6
∗ −2θ + 2∆ + θ∆E + 2∆E − 3θ
∗∆
∆ + ∆E
or we can rewrite
P dL =
(
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
− θ∗∆ + ∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
− θ∆
)
1
2
∆E
∆ + ∆E
comment is like an average weight price
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
γ = 12
∆E
∆+∆E
θ∗ ≤ −∆Eθ − 2∆E + 3θ∆ + 3∆ + 4∆γ −∆θγ
3∆γ
θ∗ ≤ 2∆γ (θ − 1) + ∆Eθ (1− γ) + 2∆E (1− γ)
3∆ (1− γ)
and proﬁt:
ΠdL =
∆E (−2θ∆ + θ∆E − 3∆θ∗ + 2∆ + 2∆E) (−4θ∆ + θ∆E + 2θ − 3θ∗∆ + 2∆ + 2∆E)
36 (∆ + ∆E)
−αq2L
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A.b.1 vs A.b.2 for H ΠA.b.1H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.b.2H (P ∗L, P ′′H)
∆E(2θ¯−θ)2
9 ≥ P ′′H
(
θ¯ − θ′′ + θ∗ − θ′)
if P ∗L =
∆E(θ¯−2θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆E
6
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)+ ∆ (θ¯ − 2θ)+ 3∆θ¯ + 3∆θ∗
∆E + ∆
or rearranged
P dH =
(
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+ θ∗∆ +
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+ θ¯∆
)
1
2
∆E
∆ + ∆E
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
γ = 12
∆E
∆+∆E
θ∗ ≤ ∆Eθ (1− γ)−∆E (1− γ) + 4∆γ + 2θ∆γ
3∆ (1− γ)
θ∗ ≤ ∆Eθ (1− γ)−∆E (1− γ)− 4∆γ − 2θ∆γ + 3θ∆ + 3∆
3∆γ
proﬁt:
ΠdH =
∆E (−2θ∆ + θ∆E − 3∆θ∗ + 4∆ + 2∆)
(
4θ∆2 + 7θ∆∆E − 4θ∆− θ∆E + 3∆2θ∗ + 2∆2 + 6θ∗∆∆E + 5∆∆E − 3θ∗∆− 2∆ + ∆E
)
36 (∆ + ∆E)
2 −αq2H
A.b.1 vs A.b.3
A.b.1 vs A.b.3 for L ΠA.b.1L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.b.3L (P ′L, P ∗H)
∆E(θ¯−2θ)2
9 ≥ P ′′L (1− θ∗ + θ′)
if P ∗H =
∆E(2θ¯−θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)
6
+
∆E
2
− θ
∗∆E
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≥ max
{
∆E (1− θ)
3∆E
,
6∆ (θ + 1)− θ∆E
3∆E
}
and proﬁt:
ΠdL =
∆E (θ − 3θ∗ + 5)2
36
− αq2L
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A.b.1 vs A.b.3 for H ΠA.b.1H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.b.3H (P ∗L, P ′′H)
∆E(2θ¯−θ)2
9 ≥ P ′′H (θ∗ − θ′)
if P ∗L =
∆E(θ¯−2θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
6
+
θ∗∆E
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
1− θ
9
≤ θ∗ ≤ 1− θ
3
− 6∆ (θ + 1)
3∆E
proﬁts is:
ΠdH =
∆E (3θ
∗ + 1− θ)2
36
− αq2H
A.b.2
A.b.2 vs A.b.1
A.b.2 vs A.b.1 for L ΠA.b.2L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.b.1L
(
P dL, P
∗
H
)
∆E∆(1−(θ+θ∗))2
9(∆E+∆)
≥ P dL (θ′ − θ)
if P ∗H =
∆E∆(θ+θ∗+2)
3(∆E+∆)
from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆∆E (2 + θ + θ
∗)
6 (∆ + ∆E)
− θ∆E
2
or after some manipulation P dL =
∆E
6
2∆−2θ∆+∆θ∗−3θ∆E
∆+∆E
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≥ max
{
2∆∆E + 4∆∆Eθ + 3θ∆
2
E
5∆∆E + 6∆2
,
2θ∆ + 3θ∆E − 2∆
∆
}
and proﬁts is:
ΠdL =
[∆∆E (2 + θ + θ
∗)− 3θ∆E (∆ + ∆E)]2
36 (∆ + ∆E)
2 ∆E
− αq2L
A.b.2 vs A.b.1 for H ΠA.b.2H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.b.1H
(
P ∗L, P
d
H
)
∆E∆(θ+θ∗+2)
2
9(∆E+∆)
≥ P dH
(
θ¯ − θ′)
if P ∗L =
∆E∆(1−(θ+θ∗))
3(∆E+∆)
from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))
6 (∆E + ∆)
+
θ¯∆E
2
106
or after some manipulation P dH =
∆E
6
2θ∆+4∆−θ∗∆+3θ∆E+3∆E
∆E+∆
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≥ max
{
3∆E (θ − 1) + 2∆ (θ − 1)
∆
,
3θ∆2E + 4θ∆∆E + 3∆
2
E + 2∆∆E
5∆∆E − 6∆2
}
and proﬁt:
ΠdH =
[
∆∆E (1− (θ∗ + θ)) + 3¯θ∆E (∆ + ∆E)
]2
36 (∆ + ∆E) ∆E
− αq2H
A.b.2 vs A.b.3
A.b.2 vs A.b.3 for L ΠA.b.2L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.b.3L
(
P dL, P
∗
H
)
∆E∆(1−(θ+θ∗))2
9(∆E+∆)
≥ P dL (1− θ∗ + θ′)
if P ∗H =
∆∆E(θ+θ∗+2)
3(∆E+∆)
from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆∆E (2 + θ + θ
∗)
6 (∆ + ∆E)
− θ
∗∆E
2
+
∆E
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≥ max
{
∆ (θ − 1)− 3∆E
2∆ + 3∆E
,
7∆∆E + 5θ∆∆E + 3∆
2
E + 6∆
2 (θ + 1)
3∆2E + 4∆∆E
}
proﬁts:
ΠdL =
[
∆∆E (2 + θ + θ
∗)
6 (∆ + ∆E)
− θ
∗∆E
2
+
∆E
2
]2
− αq2L
A.b.2 vs A.b.3 for H ΠA.b.2H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.b.3H
(
P ∗L, P
d
H
)
∆E∆(θ+θ∗+2)
2
9(∆E+∆)
≥ P dH (θ∗ − θ′)
if P ∗L =
∆E∆(1−(θ+θ∗))
3(∆E+∆)
from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))
6 (∆E + ∆)
+
θ∗∆E
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≥ max
{
7∆∆E + 5θ∆∆E + 6∆2 (θ + 1)
4∆∆E + 3∆2E
,
∆ (θ − 1)
2∆ + 3∆E
}
proﬁts:
ΠdH =
[
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))
6 (∆E + ∆)
+
θ∗∆E
2
]2
− αq2H
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A.b.3
A.b.3 vs A.b.1
A.b.3 vs A.b.1 for L ΠA.b.3L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.b.1L
(
P dL, P
∗
H
)
∆E(2−θ∗)2
9 ≥ P ′L (θ′ − θ)
if P ∗H =
∆E(1+θ
∗)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆E (1 + θ
∗)
6
− θ∆E
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≥ max
{
∆E + 3∆Eθ
6∆−∆E , 1− 3θ
}
and proﬁts is:
ΠdL =
∆E (3θ − θ∗ − 1)2
36
− αq2L
A.b.3 vs A.b.1 for H ΠA.b.3H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.b.1H
(
P ∗L, P
d
H
)
∆E(1+θ
∗)2
9 ≥ P dH
(
θ¯ − θ′)
if P ∗L =
∆E(2−θ∗)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆E (2− θ∗)
6
+
θ¯∆E
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≥ max
{
3θ − 1 , 2θ∆E + ∆E
6∆−∆E
}
and proﬁt:
ΠdH =
∆E
(
2− θ∗ + 3θ¯)2
36
− αq2H
A.b.3 vs A.b.2
A.b.3 vs A.b.2 for L ΠA.b.3L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.b.2L
(
P dL, P
∗
H
)
∆E(2−θ∗)2
9 ≥ P ′L (θ′ − θ + θ′′ − θ∗)
if P ∗H =
∆(1+θ∗)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
(
∆ (1 + θ∗)
3
− θ∗∆ + ∆E (1 + θ
∗)
3
− θ∆
)
1
2
∆E
∆ + ∆E
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
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θ∗ ≤ min
{
3θ (1− γ) + 2∆ + γ (∆ + ∆E)
∆ + 2∆γ −∆Eγ ,
∆ (1− γ)−∆Eγ + 3θγ∆
2∆ (1− γ) + ∆Eγ
}
γ = 12
∆E
∆+∆E
proﬁts:
ΠdL =
∆ (−3θ∆− 2∆θ∗ + ∆ + ∆∆E + ∆E) (−6θ∆∆E + 3θ∆− 6∆∆Eθ∗ + ∆∆E + 4∆∆E + ∆ + ∆E)
36∆E (∆ + ∆E)
−αq2L
A.b.3 vs A.b.2 for H ΠA.b.3H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.b.2H
(
P ∗L, P
d
H
)
∆E(1+θ
∗)2
9 ≥ P ′′H
(
θ¯ − θ′′ + θ∗ − θ′)
if P ∗L =
∆E(2−θ∗)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
(
∆ (2− θ∗)
3
+ θ∗∆ +
∆E (2− θ∗)
3
+ θ¯∆
)
1
2
∆E
∆ + ∆E
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ min
{
2∆E (γ − 1) + 3θ∆γ + 5∆γ
3∆ + ∆E (γ − 1)− 2∆γ ,
2∆E (1− γ) + 3θ∆ (1− γ) + 3∆ (1− γ)− 2∆γ
2∆γ + ∆E (1− γ)
}
proﬁts:
ΠdH = −
∆ (3θ∆ + 4∆θ∗ − 6θ∆E + ∆− 5∆E∆− 8∆E) (3θ∆ + 2∆θ∗ + 5∆−∆Eθ∗ + 2∆E)
36 (∆ + ∆E) ∆E
−αq2H
A.c.1
A.c.1 vs A.c.2
A.c.1 vs A.c.2 for L ΠA.c.1L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.c.2L (P ′L, P ∗H)
∆(1−θ∗)2
9 ≥ P ′L (θ′ − θ + θ′′ − θ∗)
if P ∗H =
∆(2+θ∗)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
[
∆ (2 + θ∗)
3
− θ∆E + ∆E (2 + θ
∗)
3
− θ∗∆E
]
1
2
∆
∆ + ∆E
comment is like an average weight price
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ min
{ −2∆ (1− γ)− 3θ∆Eγ − 2∆Eγ
∆ (1− γ)− 3∆E (1− γ)−∆Eγ ,
2∆ (1− γ)− 3θ∆E (1− γ)− 2∆Eγ
∆ (1− γ)− 2∆Eγ
}
and proﬁt:
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ΠdL =
∆ ((2 + θ∗) (∆ + ∆E)− 3∆E (θ + θ∗))2
36∆E (∆ + ∆E)
− αq2L
A.c.1 vs A.c.2 for H ΠA.c.1H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.c.2H (P ∗L, P ′′H)
∆(2+θ∗)2
9 ≥ P ′′H
(
θ¯ − θ′′ + θ∗ − θ′)
if P ∗L =
∆(1−θ∗)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
[
∆ (1− θ∗)
3
+ θ¯∆E +
∆E (1− θ∗)
3
+ θ∗∆E
]
1
2
∆
∆ + ∆E
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ min
{
4∆Eγ − 3θ∆E (1− γ)−∆ (1− γ)
−2∆Eγ −∆ (1− γ) ,
∆ (1− γ)− 3θ∆Eγ − 2∆Eγ
2∆Eγ − 3∆E −∆
}
proﬁt:
ΠdH =
∆ ((1− θ∗) (∆ + ∆E)− 3∆E (θ + θ∗))2
36∆E (∆ + ∆E)
− αq2H
A.c.1 vs A.c.3
A.c.1 vs A.c.3 for L ΠA.c.1L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.c.3L (P ′L, P ∗H)
∆(1−θ∗)2
9 ≥ P ′′L (θ′′ − θ)
if P ∗H =
∆(2+θ∗)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆ (2 + θ∗)
6
− θ∆
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ min
{
4 + 3θ ,
2∆ + 3θ∆
6∆E −∆
}
and proﬁt:
ΠdL =
∆ (2 + θ∗ − 3θ)2
36
− αq2L
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A.c.1 vs A.c.3 for H ΠA.c.1H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.c.3H (P ∗L, P ′′H)
∆(2+θ∗)2
9 ≥ P ′′H
(
θ¯ − θ′′)
if P ∗L =
∆(1−θ∗)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆ (1− θ∗)
6
+
θ¯∆
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ min
{
2∆ + 3θ∆
6∆−∆E , 6 + 3θ
}
proﬁts is:
ΠdH =
∆
(
1− θ∗ + 3θ¯)2
36
− αq2H
A.c.2
A.c.2 vs A.c.1
A.c.2 vs A.c.1 for L ΠA.c.2L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.c.1L
(
P dL, P
∗
H
)
∆E∆(1−(θ+θ∗))2
9(∆E+∆)
≥ P dL (θ′′ − θ∗)
if P ∗H =
∆E∆(θ+θ∗+2)
3(∆E+∆)
from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆∆E (2 + θ + θ
∗)
6 (∆ + ∆E)
− θ
∗∆
2
or after some manipulation P dL =
∆E
6
2∆−2θ∆+∆θ∗−3θ∆E
∆+∆E
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ min
{
5θ∆∆E − 2∆∆E + 6θ∆2E
4∆∆E + 3∆2
,
2∆E (θ + 1)
6∆E + 3∆
}
and proﬁts is:
ΠdL =
∆ (θ∆E − 3θ∗∆− 2θ∆E + 2∆E)2
36 (∆ + ∆E)
− αq2L
A.c.2 vs A.c.1 for H ΠA.c.2H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.c.1H
(
P ∗L, P
d
H
)
∆E∆(θ+θ∗+2)
2
9(∆E+∆)
≥ P dH (1− θ′′ + θ∗)
if P ∗L =
∆E∆(1−(θ+θ∗))
3(∆E+∆)
from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))
6 (∆E + ∆)
+
θ∗∆
2
+
∆
2
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on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ min
{
2∆E + θ∆E + 3∆
2∆E + 3∆
,
5θ∆∆E + 6θ∆
2
E − 2∆∆E − 3∆2
4∆∆E + 3∆2
}
and proﬁt:
ΠdH =
[
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))
6 (∆E + ∆)
+
θ∗∆
2
+
∆
2
]2
− αq2H
A.c.2 vs A.c.3
A.c.2 vs A.c.3 for L ΠA.c.2L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.c.3L
(
P dL, P
∗
H
)
∆E∆(1−(θ+θ∗))2
9(∆E+∆)
≥ P dL (θ′′ − θ)
if P ∗H =
∆∆E(θ+θ∗+2)
3(∆E+∆)
from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆∆E (2 + θ + θ
∗)
6 (∆ + ∆E)
− θ∆
2
or after some manipulation P dL =
∆
6
2∆E−2θ∆E+∆Eθ∗−3θ∆
∆+∆E
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ min
{(
3θ∆ + 2θ∆E − 2∆E
∆E
)(
∆
∆ + 6 (∆ + ∆E)
)
,
6 (∆E + ∆)
∆
− θ − 2
}
proﬁts:
ΠdL =
[∆∆E (2 + θ + θ
∗)− 3θ∆ (∆ + ∆E)]2
36 (∆ + ∆E)
2 ∆
− αq2L
A.c.2 vs A.c.3 for H ΠA.c.2H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.c.3H
(
P ∗L, P
d
H
)
∆E∆(θ+θ∗+2)
2
9(∆E+∆)
≥ P dH
(
θ¯ − θ′′)
if P ∗L =
∆E∆(1−(θ+θ∗))
3(∆E+∆)
from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))
6 (∆E + ∆)
+
θ¯∆
2
or after some manipulation P dH =
∆
6
2θ∆E+4∆E−θ∗∆E+3θ∆+3∆
∆E+∆
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤
[
−∆∆E (1− (θ
∗ + θ))
6 (∆ + ∆E)
+
θ¯∆
2
]
∗ 1
∆E
proﬁts:
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ΠdL =
[∆∆E (2 + θ + θ
∗) + 3θ∆ (∆ + ∆E)]2
36 (∆ + ∆E)
2 ∆
− αq2H
A.c.3
A.c.3 vs A.c.1
A.c.3 vs A.c.1 for L ΠA.c.3L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.c.1L
(
P dL, P
∗
H
)
∆(θ¯−2θ)2
9 ≥ P ′L (θ′′ − θ∗)
if P ∗H =
∆(2θ¯−θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
6
− θ
∗∆
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ min
{
6θ∆E − θ∆− 2∆
3∆
,
2 + θ
3
}
and proﬁts is:
ΠdL =
∆ (θ + 2− 3θ∗)2
36
− αq2L
A.c.3 vs A.c.1 for H ΠA.c.3H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.c.1H
(
P ∗L, P
d
H
)
∆(2θ¯−θ)2
9 ≥ P dH (1− θ′′ + θ∗)
if P ∗L =
∆(θ¯−2θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
6
+
θ∗∆
2
+
∆
2
or after some manipulation P dH =
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ min
{
2 + θ
3
,
6θ∆E − 2∆− θ∆
3∆
}
and proﬁt:
ΠdH =
∆ (4− θ + 3θ∗)2
36
− αq2H
A.c.3 vs A.c.2
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A.c.3 vs A.c.2 for L ΠA.c.3L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.c.2L
(
P dL, P
∗
H
)
∆(θ¯−2θ)2
9 ≥ P ′L (θ′ − θ + θ′′ − θ∗)
if P ∗H =
∆(2θ¯−θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
(
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
− θ∗∆E +
∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
− θ∆E
)
1
2
∆
∆ + ∆E
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
[
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
−
(
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
+
∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
− θ∆E
)
1
2
∆
∆ + ∆E
]
1
∆E
(
2∆E + 2∆
2∆E + ∆
)
≤ θ∗
θ∗ ≤
[
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
−
(
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
+
∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
− θ∆E
)
1
2
∆
∆ + ∆E
]
1
∆
(
2∆E + 2∆
2∆ + ∆E
)
proﬁts:
ΠdL =
(
2θ¯ − θ)2 ∆2 (∆ + ∆E)2 + 6 (2θ¯ − θ)∆E (∆ + ∆E)2 + 9∆E (θ∗ + θ) (∆2 (− (∆E (θ∗ + θ) + 4))− 6∆∆E − 2∆E)
36∆E (∆ + ∆E)
2 −αq2L
A.c.3 vs A.c.2 for H ΠA.c.3H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.c.2H
(
P ∗L, P
d
H
)
∆(2θ¯−θ)2
9 ≥ P ′′H
(
θ¯ − θ′′ + θ∗ − θ′)
if P ∗L =
∆(θ¯−2θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
(
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+ θ∗∆E +
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+ θ¯∆E
)
1
2
∆
∆ + ∆E
or after some manipulation P dH =
∆
6
3θ¯∆E+∆E(θ¯−2θ)+3θ∗∆E+∆(θ¯−2θ)
(∆E+∆)
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤
[(
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+ θ¯∆E
)
1
2
∆
∆ + ∆E
− ∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
](
2∆ + 2∆E
2∆2 + ∆∆E
)
[(
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+ θ¯∆E
)
1
2
∆
∆ + ∆E
− ∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
](
2∆ + 2∆E
2∆2E + ∆∆E
)
≤ θ∗
proﬁts:
ΠdH =
∆
[(
θ¯ − 2θ) (∆ + ∆E) + 3∆E (θ∗ + θ¯)]2
36 (∆ + ∆E)
− αq2H
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A.d.1
A.d.1 vs A.d.2
A.d.1 vs A.d.2 for L ΠA.d.1L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.d.2L (P ′L, P ∗H)
∆(1−θ∗)2
9 ≥ P ′L (θ′ − θ + θ′′ − θ∗)
if P ∗H =
∆(2+θ∗)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
[
∆ (2 + θ∗)
3
− θ∆E + ∆E (2 + θ
∗)
3
− θ∗∆E
]
1
2
∆
∆ + ∆E
comment is like an average weight price
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ min
{
2∆ (α− 1) + 3θ∆E (1− α) + 2∆Eα
∆ (1− α) + 2∆Eα ,
2∆ (1− α) + 3θ∆Eα− 2∆Eα
∆α− 2∆Eα+ 2∆
}
α =
1
2
∆
∆ + ∆E
and proﬁt:
ΠdL =
∆ ((2 + θ∗) (∆ + ∆E)− 3∆E (θ + θ∗))2
36∆E (∆ + ∆E)
− αq2L
A.d.1 vs A.d.2 for H ΠA.d.1H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.d.2H (P ∗L, P ′′H)
∆(2+θ∗)2
9 ≥ P ′′H
(
θ¯ − θ′′ + θ∗ − θ′)
if P ∗L =
∆(1−θ∗)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
[
∆ (1− θ∗)
3
+ θ¯∆E +
∆E (1− θ∗)
3
+ θ∗∆E
]
1
2
∆
∆ + ∆E
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ min
{
∆ (1− α)− 3θ¯∆Eα−∆Eα+ 3θ∆E
∆ (1− α) + 2∆Eα ,
∆ (α− 1) + 3θ¯∆Eα+ ∆Eα
2∆ + α (∆− 2∆E)
}
α =
1
2
∆
∆ + ∆E
proﬁt:
ΠdH =
∆ ((1− θ∗) (∆ + ∆E)− 3∆E (θ + θ∗))2
36∆E (∆ + ∆E)
− αq2H
A.d.1 vs A.d.3
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A.d.1 vs A.d.3 for L ΠA.d.1L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.d.3L (P ′L, P ∗H)
∆(1−θ∗)2
9 ≥ P ′′L (1− θ∗ + θ′)
if P ∗H =
∆(2+θ∗)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆ (2 + θ∗)
6
+
∆E
2
− ∆Eθ
∗
2
or in an other form P dL =
∆Eθ
6 +
∆E
3 − θ∆2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ min
{
3∆E − 2∆
∆− 3∆E ,
2∆− 6θ¯∆− 3∆E
2− 3∆E − 2∆
}
and proﬁt:
ΠdL =
[(2 + θ∗) ∆− 3θ∗∆E + 3∆E ] [− (2 + θ∗) ∆− 9θ∗∆E + 9∆E ]
36∆E
− αq2L
A.d.1 vs A.d.3 for H ΠA.d.1H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.d.3H (P ∗L, P ′′H)
∆(2+θ∗)2
9 ≥ P ′′H (θ∗ − θ′)
if P ∗L =
∆(1−θ∗)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆ (1− θ∗)
6
+
∆Eθ
∗
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ min
{−6θ¯∆−∆
−3∆E −∆ ,
∆
∆− 3∆E
}
proﬁts is:
ΠdH =
[(1− θ∗) ∆ + 3θ∗∆E ]2
36∆E
− αq2H
A.d.2
A.d.2 vs A.d.1
A.d.2 vs A.d.1 for L ΠA.d.2L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.d.1L
(
P dL, P
∗
H
)
∆E∆(1−(θ+θ∗))2
9(∆E+∆)
≥ P dL (θ′′ − θ∗)
if P ∗H =
∆E∆(θ+θ∗+2)
3(∆E+∆)
from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆∆E (2 + θ + θ
∗)
6 (∆ + ∆E)
− θ
∗∆
2
or after some manipulation P dL =
∆E
6
2∆−2θ∆+∆θ∗−3θ∆E
∆+∆E
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on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ min
{−∆∆Eθ −∆∆E + 6θ∆E (∆ + ∆E)
∆∆E + 3∆ (∆ + ∆E)
,
2∆∆E + θ∆∆E
3∆2 + 2∆∆E
}
and proﬁts is:
ΠdL =
∆ (θ∆E − 3θ∗∆− 2θ∆E + 2∆E)2
36 (∆ + ∆E)
− αq2L
A.d.2 vs A.d.1 for H ΠA.d.2H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.d.1H
(
P ∗L, P
d
H
)
∆E∆(θ+θ∗+2)
2
9(∆E+∆)
≥ P dH (1− θ′′ + θ∗)
if P ∗L =
∆E∆(1−(θ+θ∗))
3(∆E+∆)
from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))
6 (∆E + ∆)
+
θ∗∆
2
+
∆
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ min
{−3∆2 − 2∆∆E + 5∆∆Eθ + 6∆2Eθ
3∆2 + 4∆∆E
,
2∆E + ∆Eθ + 3∆
2∆E + 3∆
}
and proﬁt:
ΠdH =
[
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))
6 (∆E + ∆)
+
θ∗∆
2
+
∆
2
]2
− αq2H
A.d.2 vs A.d.3
A.d.2 vs A.d.3 for L ΠA.d.2L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.d.3L
(
P dL, P
∗
H
)
∆E∆(1−(θ+θ∗))2
9(∆E+∆)
≥ P dL (1− θ∗ + θ′)
if P ∗H =
∆∆E(θ+θ∗+2)
3(∆E+∆)
from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆∆E (2 + θ + θ
∗)
6 (∆ + ∆E)
− θ
∗∆E
2
+
∆E
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
∆θ −∆− 3∆E
3∆E − 2∆ ≤ θ
∗ ≤ −7∆∆E − 3∆
2
E − 5∆∆Eθ − 6θ∆2 − 6∆2
−4∆∆E − 3∆2E
proﬁts:
ΠdL =
[
∆∆E (2 + θ + θ
∗)
6 (∆ + ∆E)
− θ
∗∆E
2
+
∆E
2
]2
− αq2L
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A.d.2 vs A.d.3 for H ΠA.d.2H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.d.3H
(
P ∗L, P
d
H
)
∆E∆(θ+θ∗+2)
2
9(∆E+∆)
≥ P dH (θ∗ − θ′)
if P ∗L =
∆E∆(1−(θ+θ∗))
3(∆E+∆)
from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))
6 (∆E + ∆)
+
θ∗∆E
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ min
{−7∆∆E − 5∆∆Eθ − 6∆2 − 6θ∆2
4∆∆E − 3∆2E
;
∆∆E − 3∆∆Eθ
3∆2E − 2∆∆E
}
proﬁts:
ΠdH =
[
∆E∆ (1− (θ + θ∗))
6 (∆E + ∆)
+
θ∗∆E
2
]2
− αq2H
A.d.3
A.d.3 vs A.d.1
A.d.3 vs A.d.1 for L ΠA.d.3L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.d.1L
(
P dL, P
∗
H
)
∆E(2−θ∗)2
9 ≥ P ′L (θ′′ − θ∗)
if P ∗H =
∆E(1+θ
∗)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆E (1 + θ
∗)
6
− θ
∗∆
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ min
{
∆E (6θ − 1)
∆Eθ∗ + 3∆
;
∆E
3∆−∆E
}
and proﬁts is:
ΠdL =
(−9∆θ∗ + θ∗∆E + ∆E) (−3∆θ∗ + θ∗∆E + ∆E)
36∆
− αq2L
A.d.3 vs A.d.1 for H ΠA.d.3H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.d.1H
(
P ∗L, P
d
H
)
∆E(1+θ
∗)2
9 ≥ P dH (1− θ′′ + θ∗)
if P ∗L =
∆E(2−θ∗)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆E (2− θ∗)
6
+
θ∗∆
2
+
∆
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
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θ∗min
{
3∆− 2∆E
3∆−∆E ;
(6θ + 2) ∆E − 3∆
3∆ + ∆E
}
and proﬁt:
ΠdH =
(−9∆θ∗ + 3∆−∆Eθ∗ + 2∆E) (3∆θ∗ + 3∆−∆Eθ∗ + 2∆E)
36∆
− αq2H
A.d.3 vs A.d.2
A.d.3 vs A.d.2 for L ΠA.d.3L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.d.2L
(
P dL, P
∗
H
)
∆E(2−θ∗)2
9 ≥ P ′L (θ′ − θ + θ′′ − θ∗)
if P ∗H =
∆(1+θ∗)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
(
∆ (1 + θ∗)
3
− θ∗∆ + ∆E (1 + θ
∗)
3
− θ∆
)
1
2
∆E
∆ + ∆E
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
γ = 12
∆E
∆+∆E
θ∗ ≤ min
{
2∆ + γ (∆ + ∆E) + 3∆θ (1− γ)
γ (2∆−∆E) + ∆ ;
+3θ∆ (γ − 1)−∆γ − δ∆E
−2∆γ + ∆Eγ −∆
}
proﬁts:
ΠdL =
∆ (−3θ∆− 2∆θ∗ + ∆ + ∆∆E + ∆E) (−6θ∆∆E + 3θ∆− 6∆∆Eθ∗ + ∆∆E + 4∆∆E + ∆ + ∆E)
36∆E (∆ + ∆E)
−αq2L
A.d.3 vs A.d.2 for H ΠA.d.3H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠA.d.2H
(
P ∗L, P
d
H
)
∆E(1+θ
∗)2
9 ≥ P ′′H
(
θ¯ − θ′′ + θ∗ − θ′)
if P ∗L =
∆E(2−θ∗)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
(
∆ (2− θ∗)
3
+ θ∗∆ +
∆E (2− θ∗)
3
+ θ¯∆
)
1
2
∆E
∆ + ∆E
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ min
{
3θ (γ∆−∆E) + 5∆γ + 2∆Eγ
−∆− 2∆γ + ∆Eγ ;
5∆ (1− γ)− 2∆Eγ − 3θ∆ (1− γ)
2∆γ + ∆−∆Eγ
}
γ = 12
∆E
∆+∆E
proﬁts:
ΠdH = −
∆ (3θ∆ + 4∆θ∗ − 6θ∆E + ∆− 5∆E∆− 8∆E) (3θ∆ + 2∆θ∗ + 5∆−∆Eθ∗ + 2∆E)
36 (∆ + ∆E) ∆E
−αq2H
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Case B (pessimist)
B.a.1
B.b.1 vs B.a.2
B.a.1 vs B.a.2 for L ΠB.a.1L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠB.a.2L (P ′L, P ∗H)
∆E(θ¯−2θ)2
9 ≥ P ′L (θ∗ − θ)
if P ∗H =
∆E(2θ¯−θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
− θ∗∆E
comment is like an average weight price
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
∆
∆E
≥ 1
and proﬁt:
ΠdL =
(
∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
− θ∗∆E
)
(θ∗ − θ)− αq2L
B.a.1 vs B.a.2 for H ΠB.a.1H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠB.a.2H (P ∗L, P ′′H)
∆E(2θ¯−θ)2
9 ≥ P ′′H
(
θ¯ − θ∗)
if P ∗L =
∆E(θ¯−2θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+ θ∗∆
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
∆
∆E
≥ 1
proﬁt:
ΠdH =
(
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+ θ∗∆
)(
θ¯ − θ∗)− αq2H
B.a.1 vs B.a.3
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B.a.1 vs B.a.3 for L ΠB.a.1L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠB.a.3L (P ′L, P ∗H)
∆E(θ¯−2θ)2
9 ≥ P ′′L (θ′′ − θ)
if P ∗H =
∆E(2θ¯−θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)
6
− θ∆
2
or in an other form P dL =
∆Eθ
6 +
∆E
3 − θ∆2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ ∆E (θ + 2)− 3θ∆
6∆
and proﬁt:
ΠdL =
[
∆E
(
2θ¯ − θ)− 3θ∆]2
36∆
− αq2L
B.a.1 vs B.a.3 for H ΠB.a.1H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠB.a.3H (P ∗L, P ′′H)
∆E(2θ¯−θ)2
9 ≥ P ′′H
(
θ¯ − θ′′)
if P ∗L =
∆E(θ¯−2θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
6
+
θ¯∆
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ 3∆ (θ + 1) + θ∆E −∆E
6∆
proﬁts is:
ΠdH =
[
∆E
(
θ¯ − 2θ)+ 3θ∆]2
36∆
− αq2H
B.a.2
B.a.2 vs B.a.1
B.a.2 vs B.a.1 for L ΠB.a.2L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠB.a.1L
(
P dL, P
∗
H
)
θq0 (θ
∗ − θ) ≥ P dL (θ′ − θ)
if P ∗H = θq0 + θ
∗∆ from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
θq0 + θ
∗∆
2
− θ∆E
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
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2θ∆− θ∆E − θq0
∆
≤ θ∗ ≤ −θ∆E − θq0
∆− 2∆E
this constraint is hard to ﬁt
and proﬁts is:
ΠdL =
(θq0 + θ
∗∆− θ∆E)2
4∆E
− αq2L
B.a.2 vs B.a.1 for H ΠB.a.2H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠB.a.1H
(
P ∗L, P
d
H
)
(θq0 + θ
∗∆)
(
θ¯ − θ∗) ≥ P dH (θ¯ − θ′)
if P ∗L = θq0 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
θq0
2
+
θ¯∆E
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≥ θ¯∆E − θq0
2∆E
and proﬁt:
ΠdH =
(
θq0 + θ¯∆E
)2
4∆E
− αq2H
B.a.2 vs B.a.3
B.a.2 vs B.a.3 for L ΠB.a.2L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠB.a.3L
(
P dL, P
∗
H
)
θq0 (θ
∗ − θ) ≥ P dL (θ′′ − θ)
if P ∗H = θq0 + θ
∗∆ from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
θq0 + θ
∗∆
2
− θ∆
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ min
{
2θ∆E + 2∆E − θ∆− θq0
∆
,
θ∆ + θq0
∆
}
proﬁts:
ΠdL =
(θq0 + θ
∗∆− θ∆)2
4∆
− αq2L
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B.a.2 vs B.a.3 for H ΠB.a.2H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠB.a.3H
(
P ∗L, P
d
H
)
(θq0 + θ
∗∆)
(
θ¯ − θ∗) ≥ P dH (θ¯ − θ′′)
if P ∗L = θq0 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
θq0
2
+
θ¯∆
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≤ θ∆ + ∆− θq0
2∆
proﬁts:
ΠdH =
(
θq0 + θ¯∆
)2
4∆
− αq2H
B.a.3
B.a.3 vs B.a.1
B.a.3 vs B.a.1 for L ΠB.a.3L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠB.a.1L
(
P dL, P
∗
H
)
∆(θ¯−2θ)2
9 ≥ P ′L (θ′ − θ)
if P ∗H =
∆(2θ¯−θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
6
− θ∆E
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
θ∗ ≥ θ∆ + 3θ∆E + 2∆
6∆E
and proﬁts is:
ΠdL =
[
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)− 3θ∆E]2
36∆E
− αq2L
B.a.3 vs B.a.1 for H ΠBa.3H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠB.a.1H
(
P ∗L, P
d
H
)
∆(2θ¯−θ)2
9 ≥ P dH
(
θ¯ − θ′)
if P ∗L =
∆(θ¯−2θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
6
+
θ¯∆E
2
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
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θ∗ ≥ θ∆ + 3θ∆E + 3∆E −∆
6∆E
and proﬁt:
ΠdH =
[
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)+ 3θ¯∆E]2
36∆E
− αq2H
B.a.3 vs B.a.2
B.a.3 vs B.a.2 for L ΠB.a.3L (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠB.a.2L
(
P dL, P
∗
H
)
∆(θ¯−2θ)2
9 ≥ P ′L (θ∗ − θ)
if P ∗H =
∆(2θ¯−θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dL =
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
− θ∗∆E
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
∆
∆E
≥ 1
proﬁts:
ΠdL =
(
∆
(
2θ¯ − θ)
3
− θ∗∆E
)
(θ∗ − θ)− αq2L
B.a.3 vs B.a.2 for H ΠB.a.3H (P
∗
L, P
∗
H) ≥ ΠB.a.2H
(
P ∗L, P
d
H
)
∆(2θ¯−θ)2
9 ≥ P ′′H
(
θ¯ − θ∗)
if P ∗L =
∆(θ¯−2θ)
3 from optitimization proces we optain:
P dH =
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+ θ∗∆
on this case restiction on θ∗we have:
∆
∆E
≥ 1
proﬁts:
ΠdH =
(
∆
(
θ¯ − 2θ)
3
+ θ∗∆
)(
θ¯ − θ∗)− αq2H
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5.1 B1 First Best Solution
The solution to the following optimization program,
max
pi,ci
W (pi, ci) = (1 + αi)
ˆ ∞
pi
q(x)d(x) + (pi − ci)q(pi) + S(ci)
must satisfy the following FOCs:
∂Wi
∂pi
= −q (pi)− αiq (pi) + q (pi) + (pi − ci) q′ (pi) = 0
∂Wi
∂pi
= −αiq (pi) + (pi − ci) q′ (pi) = 0 (5.1)
⇒ pi = ci + αi q (pi)
q′ (pi)
∂Wi
∂ci
= −q (pi) + S′ (ci) = 0 (5.2)
So that p∗ and c∗ denote the optimal level of price and cost that solve the system of
equations deﬁned by (5.1) and (5.2).
With some manipulation and dividing both sides of (5.1) by piwe obtain
pi − ci
pi
= − αi|i| (5.3)
With eithe price elasticity. For 0 < ai ≤ 1 we have a negative mark up pi < ci.
Note that and for diﬀerent levels of altruism regulator ﬁxes diﬀerent prices for diﬀerent
ﬁrms, so if a1 ≤ a2 we havep∗2 ≤ p∗1 and by equation (5.2) c∗2 ≤ c∗1.
Indeed, let,
F1 = pi − ci − αi q(pi)q′(pi) = 0
F2 = −q (pi) + S′ (ci) = 0
Total diﬀerentiation leads to:{
∂F1
∂ci
dci +
∂F1
∂pi
dpi +
∂F1
∂αi
dαi = 0
∂F2
∂ci
dci +
∂F2
∂pi
dpi +
∂F2
∂αi
dαi = 0
⇔
{
∂F1
∂ci
dci
dαi
+ ∂F1∂pi
dpi
dαi
= −∂F1∂αi
∂F2
∂ci
dci
dαi
+ ∂F2∂pi
dpi
dαi
= −∂F2∂αi
In matrix format[
∂F1/∂ci ∂F1/∂pi
∂F2/∂ci ∂F2/∂pi
][
∂ci/∂αi
∂pi/∂αi
]
=
[−∂F1/∂αi
−∂F2/∂αi
]
Using Cramer's rule we obtain: ∂ci∂αi =
A1
j ;
∂pi
∂αi
= A2j
Where:
J =
[
∂F1/∂ci ∂F1/∂pi
∂F2/∂ci ∂F2/∂pi
]
; A1 =
[−∂F1/∂αi ∂F1/∂pi
−∂F2/∂αi ∂F2/∂pi
]
; A2 =
[
∂F1/∂ci −∂F1/∂αi
∂F2/∂ci −∂F2/∂αi
]
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Therefore computing the partial derivatives in A1, A2 and J :
∂F1/∂ci = −1 < 0
∂F1/∂pi = 1− αi
[
q′(pi)2−q′′(pi)q(pi)
q′(pi)2
]
≤ 1
∂F1/∂αi = − q(pi)q′(pi) > 0
∂F2/∂ci = S′′ (ci) < 0
∂F2/∂pi = −q′ (pi) > 0
∂F2/∂αi = 0
in case of a linear demand function we have ∂F1∂pi = 1− αi
and
J = q′ (pi)− (1− αi)S′′ (ci)
From (5.2) and assumption 1 we know that |q′(pi)| ≤ |S′′(ci)| therefore if ai < 1− q
′(pi)
S′′(ci)
then J is positive. The condition ai < 1− q
′(pi)
S′′(ci) ensures a negative deﬁnite Hessian matrix
(for the existence of a maximum) and therefore an interior solution.
With J > 0 the sign of will be determined by the sign of A1 and A2.
A1 = (−∂F1/∂αi) (∂F2/∂pi)− (∂F1/∂pi) (−∂F1/∂αi) = −q (pi) < 0
A2 = (∂F1/∂ci) (−∂F2/∂αi)− (−∂F1/∂αi) (∂F2/∂ci) = − q(pi)q′(pi)S′′ (ci) < 0
Therefore it follows that:
∂ci/∂αi < 0 , ∂pi/∂αi
Therefore for a1 ≤ a2 we have that p∗2 ≤ p∗1 and c∗2 ≤ c∗1
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5.2 B2 Free price scenario
Proof of Proposition 1 : Maximizing
Ui (pˆi,ci;αi) = (pi − ci) q (pi) + S (ci) + αi
ˆ ∞
pi
q (x) d (x)i (5.4)
With respect to pi and ci the optimal price p
f
i and cost c
f
i are the solution for the
following FOCs: are:
∂Ui
∂pi
= (pi − ci) q′ (pi)− αiq (pi) + q (pi) = 0 (5.5)
∂Ui
∂ci
= −q (pi) + S′ (ci) = 0 (5.6)
Rearranging (5.5)
pi − ci
pi
=
1− αi
|i| (5.7)
We have a positive mark up, if ai < 1 (i.e. p
f
i > c
f
i ); zero mark-up for ai = 1 (i.e.
pfi = c
f
i ). In the latter when ai = 1 the free price solution is the same as in the ﬁrst best
solution with zero altruism.
Comparing (5.7) with (5.3) ∀ai, −ai/|ei| ≤ 0 and (1 − ai )/|ei| ≥ 0, it follows that
pfi > p
∗
i . Moreover given that the mark-up decreases with the altruism level it follows
that pf1 ≥ pf2 for a1 ≤ a2. Furthermore given (A2.35.6) it follows that cf1 ≥ cf2 .
Indeed, let,
F1 = pi − ci − αi q(pi)q′(pi) +
q(pi)
q′(pi) = 0
F2 = −q (pi) + S′ (ci) = 0
Total diﬀerentiation leads to:{
∂F1
∂ci
dci +
∂F1
∂pi
dpi +
∂F1
∂αi
dαi = 0
∂F2
∂ci
dci +
∂F2
∂pi
dpi +
∂F2
∂αi
dαi = 0
⇔
{
∂F1
∂ci
dci
dαi
+ ∂F1∂pi
dpi
dαi
= −∂F1∂αi
∂F2
∂ci
dci
dαi
+ ∂F2∂pi
dpi
dαi
= −∂F2∂αi
In matrix format[
∂F1/∂ci ∂F1/∂pi
∂F2/∂ci ∂F2/∂pi
][
∂ci/∂αi
∂pi/∂αi
]
=
[−∂F1/∂αi
−∂F2/∂αi
]
Using Cramer's rule we obtain: ∂ci∂αi =
A1
j ;
∂pi
∂αi
= A2j
Where:
J =
[
∂F1/∂ci ∂F1/∂pi
∂F2/∂ci ∂F2/∂pi
]
; A1 =
[−∂F1/∂αi ∂F1/∂pi
−∂F2/∂αi ∂F2/∂pi
]
; A2 =
[
∂F1/∂ci −∂F1/∂αi
∂F2/∂ci −∂F2/∂αi
]
Therefore computing the partial derivatives in A1, A2 and J :
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∂F1/∂ci = −1 < 0
∂F1/∂pi = 1− αi
[
q′(pi)2−q′′(pi)q(pi)
q′(pi)2
]
+
[
q′(pi)2−q′′(pi)q(pi)
q′(pi)2
]
∂F1/∂αi = − q(pi)q′(pi) > 0
∂F2/∂ci = S′′ (ci) < 0
∂F2/∂pi = −q′ (pi) > 0
∂F2/∂αi = 0
in case of a linear demand function we have ∂F1∂pi = 2− αi
and
J = q′ (pi)− (2− αi)S′′ (ci)
From (5.2) and assumption 1 we know that |q′(pi)| ≤ |S′′(ci)| therefore if 0 ≤ ai ≤ 1
then J is positive. The condition J > 0 ensures a negative deﬁnite Hessian matrix (for
the existence of a maximum) and therefore an interior solution.
With J > 0 the sign of will be determined by the sign of A1 and A2.
A1 = (−∂F1/∂αi) (∂F1/∂pi)− (∂F1/∂pi) (−∂F2/∂αi) = −q (pi) < 0
A2 = (∂F1/∂ci) (−∂F2/∂αi)− (−∂F1/∂αi) (∂F2/∂ci) = − q(pi)q′(pi)S′′ (ci) < 0
Therefore it follows that:
∂ci/∂αi < 0 , ∂pi/∂αi < 0
Therefore for a1 ≤ a2 we have that pf2 ≤ pf1 and cf2 ≤ cf1
Furthermore since (5.6) is the same as (5.2). Knowing that pfi > p
∗
i Since q
′(pi) < 0and
S′′(ci) < 0 it follows from (5.6) that c
f
i > c
∗
i .
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5.3 B3 Non-Cooperative Scenario: The Provider's problem
Proof of Proposition 2 and Corollary 1
Given the utility function being maximized (5.4), the FOCs with respect to cost are given
by,
∂Ui
∂ci
=
(
∂pˆi
∂ci
− 1
)
q (pˆi) + (pˆi − ci) ∂q (pˆi)
∂pˆi
∂pˆi
∂ci
+ S′ (ci)− αiq (pˆi) ∂pˆi
∂ci
= 0 (5.8)
∀αi ∈ [0, 1] , i = 1, 2
Given the regulatory rule pˆi = c−i (where pˆi is the regulated price), (A3.15.8) becomes,
∂Ui
∂ci
= S′ (ci)− q (c−i) = 0 ∀αi ∈ [0, 1] , i = 1, 2 (5.9)
Given assumption 1, for i,−i = {1, 2} , i 6= −i we have: (i) ∂U2i /∂c2i < 0; (ii)|∂U2i /∂c2i | >
|∂U2i /∂ci∂c−i|, i.e. |S′′(ci)| < |q′(c−i)|.
From (5.9) we see that price do not depend on altruism and the price is given under
regulated price. Therefore the condition for proﬁt maximization (5.9) becomes:
S′ (ci) = q (c−i)
We argue that the optimal solution (cnci , c
nc
−i) is the symmetric solution to (5.9), i.e.
cnci = c
nc
−i = c
nc.
To prove that there is no asymmetric solution we will look for proﬁtable deviations
from the asymmetric equilibrium. Consider the asymmetric solution cnc1 > c
nc
2 = c
nc.
Suppose that ﬁrm 1 decreases its cost by ∆c11). From (5.9) we can see that ﬁrm 1 by
varying c1 in ∆c1 gains q(cnc2 )∆c1 at the cost of S
′(c1)∆c1 . By the SOCs we know that
S′(c1) < q(cnc2 ) therefore it is always proﬁtable for ﬁrm 1 to decrease its cost.
Now suppose that ﬁrm 1 increases its cost by ∆c1 . From (5.9) we can see that ﬁrm
1 by varying c1 in ∆c1 gains S′(c1)∆c1 at the cost of q(cnc2 )∆c1 . Given that by SOCs
S′(c1) < q(cnc2 ) then it is not proﬁtable for ﬁrm 1 to increase its cost.
Consider the asymmetric solution cnc1 < c
nc
2 = c
nc.
Suppose that ﬁrm 1 deviates by decreasing its cost by ∆c1. From (5.9) we can see
that ﬁrm 1 by varying c1 in ∆c1 gains q(cnc2 )∆c1 at the cost of S
′(c1)∆c1 . Now for
cnc1 < c
nc
2 = c
nc and given the SOCs we know that S′(c1) > q(cnc2 ) therefore it is never
proﬁtable to deviate by decreasing the cost.
Now suppose that ﬁrm 1 increases its cost by ∆c1 . From (5.9) we can see that by
varying c1 in ∆c1 it gains S′(c1)∆c1 at the cost of q(cnc2 )∆c1 . Now for cnc1 < cnc2 = cnc
and given the SOCs we know that S′(ci) > q(cnc2 ) therefore it is always proﬁtable to
deviate by increasing the cost.
Therefore the only possible solution is the symmetric equilibrium cn1c = c
nc
2 = c
nc.
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Comparing costs and prices across the diﬀerent scenarios.
First note that in the non-comparative scenario cnc does not vary with the altruism level
(neither the price given the price rule pˆ = c−i) while prices and costs in the ﬁrst best
and free price scenarios (i.e. cfi , c
∗
i , p
f
i and p
∗
i ) are all decreasing in the level of altruism
(see proof above).
Symmetric case
For the case of selﬁsh ﬁrms, i.e. ai = a−i = 0, thenpf > cf > c∗ = p∗ = pnc = cnc
so that prices and costs are the same in the ﬁrst best and non-cooperative scenario and
higher in the free price scenario. Indeed, comparing the non-cooperative with the ﬁrst
best solution. We know that for ai = 0,∀i = 1, 2, from (5.1) it follows that p∗i = c∗i .
Therefore given that the cost FOC in the non-cooperative scenario (5.9) is equal to the
cost FOC in the ﬁrst best (5.2) it follows that cnci = c
∗
i = p
∗
i . The remainder inequalities
have been demonstrated above.
When ai = a−i = 1, then pf = cf = pnc = cnc > c∗ > p∗, in this case the free price
scenario and the non-cooperative scenario under yardstick competition give the same
result.
Indeed, suppose now that ai increases from zero such that ai > 0, ∀i = 1, 2. We know
that, for ai > 0∀i = 1, 2 and from (5.1) p∗i < c∗i . For FOC (5.2) to hold it must follow that
c∗i |(ai=0) > c∗i |(ai>0). Since we know that c∗i |(ai=0) = cnci it follows that cnci > c∗i |(ai>0).
Comparing the non-cooperative with the free price scenario. We know that for ai =
1,∀i = 1, 2, from (5.5) it follows that pfi = cfi . Therefore given that the cost FOC in
the non-cooperative scenario (5.9) is equal to the cost FOC in free price scenario (5.6)
it follows that cfi = p
f
i = c
nc
i = p
nc
i . The remainder inequalities have been demonstrated
above.
Asymmetric case
Finally for 0 ≤ a1 ≤ a2 ≤ 1 we know that:
a. From the non-cooperative scenario (appendix A3) pnc1 = p
nc
2 = c
nc
1 = c
nc
2
b. From appendix A1 we know that c∗1 ≥ c∗2
c. From appendix A2 that cf1 ≥ cf2 ≥ c∗1 ≥ c∗2
d. Above in this section we have also shown that cnc1 = c
nc
2 ≥ c∗1 ≥ c∗2
e. For ai < 1 ∀i = 1, 2, Comparing the free price with the non-cooperative scenario,
from (5.5) it follows that pfi > c
f
i . Therefore given that the cost FOC in the non-
cooperative scenario (5.9) is equal to the cost FOC in free price scenario (5.6) it follows
that cf1 > c
nc
1 = c
nc
2 = p
nc
1 = p
nc
2 .
f. For ai = 1 ∀i = 1, 2, as shown above we know that cfi = pfi = cnci = pnci .
g. Given c), e) and f) it follows cf1 ≥ cf2 ≥ cnc1 = cnc2 = pnc1 = pnc2
h. Finally given d) and g) it follows that cf1 ≥ cf2 ≥ cnc1 = cnc2 = pnc1 = pnc2 ≥ c∗1 ≥ c∗2
Therefore given a)-h) it follows that the costs of the diﬀerent scenarios are ranked in
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the following way: cf1 ≥ cf2 ≥ cnc1 = cnc2 ≥ c∗1 ≥ c∗2, while the prices ranking is as follows:
pf1 ≥ pf2 ≥ pnc1 = pnc2 ≥ p∗1 ≥ p∗2 .
Comparative statics and equilibrium payoﬀs
Recall from (5.9) that the optimal costs must satisfy the FOCs:
∂Ui
∂ci
= S′ (ci)− q (c−i) = 0 ∀αi ∈ [0, 1] , i = 1, 2
let,
F1 ≡ ∂U1∂c1 = −q (c2) + S′ (c1) = 0
F2 ≡ ∂U2∂c2 = −q (c1) + S′ (c2) = 0
Total diﬀerentiation leads to:{
∂F1
∂c1
dc1 +
∂F1
∂c2
dc2 +
∂F1
∂αi
dαi = 0
∂F2
∂c1
dc1 +
∂F2
∂c2
dc2 +
∂F2
∂αi
dαi = 0
⇔
{
∂F1
∂c1
dc1
dαi
+ ∂F1∂c2
dc2
dαi
= −∂F1∂αi
∂F2
∂c1
dc1
dαi
+ ∂F2∂c2
dc2
dαi
= −∂F2∂αi
In matrix format[
∂F1/∂c1 ∂F1/∂c2
∂F2/∂c1 ∂F2/∂c2
][
∂c1/∂αi
∂c2/∂αi
]
=
[−∂F1/∂αi
−∂F2/∂αi
]
Using Cramer's rule we obtain: ∂ci∂αi =
A1
j ;
∂pi
∂αi
= A2j
Where:
J =
[
∂F1/∂c1 ∂F1/∂c2
∂F2/∂c1i ∂F2/∂c2
]
; A1 =
[−∂F1/∂αi ∂F1/∂c2
−∂F2/∂αi ∂F2/∂c2i
]
; A2 =
[
∂F1/∂c1 −∂F1/∂αi
∂F2/∂c1 −∂F2/∂αi
]
Therefore computing the partial derivatives in A1, A2 and J :
∂F1/∂c1 = S′′ (cnc1 ) < 0
∂F1/∂c2 = −q′ (cnc2 ) > 0
∂F1/∂αi = 0
∂F2/∂c1 = −q′ (cnc1 ) > 0
∂F2/∂c2 = S′′ (cnc2 ) < 0
∂F2/∂αi = 0
With J>0 the sign of ∂c1/∂αi,∂c2/∂αi will be determined by the sign of A1 and A2.
A1 = (−∂F1/∂αi) (∂F1/∂c2)− (∂F1/∂c2) (−∂F2/∂αi) = 0
A2 = (∂F1/∂c1) (−∂F2/∂αi)− (−∂F1/∂αi) (∂F2/∂c1) = 0
Therefore it follows that:
∂c1/∂αi = ∂c2/∂αi = 0 (5.10)
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Utility payoﬀs
The utility payoﬀ of provider i as a result of its maximization behaviour is given by,
Unci =
(
cnc−i − ci
)
q
(
cnc−i
)
+ S (cnci ) + αi
ˆ ∞
cnc−i
q (x) d (x) = (5.11)
= S (cnci ) + αi
ˆ ∞
cnc−i
q (x) d (x)
When αi = α−i = α, in equilibrium by symmetry cnci = c
nc
−i = c
nc and FOC (A3.25.9)
becomes,
∂U
∂c
= −q (c) + S′ (c) = 0 (5.12)
Therefore, for both ownership types in equilibrium providers gain the same utility
payoﬀ
Unc = S (cnc) + α
ˆ ∞
cnc
q (x) d (x)
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5.4 B4 Cooperative Scenario
Proof of Proposition 3
In a cooperative scenario providers optimally choose ci by maximizing their joint proﬁts
JU :
max
ci
JU =
2∑
i=1
[
(pˆi − ci) q (pˆi) + S (ci) + αi
ˆ ∞
pˆi
q (x) dx
]
Thus for pˆi = c−i
max
ci,c−i
JU =
2∑
i=1
[
(c−i − ci) q (c−i) + S (ci) + αi
ˆ ∞
c−i
q (x) dx
]
(5.13)
The FOCs are given by,
∂JU
∂ci
= −q (c−i) + S′ (ci) + (ci − c−i) q′ (ci) + (1− α−i) q (ci) = 0 i = 1, 2 (5.14)
These conditions can be rewritten as:
∂JU
∂c2
= (1− α1) q (cc2) + S′ (cc2) = q (cc1) + (cc1 − cc2) q′ (cc2) (5.15)
and
∂JU
∂c1
= (1− α2) q (cc1) + S′ (cc1) = q (cc2) + (cc2 − cc1) q′ (cc1) (5.16)
Suppose that cc2 < c
c
1. Given S
′′ (ci) < 0 and α1 ≤ α2 ⇒ (1− α1) q (cc2) + S′ (cc2) >
(1− α2) q (cc1) + S′ (cc1).
Therefore,
q (cc1)+(c
c
1 − cc2) q′ (cc2) > q (cc2)+(cc2 − cc1) q′ (cc1)⇒ q (cc1)−q (cc2)+(cc1 − cc2) [q′ (cc2)− q′ (cc1)] >
0
However for q′ (.) < 0 and q′′ (.) > 0 this inequality never holds for cc2 < cc1 . Now
suppose that cc2 < c
c
1 . Then rewriting and subtracting (5.15) and (5.16) we obtain:
q (cc) (α2 − α1) = 0
For q (.) > 0 and α1 ≤ α2 this can only hold for α1 = α2. Therefore for α1 ≤ α2 it
must be that cc2 > c
c
1 . For α1 = α2 by symmetry c
c
2 = c
c
1 .
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Comparative Statics
Proceeding with comparative statics let:{
∂F1
∂c1
dc1 +
∂F1
∂c2
dc2 +
∂F1
∂α1
dα1 +
∂F1
∂α2
dα2 = 0
∂F2
∂c1
dc1 +
∂F2
∂c2
dc2 +
∂F2
∂α1
dα1 +
∂F2
∂α2
dα2 = 0
⇔
{
∂F1
∂c1
dc1
dα1
+ ∂F1∂c2
dc2
dα1
= −∂F1∂α1
∂F2
∂c1
dc1
dα1
+ ∂F2∂c2
dc2
dα1
= −∂F2∂α1
In matrix format[
∂F1/∂c1 ∂F1/∂c2
∂F2/∂c1 ∂F2/∂c2
][
∂c1/∂α1
∂c2/∂α1
]
=
[−∂F1/∂α1
−∂F2/∂α1
]
Using Cramer's rule we obtain: ∂ci∂α1 =
A1
j ;
∂pi
∂α1
= A2j
Where:
J =
[
∂F1/∂c1 ∂F1/∂c2
∂F2/∂c1i ∂F2/∂c2
]
; A1 =
[−∂F1/∂αi ∂F1/∂c2
−∂F2/∂αi ∂F2/∂c2i
]
; A2 =
[
∂F1/∂c1 −∂F1/∂α1
∂F2/∂c1 −∂F2/∂α1
]
Therefore computing the partial derivatives in A1, A2 and J :
∂F1/∂c1 = S′′ (c1) + q′ (c1) + (1− α2) q′ (c1) + (c1 − c2) q′′ (c1) < 0
∂F1/∂c2 = −q′ (c1)− q′ (c2)
∂F1/∂αi = 0
∂F2/∂c1 = −q′ (c1)− q′ (c2)
∂F2/∂c2 = S′′ (c2) + q′ (c2) + (1− α1) q′ (c2) + (c2 − c1) q′′ (c2) < 0
∂F2/∂αi = −q (c2) < 0
J = [S′′ (c2) + q′ (c2) + (1− α1) q′ (c2)]∗[S′′ (c1) + q′ (c1) + (1− α2) q′ (c1)]−[−q′ (c1)− q′ (c2)]2
Under the assumption 1 q′(pi) ≤ S′′(ci) and linear demand function J > 0 so the sign
of ∂c1/∂α1,∂c2/∂α1 will be determined by the sign of A1 and A2.
A1 = (−∂F1/∂α1) (∂F1/∂c2)− (∂F1/∂c2) (−∂F2/∂α1) < 0
A2 = (∂F1/∂c1) (−∂F2/∂α1)− (−∂F1/∂α1) (∂F2/∂c1) < 0
For a linear demand function A2 < 0 and A1 < 0. It follows that:
∂cc1/∂α1 < 0, ∂c
c
2/∂α1 < 0 (5.17)
Analogously for a2:
∂cc1/∂α2 < 0, ∂c
c
2/∂α2 < 0 (5.18)
Proof or Corollary 2
In order to show , consider (5.16) for i = 1 and rewrite it as:
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∂JU
∂c1
= −q (cc2) + S′ (cc1) + (cc1 − cc2) q′ (cc1) + (1− α2) q (cc1) = 0
Comparing with the non-cooperative FOC the latter has an extra term:(cc1 − cc2) q′ (cc1)+
(1− α2) q (cc1) . As in equilibrium cc2 > cc1 it follows that (cc1 − cc2) q′ (cc1)+(1− α2) q (cc1) >
0 . Consequently cc1 > c
nc ≥ c∗. As cc2 > cc1 ⇒ cc2 > cnc ≥ c∗ ∀αi ∈ [0, 1] .
In the symmetric case, when the providers have the same level of altruism, i.e. when
α1 = α2 = α, in equilibrium by symmetry, c1 = c2 = cc , (5.14) becomes,
∂JU
∂c
= S′ (cc)− αq (cc) = 0 (5.19)
Also, in the symmetric case, when a → 1 (5.19) becomes the same as (5.9), therefore
cc → cnc.
Now consider α1 = α2 = 1. The FOC in the cooperative scenario becomes −q
(
cc−i
)
+
S′ (cci ) +
(
cci − cc−i
)
q′ (cci ) = 0 . By symmetry c
c
2 = c
c
1 = c
c that is the solution to the
FOC that simpliﬁes to S′ (cci ) − q
(
cc−i
)
= 0 . Comparing the latter with the (5.12) it
follows that cc = cnc > c∗
Consider now α1 = α2 = 0 . Since cc2 = c
c
1 = c
c the FOCs in the cooperative scenario
(5.15) and (5.16) become S′ (cc) = 0. Comparing the latter with (5.12) since −q(c) < 0
it follows that cc > cnc > c∗ .
Comparing the cooperative solution with the with the ﬁrst best solution for the sym-
metric case, analysing the ﬁrst best FOC ∂Wi∂ci = −q (pi) + S′ (ci) = 0 we have that:−q (p∗)+S′ (c∗) = −q (cc)+S′ (cc) = 0⇔ q (p∗)−q (cc) = S′ (c∗)−S′ (cc) as in the ﬁrst
best the price is below the marginal cost c∗ then q (p∗)−q (cc) > 0⇒ S′ (c∗)−S′ (cc) > 0
. As S′′ (.) < 0⇒ cc > c∗.
For the symmetric case a1 = a2 = a, proceeding with some comparative static analysis,
consider the FOC (5.14) by the implicit function theorem dc
c
dα =
∂2JU/∂cc∂α
∂2JU/∂2cc
.
Diﬀerentiating (5.14) for cc and α we ﬁnd that ∂2JU/∂cc∂α = −q (c) and ∂2JU/∂2cc =
S′′ (c)− αq′ (c). Given that by the second order conditions the latter is negative then it
follows that
dcc
dα
= − −q (c)
S′′ (c)− αq′ (c) < 0 (5.20)
i.e., the higher is the providers' altruism level the lower is the collusive cost.
Utility Payoﬀs
Substituting the optimal cost strategies on the utility function the utility payoﬀ earned
by provider i under collusion is given by,
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U c =
(
cc−i − cci
)
q
(
cc−i
)
+ S (cci ) + α
ˆ ∞
cc−i
q (x) dx (5.21)
In the symmetric case for homogeneous providers i.e. a1 = a2 = a, the utility payoﬀ is
given by,
U c = S (cc) + α
ˆ ∞
cc
q (x) dx (5.22)
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5.5 B5 Defection Scenario
Proof of Proposition 4
The defecting provider i will revert to behaving accordingly to the best response function
as in (5.9)
S′ (ci)− q
(
cc−i
)
= 0 (5.23)
In the non-cooperative scenario we know that −q (cnc) + S′ (cnc) = 0 ⇒ S′ (cnc) −
S′
(
cdi
)
= q (cnc)− q (cci ). With cci > cnc and q′ < 0 then q (cnc)− q (cci ) > 0⇒ S′ (cnc)−
S′
(
cdi
)
> 0 . As S′′(.) < 0⇒ cnc < cdi .
consider now{
S′
(
cd1
)− q (cc2) = 0
S′
(
cd2
)− q (cc1) = 0 ⇒ −q (cc2) + q (cc1) + S′
(
cd1
)− S′ (cd2) = 0
Given q′ (ci) < 0 , it follows that −q (cc2)+q (cc1) > 0, then it must be S′
(
cd1
)−S′ (cd2) <
0 . As S′′(.) < 0 it follows that cd2 < cd1 must hold true.
Consider equation (5.23) evaluated at cc−i and c
c
i and compare it with the FOC in
collusion (5.14). For i = 1, the last two terms in (5.14) are positive, thus it must be
S′ (cci )−q
(
cc−i
)
< 0 for the FOC to be satisﬁed. It follows that the cost chosen in defection
is less than the cooperation cost. Thus the defection cost falls within, cnc1 < c
d
1 < c
c
1 .
With regards to provider 2, rewrite FOC (5.14) as:
∂JU
∂c1
≡ −α2q (c1) + S′ (c1) + (c1 − c2) q′ (c1) + q (c1)− q (c2) = 0
∂JU
∂c2
≡ −α1q (c2) + S′ (c2) + (c2 − c1) q′ (c2) + q (c2)− q (c1) = 0
As c2 > c1 and q′(.) < 0 then (c1 − c2) q′ (c1) + q (c1) + q (c2) > 0 . For ∂JU/∂c1 = 0
to be veriﬁed it must be that −α2q (c1) + S′ (c1) < 0. Analogously, as (c2 − c1) q′ (c2) +
q (c2) − q (c1) < 0 . For ∂JU/∂c2 = 0 then −α1q (c2) + S′ (c2) > 0 . As α2 ≤ 1 then
−α2q (c1) + S′ (c1) < 0 ⇔ S′ (c1) < q (c1) . Also as S′(.) is decreasing for c2 > c1 ⇒
S′ (c2) < S′ (c1) < q (c1) . Therefore if S′ (cc2)− q (cc1) < 0⇒ cd2 < cd2 .
It is now possible to rank all the costs under the yardstick regulation, c∗2 ≤ c∗1 ≤ cnc1 =
cnc2 ≤ cd2 ≤ cd1 ≤ cc1 ≤ cc2
Comparative Statics
Recall from (5.23) that the optimal costs must satisfy the FOCs:
∂Ui
∂ci
= S′
(
cdi
)
− q (cc−i) = 0 ∀αi ∈ [0, 1] , i = (1, 2)
let,
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F1 ≡ ∂U1∂c1 = −q (cc2) + S′
(
cd1
)
= 0
F2 ≡ ∂U2∂c2 = −q (cc1) + S′
(
cd2
)
= 0
We know from equation A.3.9 that ∂cci/∂ai ≤ 0 so total diﬀerentiation leads to:{
∂F1
∂c1
dc1 +
∂F1
∂c2
dc2 +
∂F1
∂α1
dα1 +
∂F1
∂α2
dα2 = 0
∂F2
∂c1
dc1 +
∂F2
∂c2
dc2 +
∂F2
∂α2
dα1 +
∂F2
∂α2
dα2 = 0
⇔
{
∂F1
∂c1
dc1
dα1
+ ∂F1∂c2
dc2
dα1
= −∂F1∂α1
∂F2
∂c1
dc1
dα1
+ ∂F2∂c2
dc2
dα1
= −∂F2∂α1
In matrix format[
∂F1/∂c1 ∂F1/∂c2
∂F2/∂c1 ∂F2/∂c2
][
∂c1/∂α1
∂c2/∂α1
]
=
[−∂F1/∂α1
−∂F2/∂α1
]
Using Cramer's rule we obtain: ∂ci∂α1 =
A1
j ;
∂pi
∂α1
= A2j
Where:
J =
[
∂F1/∂c1 ∂F1/∂c2
∂F2/∂c1i ∂F2/∂c2
]
; A1 =
[−∂F1/∂α1 ∂F1/∂c2
−∂F2/∂α1 ∂F2/∂c2i
]
; A2 =
[
∂F1/∂c1 −∂F1/∂α1
∂F2/∂c1 −∂F2/∂α1
]
Therefore computing the partial derivatives in A1, A2 and J :
∂F1/∂c1 = S′′
(
cd1
)
< 0
∂F1/∂c2 = −q′ (cc2) > 0
∂F1/∂αi = −q′ (cc2) ∂c
c
2
∂α1
∂F2/∂c1 = −q′ (cc1) > 0
∂F2/∂c2 = S′′
(
cd2
)
< 0
∂F2/∂αi = −q′ (cc1) ∂c
c
1
∂α1
With J > 0 the sign of ∂c1/∂αi,∂c2/∂αi will be determined by the sign of A1 and A2.
A1 = (−∂F1/∂αi) (∂F1/∂c2)− (∂F1/∂c2) (−∂F2/∂αi) < 0
A2 = (∂F1/∂c1) (−∂F2/∂αi)− (−∂F1/∂αi) (∂F2/∂c1) < 0
Therefore it follows that:
∂cd1/∂αi < 0 ∂c
d
2/∂αi < 0 (5.24)
Utility payoﬀs
The utility payoﬀ provider i earns in defection is given by:
Ud =
(
cc−i − cdi
)
q
(
cc−i
)
+ S
(
cdi
)
+ αi
ˆ ∞
cc−i
q (x) dx (5.25)
When the providers have the same level of altruism, i.e. αi = α−i = α , by symmetry
the cooperative solution is such that cci = c
c
−i = c
c and the defection cost cdi = c
d
−i = c
d
is the solution to S′
(
cd
)− q (cc) = 0 . If we evaluate this at cc = c and compare it with
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FOC (5.19a), we obtain S′ (cc) − q (cc) ≤ 0. As S′(.) is a decreasing function, therefore
cd < cc . Also S′ (c∗)− q (cc) > 0 , then cd > c∗.
The utility payoﬀ both providers earn is given by:
Ud =
(
cc − cd
)
q (cc) + S
(
cd
)
+ α
ˆ ∞
cc
q (x) dx (5.26)
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5.6 B6 Payoﬀ Utility Ranking
Rank of utility payoffs under the different scenarios
Symmetric altruism
Suppose a1 = a2 = 0 the payoﬀ functions at the optimum are:
Unci |αi=0 = S(cnc) (5.27)
U ci |αi=0 = S(cc) (5.28)
Udi |αi=0 = (cc−i − cdi )q(cci ) + S(cd) (5.29)
Therefore it follows that: Unci ≤ U ci ≤ Udi .
Now we consider the case in which ai = a−i = 1. We have shown before if ai → 1
then cci → cnci (see proof of Proposition 3) and at cnci there are no proﬁtable deviations.
Therefore it follows that:
U ci = U
nc
i = U
d
i = S(c
nc
i ) +
ˆ ∞
cnc−i
q(x)dx (5.30)
Assymmetric altruism
Case 1: a1 = 0 and a2 = 1
The utility payoﬀs for these levels of altruism are:
Unc1 |α1=0 = S(cnc) (5.31)
U c1 |α1=0 = (cc2 − cc1)q(cc2) + S(cc1) (5.32)
Ud1 |α1=0 = (cc2 − cd1)q(cc2) + S(cd1) (5.33)
Unc2 |α2=1 = S(cnc) +
ˆ ∞
cnc
q(x)dx (5.34)
U c2 |α2=1 = (cc1 − cc2)q(cc1) + S(cc2) +
ˆ ∞
cc1
q(x)dx (5.35)
Ud2 |α2=1 = (cc1 − cd2)q(cc1) + S(cd2) +
ˆ ∞
cc1
q(x)dx (5.36)
Since cnc1 < c
c
1 < c
c
2 then S(c
c
1) > S(c
nc
1 ) and (c
c
2 − cc1)q(cc2) > 0, implying that
Unc1 < U
c
1 .
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Since cnc1 < c
d
1 < c
c
2 analysing (5.32) and (5.33) it follows that U
c
1 < U
d
1 . Therefore:
Unc1 < U
c
1 < U
d
1
Subtracting equation (5.34) to (5.35) we obtain:
Unc2 |α2=1 − U c2 |α2=1 = −(cc1 − cc2)q(cc1) + (S(cnc)− S(cc2)) +
´∞
cnc1
q(x)dx− ´∞cc1 q(x)dx
Recall that ccn1 = c
cn
2 < c
d
2 < c
c
1 < c
c
2. The term−(cc1 − cc2)q(cc1) > 0 is positive for
a2 > a1. Furthermore since ccn < cc (see proof of Proposition 3) the term
´∞
cnc1
q(x)dx−´∞
cc1
q(x)dx > 0 is positive since the consumer surplus is bigger in the non-cooperative
game. Finally, since cnc2 < c
c
2 the term (S(c
nc)−S(cc2)) < 0 is negative since the slackness
is bigger in the cooperative than in the non-cooperative scenario.
Therefore it follows that Unc2 < U
c
2 if and only if:
(S(cnc2 )− S(cc2)) ≤ (cc1 − cc2)q(cc1)−
ˆ ∞
cnc1
q(x)dx+
ˆ ∞
cc1
q(x)dx (5.37)
A more general formulation of equation (5.37) for 0 ≤ a2 ≤ 1 is
(S(cnc2 )− S(cc2)) ≤ (cc1 − cc2)q(cc1)− α2
ˆ ∞
cnc1
q(x)dx−+α2
ˆ ∞
cc1
q(x)dx (5.38)
Therefore for ﬁrm 2 cooperation is proﬁtable only if we assume that the beneﬁt from
slack is big enough to oﬀset the ﬁnancial loose and the decrease in consumer surplus
that more altruistic ﬁrms have to bear in cooperation. So U c2 > U
nc
2 , only if equation
(A6.115.37) holds, otherwise U c2 < U
nc
2 .
For the less altruistic ﬁrm, i.e. ﬁrm 1 condition (5.37) is easier to hold since (cc2 −
cc1)q(c
c
2) > 0.
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5.7 B7 Proof of proposition 5 and corollary 3
Let d∗ denote the discount rate above which collusion is sustainable such that:
δi ≥ (U
d
i − U ci )
(Udi − Unci )
δ−i≥
(Ud−i − U c−i)
(Ud−i − Unc−i)
Consider ﬁrm i. In order to understand how the each ﬁrm collusive behaviour varies
with the level of altruism we need to assess the ∆di given ∆ai > 0. Consider the payoﬀ
utilities:
Unci = S(c
nc
i ) + αi
ˆ ∞
cnc−i
q(x)dx (5.39)
U ci = (c
c
−i − cci )q(cc−i) + S(cci ) + αi
ˆ ∞
cc−i
q(x)dx (5.40)
Udi = (c
c
−i − cdi )q(cc−i) + S(cdi ) + αi
ˆ ∞
cc−i
q(x)dx (5.41)
Derivation with respect to ai:
.
∂Unci
∂αi
=
ˆ ∞
cnc−i
q(x)dx (5.42)
∂U ci
∂αi
=
(
∂cc−i
∂αi
− ∂c
c
i
∂αi
)
q(cc−i)+(c
c
−i−cci )q′(cc−i)
∂cc−i
∂αi
+S′(cci )
∂cci
∂αi
+
ˆ ∞
cc−i
q(x)dx−αiq(cc−i)
∂cc−i
∂αi
(5.43)
∂Udi
∂αi
=
(
∂cc−i
∂αi
− ∂c
d
i
∂αi
)
q(cc−i)+(c
c
−i−cdi )q′(cc−i)
∂cc−i
∂αi
+S′(cdi )
∂cdi
∂αi
+
ˆ ∞
cc−i
q(x)dx−αiq(cc−i)
∂cc−i
∂αi
(5.44)
Consider for now the symmetric case ai = a−i = 0. As seen above the payoﬀ utilities
can be ranked as: Unci ≤ U ci ≤ Udi (see Graph 1).
Now consider the case for which ai = a−i = 1, as we have shown before if ai → 1 ⇒
cci → cnci implyingU ci = Unci = Udi .
Therefore (5.42), (5.43) and (5.44) cam be written as:
∂Unci
∂αi
=
ˆ ∞
cnc−i
q(x)dx (5.45)
∂U ci
∂αi
=
(
∂cc−i
∂αi
− αi
∂cc−i
∂αi
)
q(cc−i)+(c
c
−i−cci )q′(cc−i)
∂cc−i
∂αi
+
∂cci
∂αi
(
S′(cci ) + q(c
c
−i)
)
+
ˆ ∞
cc−i
q(x)dx
(5.46)
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∂Udi
∂αi
=
(
∂cc−i
∂αi
− αi
∂cc−i
∂αi
)
q(cc−i)+(c
c
−i−cci )q′(cc−i)
∂cc−i
∂αi
+
∂cdi
∂αi
(
S′(cdi ) + q(c
d
−i)
)
+
ˆ ∞
cc−i
q(x)dx
(5.47)
Consider (5.45) and (5.46). We know that for ai = 0, Unci < U
c
i also that ai → 1 ⇒
U ci → Unci therefore it must hold that ∂Uci/∂ai ≤ ∂Unci /∂ai meaning that Unci grows faster
than U ci . Therefore since for ai → 1 ⇒ cci → cnci it follows that ∂U ci /∂ai → ∂Unci )/∂ai
(see Graph 1). If Unci increases faster than U
c
i the it follows that di increases with ai, i.e.
for ﬁrm i cooperation becomes more diﬃcult for higher altruism levels.
Consider now the impact of ∆ai > 0 on d−i. Consider the payoﬀ utilities for ﬁrm −i
Unc−i = S(c
nc
−i) + α−i
ˆ ∞
cnci
q(x)dx (5.48)
U c−i = (c
c
i − cc−i)q(cci ) + S(cc−i) + α−i
ˆ ∞
cci
q(x)dx (5.49)
Ud−i = (c
c
i − cd−i)q(cci ) + S(cd−i) + α−i
ˆ ∞
cci
q(x)dx (5.50)
Derivation with respect to ai:
∂Unc−i
∂αi
= 0 (5.51)
∂U c−i
∂αi
=
(
∂cci
∂αi
− ∂c
c
−i
∂αi
)
q(cci ) + (c
c
i − cc−i)q′(cci )
∂cci
∂αi
+S′(cc−i)
∂cc−i
∂αi
−αiq(cc−i)
∂cci
∂αi
(5.52)
∂Udi
∂αi
=
(
∂cci
∂αi
− ∂c
d
−i
∂αi
)
q(cci ) + (c
c
i − cd−i)q′(cci )
∂cci
∂αi
+ S′(cd−i)
∂cd−i
∂αi
− αiq(cc−i)
∂cci
∂αi
(5.53)
It is straightforward to see that ∂U c−i/∂ai ≥ ∂Unc−i/∂ai, i.e. when the opponent's
altruism increases the ﬁrm cooperation utility payoﬀ also increases. Since ∂Unc−i/∂αi = 0
it follows that d−i decreases with the opponent's altruism level.
Summarizing, we have shown that ∆ai > 0leads to a decrease in d−i and an increase
in di. Since:
δ∗ = max {δi, δ−i}
We need to assess max {δi, δ−i}. If ai = a−i we know that di = d−i. Departing from
the symmetric case, consider a positive increase in ﬁrm's 2 altruism level, i.e. ∆a2. As
shown above this will increase d2 and decrease d1, implying that d2 ≥ d1.
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Still, departing from the symmetric case, consider a decrease in ﬁrm's 1 altruism level,
i.e. ∆a1 < 0. As shown above this will increase d2 and decrease d1, implying that d2 ≥ d1.
Therefore we conclude that d∗ = d2 implying that d∗|a1=a2 ≤ d∗|a′1<a2 for a1 ≥ a′1 and
d∗|a1=a2 ≤ d∗|a<1 a′2 for a2 ≤ a
′
2.
Note that departing from a symmetric case an increase in a1 and a decrease in a2 are
not feasible since in our model a1 ≤ a2.
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